Abstract

During World War II, guerrillas from across the Philippines opposed Imperial Japan’s occupation of the archipelago. While the guerrillas often fought each other and were never strong enough to overcome the Japanese occupation on their own, they disrupted Japanese operations, kept the spirit of resistance to Japanese occupation alive, provided useful intelligence to the Allies, and assumed frontline duties fighting the Japanese following the Allies’ landing in 1944. By examining the organization, motivations, capabilities, and operations of the guerrillas, this dissertation argues that the guerrillas were effective because Japanese punitive measures pushed the majority of the population to support them, as did a strong sense of obligation and loyalty to the United States. The guerrillas benefitted from the fact that many islands in the Philippines had weak Japanese garrisons, enabling those resisting the Japanese to build safe bases and gain and train recruits. Unlike their counterparts opposing the Americans in 1899, the guerrillas during World War II benefitted from the leadership of American and Filipino military personnel, and also received significant aid and direction from General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters. The guerrillas in the Philippines stand as one of the most effective and sophisticated resistance movements in World War II, comparing favorably to Yugoslavian and Russian partisans in Europe.
Acknowledgments

This project would not have been possible without the guidance, mentorship, and feedback from my dissertation advisor, Prof. Peter Mansoor. His expertise was indispensable as I conducted research and worked on each chapter. My other committee members, Profs. Mark Grimsley and Bruno Cabanes also assisted greatly, and the concepts I learned in their classes have been incredibly helpful as I crafted my arguments. I am also grateful for the assistance offered by the staffs at the National Archives (NARA II) in College Park, MD, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, PA, and Jim Zobel at MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives in Norfolk, VA. Additionally, I am appreciative of the feedback from my colleagues in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, including Professors Clifford Rogers, Sam Watson, Jenny Kiesling, John Stapleton, and Steve Waddell, as well as Colonels Ty Seidule and Bryan Gibby, who allowed time for me to work on my dissertation. The support of my parents, who have always pushed me to work hard, has always been inspiring. Last but not certainly not least, I am greatly indebted to my wife Taryn for her continued support as I worked through this project- I could not have done it without her. Any errors or mistakes in this work are mine alone.
Vita

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Publications


Fields of Study

Major Field: History
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On the morning of February 3, 1945, paratroopers of the U.S. Army’s 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) staged a daring daylight parachute assault along Tagaytay Ridge on the island of Luzon in the Philippines, part of operations to liberate the island from Japanese occupation. The first 345 paratroopers in the eighteen lead transport planes landed near their assigned drop zone, previously scouted and marked the night before by elements of the 511th’s Demolition Platoon assisted by local Filipino guerrillas. However, the succeeding thirty aircraft, inexplicably trailing six miles behind this initial element, were confused when leading aircraft dropped two supply bundles prematurely. Seeing these two bundles ejected, paratroopers began exiting their C-47 transports. Despite pleas by the pilots to cease the drop because they were not yet over the correct drop zone, the jumpmasters of the 511th PIR continued to send paratroopers out of their planes. After all of the parachute drops were complete, the men of the 511th found themselves scattered over an area of six miles, with barely a third landing in the

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planned drop zone.² To add to the confusion, the transport planes had not properly slowed before disgorging their paratroopers, causing many jumpers to experience an especially hard shock when their parachutes opened and resulting in the loss of helmets and other equipment.³ On top of it all, twenty- to thirty-mile-per-hour winds caused many paratroopers to experience hard landings.

Fortunately for the airborne troopers, the Japanese did not oppose their parachute assault, as there were no defending troops on Tagaytay Ridge. As a later letter to the local guerrilla commander acknowledged, the Fil-American Cavite Guerrilla Forces (FACGF), one of many groups operating on Luzon prior to the Allied invasion, had already largely cleared the area of Japanese forces.⁴ This was one of countless actions where the overt and covert actions of Filipinos, and American servicemen and women left behind in the Philippines after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor in 1942, contributed to the Allied war effort and the liberation of the islands in 1944 and 1945.

Three years earlier, on May 8, 1942, General Jonathan Wainwright, commander of American and Filipino forces in the Philippines, surrendered his battered and starving soldiers to units of the Imperial Japanese Army. Resistance to the Japanese did not cease with Wainwright’s surrender, however. Filipino guerrilla forces, often led by Filipino or

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² Of the men in the second lift of transport aircraft, 425 landed on the proper drop zone, with the other 1,345 landing between four and six miles east-northeast of the drop zone. Flanagan, The Angels, 247.
³ Ibid.
American officers, continued to fight and evade Japanese forces for the next two years until Allied forces landed in the Philippines in 1944 and completed the liberation of the islands in 1945. The guerrillas, who numbered in the hundreds of thousands and spanned the breadth of Filipino society, operated on almost every island in the archipelago. Each group had its own motivations and goals—indeed, in some cases the only thing they had in common was the goal of resisting the Japanese. How then did American General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), manage to get the guerrillas to provide needed intelligence, attack key Japanese infrastructure, and conduct other operations in the months preceding the Allied liberation of the Philippines in 1944?

After he found out about these scattered guerrilla units through limited communications and messengers arriving in his headquarters over the course of 1942 and 1943, MacArthur resolved to support and encourage the guerrillas by whatever means he could in preparation for his promised return to the Philippines. Despite some mention in official histories and the papers of MacArthur or his subordinates, the planning of and

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5 The author uses the term “guerrilla” as opposed to other terms such as “insurgent” for a number of reasons, chiefly because this is what the Filipinos and Americans resisting the Japanese occupation called themselves. The use of the term will generally denote an individual (combatant) engaged in irregular combat operations against the Japanese, as opposed to operations by organized U.S. Army or other Allied Army units. This corresponds to the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) definition of a guerrilla as “A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.” (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2) The DOD defines guerrilla warfare as “Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.” (U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02). Records indicate that the U.S. Army had officially recognized 165,000 guerrillas on Luzon and 95,000 in the Visayas and on Mindanao by 1947. Grant S. Wilcox, Office of the Chief of Claims Service, “To: Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool,” dated 16 September 1947, Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II.
support for the guerrilla campaign at MacArthur’s SWPA Headquarters has not been studied in detail using a scholarly methodology. Meanwhile, one searches in vain for an account examining the guerrillas holistically.

Overall, the historiography of the Filipino guerrilla movement is fairly limited, especially when considering the movement’s complexity and numerous actors. Existing sources generally portray the Americans and Filipinos heroically and successfully struggling against the Japanese occupation against overwhelming odds.⁶ Published in 1965, a key work from the Philippines was Teodor A. Agoncillo’s two-volume *The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945*. Although fairly even-handed, this work discusses the guerrillas in just two chapters of the second volume, but only using limited summaries from archival records. Various Filipino veterans’ groups and former guerrillas published other important sources in the 1960s and 1970s. These accounts, which fall into the realm of “regimental histories” described by Allan Millett, include Col. Gamaliel L. Manikan’s *Guerilla Warfare On Panay Island in the Philippines*

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⁶ This portrayal is the theme of Charles Willoughby’s *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945*. Writing in 1972, Willoughby, MacArthur’s Intelligence Chief in the Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters, had a unique perspective on the guerrilla movement, although his book has an unashamedly positive spin on guerrilla operations and vilifies Filipino collaborators as small minority of the Filipino population. Col. Allison Ind’s *Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan*, published in 1958, describes the AIB’s role in the Pacific War, and goes into some depth regarding the guerrilla movement, but it is essentially a memoir of Ind’s time in the AIB and is a proud record of the organization’s efforts. This book was recently republished as *Secret War Against Japan: The Allied Intelligence Bureau in World War II*. Several fictional American films, based in part on existing accounts, portray Americans left in the Philippines after Wainwright’s surrender and their raising of local guerrilla units to fight the Japanese. These include *Surrender- Hell!* (1959), *American Guerilla in the Philippines* (1950), and *Back to Bataan* (1945; starring American film icon John Wayne). All of these works may be thought of as what Michael Howard called “nursery history” in a lecture at RUSI. Michael Howard Esq. M.C., M.A. “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Royal United Services Institution Journal, 107:625 (1962), 5.
(1977), Col. Uldarico S. Baclagon’s *They Chose to Fight: The story of the resistance movement in Negros and Siquijor Islands* (1962), and Proculo L. Mojica’s *Terry’s Hunters (The True Story of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas)* (1965). While generally credible, due to the authors’ personal experiences as guerrillas as well as their close relationships with other participants, these histories largely focus on the struggles on individual islands and do not incorporate many archival records.

American guerrillas also produced their share of memoirs, several of which were written in conjunction with University of Notre Dame History Professor Bernard Norling. These works, all of which focus on individual guerrilla groups under American officers, have a positive portrayal of the guerrillas in a heroic struggle against Japanese oppression. They include *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon, Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945*, and *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines*. Other works in a similar vein, popular histories by non-academic historians, are Scott Mills’ *Stranded in the Philippines: Professor Bell’s Private War Against the Japanese; Mike Guardia’s American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann*; and Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele’s *Lt. Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander*.

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7 Allan R. Millett, “American Military History: Clio and Mars as Pards,” in *Military History and the Military Profession*, David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson, eds. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 4; Millett deems regimental histories a subset of military-utilitarian military histories, in contrast to civilian-utilitarian military histories. The latter, primarily practiced by academic military historians, is used for several purposes, including investigation of a particular historical experience; providing clues to larger society through study of military institutions; exposing the limitations of military-utilitarian military history; and study of war as an intellectual pathway to the establishment of peace.
Coverage of the guerrillas in American scholarship has been limited. In Ronald Spector’s seminal one-volume work about the Pacific War, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan*, he mentions the guerrillas in the Philippines in a short three-page section. Spector describes the guerrilla movement as fairly widespread, and says the Japanese occupiers, despite attempts to build “oriental solidarity,” were never able to connect with a Filipino population that valued its Western and Eastern culture.\(^8\) In contrast to some accounts, H.W. Brands, in his history of Filipino-American relations *Bound to Empire*, discusses the guerrilla movement in his section on World War II, saying it helped preserve Filipino “self-respect” and provide intelligence but did not affect Japanese war plans.\(^9\) Brands portrays collaboration as more widespread than other historians while emphasizing Filipino attempts to survive the Japanese occupation in contrast to “benign” American rule and informal influence. In the official U.S. Army histories about the Pacific War, the guerrillas are mentioned sporadically and only in relation to wider U.S. military operations during the liberation of the archipelago. They are, however, portrayed positively, their knowledge of local terrain and ability to gather intelligence for U.S. forces being particularly valued.

Recent works have given the guerrillas more attention. Richard B. Meixsel’s *Frustrated Ambition: General Vicente Lim and the Philippine Military Experience, 1910-1944*, although a biography of a leader who failed to build a guerrilla movement as he

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intended, discusses the interactions between several of the guerrilla groups and their interactions with MacArthur’s headquarters. *MacArthur’s Spies: The Soldier, the Singer, and the Spymaster Who Defied the Japanese in World War II* (2017), by journalist Peter Eisner, takes a fresh look at a Manila spy ring which gave MacArthur and the guerrillas important intelligence during the Japanese occupation. Dirk Jan Barreveld’s *Cushing’s Coup: The True Story of How Lt. Col. James Cushing and His Filipino Guerrillas Captured Japan’s Plan Z* (2015), examines a crucial intelligence coup which helped the U.S. Navy triumph in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. William B. Breuer’s *MacArthur’s Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions* (2005) portrays the guerrillas and MacArthur’s intelligence apparatus as shadowy but heroic figures struggling against the Japanese occupation and supporting American efforts to retake the islands.\(^\text{10}\) While these recent works have highlighted significant aspects of the guerrillas’ fight against the Japanese, a thorough, scholarly,\(^\text{10}\) American military officers have also prepared some masters’ theses on the guerrillas in recent years, but these have largely relied on memoirs and secondary literature. These include Peter T. Sinclair II’s short monograph entitled *Men of Destiny*, which examines the overall American/Filipino guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. In it, he argues that the Japanese were unable to wage a successful counter-guerrilla campaign because of their small numbers and the widespread nature of the guerrilla movement. This monograph is not based on archival research; rather it is a synthesis of existing secondary sources and interviews with and memoirs of individual American commanders of guerrilla groups. In 2013, Matthew Cenon Andres, an amateur Filipino-American historian, published the short work *Pinoys at War: Relative Deprivation, Motivation, and the Filipino Guerrillas of World War II*, based on interviews with Filipinos who lived through the Japanese occupation. Andres concludes that the majority of Filipino guerrillas were able to continue struggling for upwards of three years because of a faith in the return of their American allies and because they maintained a base of support among the civilian population. The best secondary source dealing with Filipino collaborators is David Steinberg’s *Philippine Collaboration in World War II*. Steinberg, using Filipino records and personal interviews, states that collaborators were a very small minority, due to the Filipinos’ closer cultural and political identification with the Commonwealth government in exile and the United States. He does reveal that certain Filipino elites, hoping to retain their status in Filipino society, were keen on collaborating with the occupiers.
holistic account examining the records of the guerrillas on all of the major islands has yet to be written.

Integrating extant published sources with the extensive, although uneven, guerrilla records in the U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, PA, and the MacArthur Library in Norfolk, VA, this dissertation reveals not only the nature of the guerrilla movement itself, but the interplay of the various groups’ competing goals and the goals of MacArthur’s SWPA Headquarters. In addition, this study further investigates the frictions within MacArthur’s own headquarters and disputes at higher levels of the American command structure regarding support to the guerrillas and demonstrates how such disputes were settled and overcome. Finally, this study provides a fuller picture of the nature of the war in the South and Southwest Pacific, revealing the extent to which the guerrilla movement affected operations throughout the area by providing intelligence and diverting Japanese troops needed elsewhere to counterguerrilla operations.11

From a theoretical standpoint, the experience of the guerrillas in the Philippines during World War II supports widely-held beliefs about the nature of insurgencies and

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11 Due to language barriers as well as a dearth of Japanese records, many of which were destroyed at the end of the war or immediately afterwards, the Japanese perspective is somewhat lacking from this dissertation. Translated documents when available are used to give some perspective on the Japanese occupation and military operations. See Midori Kawashima, “The Records of the Former Japanese Army concerning the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, The Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia (Mar., 1996), pp. 124-131. Additionally, with some 1,300 recognized guerrilla units and many others which went unrecognized by the U.S. and Filipino governments for various reasons, a complete history of all guerrillas would fill many volumes. This dissertation thus examines many of the more prominent groups and makes observations which give a general sense of the guerrilla experience and the groups’ effectiveness at fighting the Japanese and disrupting their operations.
counterinsurgencies. In his classic nineteenth-century treatise *On War*, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz discusses five conditions essential for a “general uprising,” conditions met by the Filipino guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. The five conditions are:

a. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
b. It must not be decided by a single stroke.
c. The theater of operations must be fairly large.
d. The national character must be suited to that type of war.
e. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.12

As far as Clausewitz’s first and fifth points, the guerrillas fighting the Japanese during World War II were largely able to operate in rugged mountainous regions in the interior of their respective islands, establishing bases in remote areas that the Japanese had difficulty accessing away from the coasts.13 To Clausewitz’s second point, after General Wainwright’s surrender, the guerrillas largely avoided combat operations where they were at a disadvantage, preventing the Japanese from destroying guerrilla units in a single stroke. The Philippines, with more than 7,600 islands (of which approximately 2,000 are inhabited) covering some 115,831 square miles, would certainly qualify for Clausewitz’s third point. As for the Philippines’ “national character,” Filipino nationalism, and a belief in the return of Allied forces to liberate their country, proved significant in mobilizing the population to support the guerrillas. Clausewitz’s ideas on a

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13 As will be discussed in following chapters, a notable exception was Robert Lapham’s Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces, which operated in lowland areas that provided more ready access to food stores.
general uprising, despite being largely informed by wars from the early nineteenth century, certainly held true for the Philippines during World War II.

Turning to more modern thinkers, French officer and noted counterinsurgency practitioner and theorist David Galula, a veteran of the Algerian War of Independence, posited that the population must be the objective in a counterinsurgency. More recently, Max Boot has articulated twelve statements on guerrilla warfare based on an examination of several dozen case studies over a five-thousand-year period. The experience of the guerrillas in the Philippines during World War II specifically confirms three of Boot’s statements: “Few counterinsurgents have ever succeeded by inflicting mass terror- at least in foreign lands”; “Establishing legitimacy is vital for any successful insurgency or counterinsurgence- and, in modern times, that is hard to achieve for a foreign group or government”; and “Guerrillas are most effective when able to operate with outside support- especially with conventional army units.” Ultimately, in a case that confirms the theories of both Galula and Boot, the Japanese failed to pacify the Philippines because they did not gain widespread support from the native population and were unable to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Filipino people. Meanwhile, overwhelming Allied superiority in troops and material during the 1944-1945 liberation of the Philippines meant that the guerrillas and regular Allied troops presented the under-

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resourced Japanese with what some scholars would call a complex hybrid threat that virtually ensured Japanese defeat.\textsuperscript{16}

Beyond the confirmation of general theories, it is important to understand how the guerrillas were able to operate. Piecing together evidence from existing sources and archival records, it is clear that, while incapable of completely overthrowing the Japanese occupiers on their own, the guerrillas were able to survive the occupation and conduct effective operations for a number of reasons. First, the number of Japanese occupation forces was too small to effectively control all areas of the Philippines. Concentrated largely on Luzon and in and around population centers on other islands, the Japanese were largely unable to police the countryside and rural areas in which the guerrillas operated. Given Japanese strategic priorities in other areas of the Pacific and China, the lack of troops was not surprising. While Japanese “punitive expeditions” in guerrilla territory were sometimes successful in disrupting or even destroying guerrilla groups, Japanese success was often elusive without adequate intelligence on the guerrillas’ whereabouts, a problem that stemmed from the second factor in the guerrillas’ success—widespread support from the population.\textsuperscript{17}

The Filipino population provided the guerrillas significant financial and material support, including food, medical supplies, and, in rare cases, weapons. Popular support

\textsuperscript{16} See Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., for more on hybrid warfare.

\textsuperscript{17} This matched a pattern of Japanese operations in other theaters, such as China, according to Gene Z. Hanrahan in Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, Armed Services Technical Memorandum OR-T-268 (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1954).
also allowed the guerrillas to obtain intelligence on Japanese forces and movements. Among Filipinos, hope for and belief in the return of the Commonwealth government made it difficult for the Japanese to gain supporters, while many Filipinos in turn saw Japanese as hindering the road to Filipino independence, an eventuality legislated by the U.S. Congress and slated to occur in 1946. A feeling of loyalty and indebtedness to the United States, as well as “the belief in the ideological worth of democracy over totalitarianism” were other factors in resistance to the Japanese. A Japanese reporter who had been in Manila in 1943 would later write, “Despite all that the Japanese could do, they could not combat rising prices and the influences which the Americans had left behind during the 40 years of rule. The American way of life meant smart clothes, beautiful homes and new motorcars to the Filipinos. The Japanese occupation meant only high prices, controls and regimentation.”

Even the granting of nominal “independence” by the Japanese in 1943 under Jose Laurel and the offer of amnesty for guerrillas was seen as an act of weakness by most Filipinos. Meanwhile, guerrilla sympathizers infiltrated government and Philippine Constabulary units, nominally working in support of the Japanese forces and puppet government but in fact supporting the guerrillas. These sympathizers passed significant

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19 This quote comes from an unpublished memoir by Tatsuki John Fujii, reporting from occupied Manila in 1943. Grant Goodman acquired a copy of the memoir and an excerpt from the memoir forms the basis for his journal article “Manila in June 1943,” available in *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Third Quarter 2000), pp. 415-419. The quote comes from page 417.
amounts of intelligence to the guerrillas and even gave the guerrillas weapons. Groups of pro-Japanese militants, such as the *Makabayan ng mga Pilipino* (Patriotic Association of Filipinos, or Makapili), engaged the guerrillas at points, but were relatively weak.20

Third, the Japanese did themselves no favors through the brutal treatment of Filipino prisoners of war (POWs) and the local population. Many escaped or released POWs went on to become guerrilla leaders, putting their military experience to good use. The brutality of the Japanese in China also inspired Chinese immigrants in the Philippines to resist the Japanese occupation. While the Japanese certainly offered “carrots” to the Filipino population in addition to “sticks,” Filipinos largely viewed the Japanese as occupiers, often through a racist lens. This view was exacerbated by food shortages during the occupation, with the Japanese often exporting food out of the Philippines to the Home Islands, while the sinking of Japanese merchant ships by the Allies prevented food importation.21

Fourth, the guerrillas benefitted from a cadre of competent officers and enlisted soldiers, both American and Filipino, who were able to form and lead many of the

20 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45, Volume Two* (1965; repr. Diliman, Quezon City, P.I.: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 786-788. Because several Makapili members were reputed to have participated in Japanese atrocities, some were put on trial for treason after the war. See a transcript of the 1947 Philippine Supreme Court case *The People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Capacete* for an example, available at <https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1947/nov1947/gr_1-943_1947.html>.

groups. Although the Japanese were able to ruthlessly hunt down and kill many guerrilla leaders, especially on Luzon, there were sufficient numbers of other talented personnel who could take their place. As historians such as Ricardo Trota Jose have pointed out, the Philippine Army was largely untrained and unskilled at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1942. However, those who were competent, including Macario Peralta on Panay and Salvador Abcede on Negros, were able to command, build, and train their units to a sufficient level to harass the Japanese and survive punitive attacks, even assuming positions on the frontlines alongside liberating Allied troops when they returned in 1944 and 1945. These commanders often created sophisticated intelligence networks and administered their units using extensive staff systems, with correspondingly large amounts of paperwork, largely based on American models. Civilians tended to respect the military competence of either American or Filipino military personnel, giving the latter credibility and drawing people to their groups. Unlike the guerrillas fighting against the Americans from 1899-1902, who were largely led by rural elites, the guerrillas in the Philippines during World War II benefitted from the leadership of militarily competent soldiers.

Despite these factors in the guerrillas’ success, they were far from perfect. Significant infighting took place between many of the commanders and their groups and will be further examined in Chapter 3. It was common for the guerrillas to torture and/or

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summarily execute individuals suspected of collaborating with the Japanese.\textsuperscript{23}

Additionally, although commanders tried to minimize abuses, the guerrillas did intimidate and take advantage of civilians. On Panay, alleged abuse of civilians was a point of contention between Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, the guerrilla commander on the island, and the civilian shadow governor, Tomas Confesor.\textsuperscript{24} On Negros, commanders had to be ordered to “refrain from using hard or threatening words” with civilians.\textsuperscript{25} Meanwhile, there were many bands which took advantage of the absence of rule of law and were little more than brigands. Many guerrilla groups fighting the Japanese found themselves administering rough justice to these opportunists. Beyond negative interactions with local civilians, the guerrillas sometimes lacked basic military discipline as well. For example, accidental discharges of firearms on Negros became such a problem that it prompted a memorandum from one of the division commanders.\textsuperscript{26}

However, guerrilla missteps were largely inconsequential to the fight against the Japanese.

Nevertheless, for all their ability to survive the Japanese occupation, conduct harassing operations, and gather intelligence on their own, support from MacArthur’s General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA-GHQ) was also important for the

\textsuperscript{23} A discussion of guerrilla justice “systems” will form a portion of Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{24} Their feud will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{25} Captain Felipe C. Lubaton, “Memorandum: To: All Battery Commanders, Sub-sector ‘B’,,” dated 13 December ‘43, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{26} 1st Lieut. Emilio Borromeo, “Memorandum to- All Unit Comdtrs, 72D,” dated 29 August ‘44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II. According to the memo, “There has [sic] been too many cases of accidental firing happening lately due to carelessness of the part of the men in handling of firearms. This must be stopped at once.”
guerrillas. When MacArthur and President Manuel Quezon gave their approval for a
given guerrilla commander to head a certain district, that commander gained significant
prestige and legitimacy, increasing his support from the population and strengthening
efforts at recruitment. SWPA-GHQ, through the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) and
Philippine Regional Section (PRS), also provided material and training support to the
guerrillas via submarine. Key material items provided to the guerrillas included arms,
ammunition, and radios. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, AIB/PRS sent agents
into the Philippines to both ascertain information on the guerrillas and provide training
and support in setting up intelligence networks. Notably, these agents, especially Filipino
pilot Jesus Villamor and U.S. Army officer Charles M. Smith, helped consolidate the
guerrilla groups on several of the islands, with the effect of reducing or eliminating
infighting and increasing their effectiveness. Although, contrary to the hopes of Col.
Courtney Whitney, head of the PRS, AIB/PRS never had full control of the guerrillas due
to issues of time, distance, and communications, as well as guerrilla unwillingness to
have their operations micromanaged from Australia, the relationship between AIB/PRS
and the guerrillas was generally fruitful for both sides.

The following chapters proceed in both a narrative and thematic fashion to
examine various aspects of the guerrillas’ experience against the Japanese, drawing
general conclusions about the character of the campaign while pointing out specific
differences between time periods and geographic areas. Chapter 1 discusses the
aftermath of the surrender of USAFFE forces and the initial establishment of the various
guerrilla groups, mostly around Filipino or American military leaders, and notes the ways in which groups formed, which was hardly uniform across the archipelago. Chapter 2 examines the actions of the Allied Intelligence Bureau and the Philippine Regional Section, organizations which contributed greatly to the survival and success of the guerrillas but had their own share of difficulties navigating how best to do so. The third chapter goes over the conflicts between guerrilla groups, and how those conflicts were resolved, ultimately determining that the approval (or lack thereof) of MacArthur, as well as the raw strength of a group, helped determine whether a given guerrilla unit would survive such conflicts. This reveals the fact that discussing the guerrillas as a unified “movement” is perhaps a misnomer— the guerrillas were more a loose collection of groups with largely similar goals of resisting the Japanese. Chapter 4 examines the crucial period between 1943 and 1944, during which the guerrillas took severe losses at the hands of the Japanese but were typically able to replace lost leaders and gain strength. Another thematic chapter, Chapter 5 discusses guerrilla logistics and administration, making note of the sophisticated staff systems which allowed the guerrillas to gain supplies, support, and organize for effective resistance against the Japanese. The sheer volume of guerrilla records and correspondence make it clear that many groups were well-organized and operated relatively free from Japanese interference. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the guerrillas during the liberation of the Philippines, arguing that the guerrillas were able to field large units and contribute in a significant way to the liberation because of their previous efforts during the occupation.
In the end, the guerrillas made life difficult for the Japanese occupiers, kept the spirit of resistance to Japanese occupation alive, provided useful intelligence to the Allies, and managed to assume important frontline duties in fighting the Japanese after the Allies landed in the Philippines in 1944. Though their contribution is hard to quantify, the guerrillas made the Allied liberation of the islands easier, taking the place of several divisions of American troops and providing intelligence on Japanese forces which made Allied efforts more efficient and effective. Alongside Yugoslavian forces under Tito and Russian partisans on the Eastern Front, the guerrillas in the Philippines stand as one of the most effective and sophisticated guerrilla movements in World War II.
Chapter 1, The Beginnings of Resistance: Blackout and Establishment of Guerrilla Groups in the Philippines

In October 1942 two American army officers arrived in Australia, having undertaken an extremely risky voyage by boat to escape the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Leaving from Luzon, northernmost of the main Philippine islands, Captain William L. Osborne and Captain Damon J. Gause moved south to Palawan Island, Northern Borneo, Tawi Tawi, and the Macassar Strait before arriving in Australia. Osborne and Gause brought Allied forces news of guerrillas resisting the Japanese on a number of islands in the Philippines, including Luzon, Palawan, and Tawi Tawi. The first direct personal information, as opposed to radio communications, received from the Philippines since the Japanese occupation, the stories provided by Osborne and Gause were among indications that strong resistance was building against the Japanese in the Philippine archipelago.

Prior to the arrival of Osborne and Gause in Australia, on April 10, 1942, after suffering from a chronic lack of supplies after months of fighting, American and Filipino
forces on the Bataan Peninsula in Luzon surrendered to advancing Japanese ground forces.\textsuperscript{27} Allied forces on Corregidor held out for almost a month longer, but given the poor physical condition of these troops and no prospect for retreat or reinforcement, General Jonathan Wainwright, who had succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as commander of all American and Filipino forces in the Philippines, surrendered all of these forces to the Japanese on May 8, 1942.\textsuperscript{28} The surrender severed all radio communications between the Philippines and MacArthur’s new General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), with the exception of a single radio station manned by Filipinos and Americans under Filipino army officer Lt. Col. Guillermo Nakar. Operating out of Nueva Ecija Province on Luzon just southeast of Lingayen Gulf, Nakar’s unit continued to transmit messages on Japanese activities until SWPA received a final message on August 22, 1942. The Japanese captured Nakar in early September and promptly executed him at Fort Santiago in Manila.\textsuperscript{29}

Despite the execution of Nakar, U.S. Army Captain Ralph Praeger had formed a guerrilla unit in northern Luzon and had begun transmitting radio messages to SWPA by the fall of 1942, sending twenty-two messages in December.\textsuperscript{30} Disregarding Wainwright’s order to surrender, guerrilla units continued to form and grow throughout

\textsuperscript{27} Louis Morton, \textit{United States Army in World War II: The War in The Pacific- The Fall of the Philippines} (1989; repr., Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1995), 463-467. Although he intended to remain with his troops until the end of the increasingly desperate campaign, MacArthur left the islands in March 1942 under orders from American President Franklin Roosevelt. Ibid., 359-365.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 564.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
the Philippines during the spring, summer, and fall of 1942. The formation of these groups was a haphazard affair, with some organizing soon after the American-Filipino official surrender and others forming over the coming months. The disorganized nature of the guerrilla groups and lack of a single unified command structure would make it difficult for SWPA to coordinate with them from its base in Australia and necessitated the infiltration of agents back into the Philippines to work with the guerrillas.

Guerrillas came from all walks of life and elements of society. Many of the groups on Luzon and other islands were led by American or Filipino military officers who had refused to surrender, or Filipino soldiers who had been in Japanese captivity before their release from Camp O’Donnell on Luzon in July 1942. However, there were plenty of cases of grassroots civilian or paramilitary organizations taking up arms against the Japanese. On Luzon, peasant and tailor Luis Taruc formed the *Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (People’s Anti-Japanese Army), or *Hukbalahap*, commonly called the Huks, an organization dedicated to fighting the Japanese and forming a Communist-Socialist government in the Philippines. Marcos V. Augustin, a former Manila cab driver and boxer, formed a group along with his mistress and confidant, Yay

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Panlilio, who was a former newspaper reporter. Elsewhere on Luzon, Vincente Umali, the former mayor of Tiaong in Tayabas, formed a group called President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG) in mid-1942. On Cebu in 1942, radio announcer Harry Fenton, a discharged U.S. Army soldier, led guerrillas in the southern part of the island.

Cadets and university faculty also commonly formed guerrilla groups. On Luzon, the Hunters ROTC group formed after disgruntled cadets, mobilized to fight the Japanese and then quickly demobilized before the American surrender, decided to gather weapons and take up opposition to the occupiers. Another group on Luzon, the “Red Lions,” was formed by ROTC cadets from the College of Agriculture in Los Banos, Laguna, and was eventually absorbed into the self-titled President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG). ROTC cadets also comprised some of the troops of a Philippine Army battalion and later guerrilla group on Negros. Academics were also guerrilla leaders. On Negros, Silliman University Professor and Presbyterian missionary Roy Bell, after initially offering material support to the guerrillas, became a full-fledged guerrilla himself in August of 1942.

36 Phil C. Avancena, “Affidavit,” dated May 1948, RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
38 Scott A. Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines: Professor Bell’s Private War Against the Japanese* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 51-52.
Interestingly, miners in the Philippines often became guerrilla leaders. Due to the Great Depression in 1929 and the removal of the United States from the gold standard in 1933, mineral prospecting in the Philippines became common in the prewar period, and by 1939 the Philippines was a world leader in gold and mineral production.\textsuperscript{39} A number of these miners were Americans, especially the managers of the many mining companies which sprang up before World War II. Enterprising Americans opposed to the Japanese occupation quickly turned the companies, ready-made hierarchical organizations, into guerrilla groups. John Horan on Luzon, the Cushing brothers James (Cebu) and Walter (Luzon), and Wendell Fertig (Mindanao) were all American miners who played prominent roles as guerrilla leaders. Courtney Whitney, later a U.S. Army Col. and head of the Philippine Regional Section (PRS) in MacArthur’s headquarters overseeing support to the guerrillas, was also associated with mining in the Philippines in before the Japanese invasion.

Not all guerrillas were Americans or Filipinos. There were approximately 120,000 ethnic Chinese in the Philippines on the eve of war.\textsuperscript{40} Motivated by Chinese nationalist sentiments and antipathy towards the Japanese due to Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China in the 1930s, the number of Chinese guerrillas who fought the Japanese has been estimated at several thousand, divided between communist and

\textsuperscript{40} Y.Y. Li, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors: Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 1942-1945} (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), 4.
nationalist groups. In addition to the Chinese, and initially operating on the islands between Borneo and the Philippines, Australians under Major Rex Blow who had escaped the Japanese on Borneo formed a small guerrilla group that eventually supported the Philippine guerrilla 108th Division on Mindanao.

Despite the wide variety of people who fought or supported the guerrillas, their motivation was fairly similar. For Americans, as one might expect, hostility to the Japanese stemmed from anger at the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and racist views of the Japanese as aggressive imperialists. Most normal Filipinos, despite wide racial, religious, and linguistic differences, generally supported the guerrillas, stemming from a long-standing nationalist identity. While many Filipinos viewed the Japanese as industrious, due to American influence Filipinos also saw the Japanese as a threat to Filipino freedom. This idea was reinforced among the majority of the Filipino population by reports of Japanese abuse of civilians from the earliest days of the invasion. Gen. MacArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines also strengthened the resolve of many Filipinos to resist the Japanese.

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41 Ibid., 22, 31, 89, 124. Li also asserts that Japanese mistreatment of the Philippine Chinese contributed to motivations for resisting Japanese occupation.
44 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45, Volume Two (1965; repr. Diliman, Quezon City, P.I.: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 607-609.
In contrast to the Filipino masses, most ruling-class Filipinos, anxious to maintain their legitimacy and power, collaborated fairly readily with the Japanese occupiers.  

However, the choice to surrender and work with the occupiers or fight on was difficult for many American and Filipino troops, who were torn between obeying Wainwright’s order to surrender or continuing resistance to an enemy who was increasingly brutal and oppressive.  

While the Japanese initially used the Philippine Constabulary (PC) to monitor or even recruit former Filipino soldiers, many former members of the Constabulary joined the guerrillas and from the beginning of the occupation the Japanese were legitimately hesitant to arm the PC for fear the weapons would fall into guerrilla hands.  

Ultimately, Japanese troops would bear the brunt of the fighting against the guerrillas.

In many ways, the geography of the Philippines favored the guerrillas.  

Oftentimes U.S. or Filipino troops who did not surrender were able to flee to mountainous areas and create bases that were relatively secure from Japanese attacks.  

When USAFFE forces surrendered, the Japanese would typically occupy the major cities on an island’s coasts but leave the interior unsecured.  

While ways in which guerrilla groups formed and sustained themselves were hardly uniform across the archipelago, most groups needed areas generally free from Japanese control to survive.  

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46 Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II*, 13.  Steinberg argues that this was consistent with the behavior of past Filipino oligarchs from the late Spanish era and the period of American rule.  


more remote an area was, the more difficult it was to sustain a guerrilla force, especially as food became increasingly short during the Japanese occupation. The most successful guerrilla groups in the period from the surrender of USAFFE to the beginning of 1943 were thus those that secured at least tacit public support, had secure base areas, and were in areas with sufficient food and resources to sustain themselves. With some exceptions, most groups did their best to avoid contact with the Japanese, instead conducting reconnaissance and surveillance and organizing and training for future direct action against the occupying forces.

Figure 1. The Japanese Invasion of the Philippines and the Forces Employed

Northern Luzon

The first significant action against the Japanese by guerrillas during World War II occurred in Candon on Luzon in January of 1942.\textsuperscript{50} There, guerrillas under the headstrong American miner Walter Cushing ambushed two separate Japanese truck columns, killing sixteen Japanese and capturing or destroying fourteen trucks for the loss of only one guerrilla wounded.\textsuperscript{51} Cushing had previously raised a private 200-man guerrilla army on December 8, 1941, after hearing of Japanese attacks on American military installations on Luzon, giving the guerrillas basic military training under the tutelage of an American officer. While the action at Candon was certainly effective from the standpoint of the guerrillas, it also brought significant Japanese attention, a pattern that would be repeated over the course of the Japanese occupation of Luzon. Of all the islands on which guerrillas operated, Luzon would prove the most difficult place to sustain operations, both because of the island’s geography and strong presence of Japanese security forces.

Luzon, northernmost of the major Philippine islands, is the largest island in the Philippines and home to the national capital, Manila. While the northern part of the island is fairly rugged and mountainous, the central part of the island contains a broad central plain running from Lingayen Gulf in the northwest leading to Manila to the south.

\textsuperscript{50} Donald Chaput, “Philippine Resistance in Candon, 1942,” \textit{Philippine Studies}, Vol. 47, No. 1 (First Quarter 1999), 100.
\textsuperscript{51} Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon}, 2.
Although crisscrossed with a number of rivers, the central plain was relatively easy for Japanese forces to access and control, making it difficult for guerrillas to operate there, and only one notable group, that of U.S. Army officer Robert Lapham, did so. Further south, Manila sits on Manila Bay, and at the beginning of World War II possessed a population of 684,000 and good port facilities. A fairly extensive road network on much of central and southern Luzon facilitated the movements of the soldiers of both sides during the war, and during the occupation made it fairly easy for the Japanese to shift troops in reaction to guerrilla activity. Northern Luzon was more mountainous and remote, which impacted the development of the guerrilla movement there.

Besides the resistance under Walter Cushing in northern Luzon, other Filipinos organized around Roque B. Ablan, governor of Ilocos Norte, aided by Philippine Army Lt. Feliciano Madamba. Possessing over three hundred rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns, these guerrillas ambushed a Japanese column on January 28, 1942 and killed some fifty Japanese troops. Ablan and Madamba were subsequently able to impose discipline on a number of smaller guerrilla groups in northern Luzon, some of which had been acting as bandits. They also divided their province into sectors, each headed by a guerrilla leader, and set up a system of runners to distribute news and orders. Despite some other successful minor actions against the Japanese, widespread civilian support, and encouragement from President Quezon, then in Manila, Ablan’s group drew the ire of the Japanese, who, aided by collaborators and captured American soldiers,

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53 Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years*, 611.
initiated a series of raids to liquidate Ablan’s group following the fall of Corregidor.\textsuperscript{54}

This pressure resulted in the destruction of the nascent guerrilla group by January 1943, while the fate of Ablan, a fugitive after the Japanese raids, remained unknown.\textsuperscript{55}

The Japanese invasion cut off several American and Filipino units on northern Luzon from the main fighting near Bataan. After Wainwright’s surrender on Corregidor, only the senior members of the units in northern Luzon surrendered to the Japanese— the vast majority of other ranks viewed the surrender as illegal.\textsuperscript{56} Under the command of U.S. Army Captain Ralph B. Praeger, Troop C of the 26\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry Regiment (Philippine Scouts) was patrolling the Cagayan Valley in northern Luzon to delay Japanese forces moving southward from a landing in Aparri (see Figure 1) when other Japanese troops landed at Lingayen Gulf and cut off Praeger’s unit from the rest of the USAFFE forces.\textsuperscript{57} Praeger’s company continued to harass Japanese units after the surrender of USAFFE forces in May 1942, trying to balance intelligence-gathering on the Japanese, a priority for MacArthur’s headquarters once contact was made, with direct action against the occupiers desired by the local population.\textsuperscript{58} Over the summer, the Apayao Company of the Philippine Constabulary and Company B of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment (Philippine Army) augmented Praeger’s force, and he renamed it the Cagayan Apayao Force

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 612.
\textsuperscript{55} Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon}, 17-18.
\textsuperscript{56} Headquarters, USAFIP North Luzon, “Amendment of Date of Recognition of ‘United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon,’” dated 26 November 1945, RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258 “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
\textsuperscript{57} Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon}, 42; Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 479.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 181-183.
As 1942 ended, however, the CAF was in a dire position as the Japanese flooded northern Luzon with troops to destroy the emerging guerrilla movement.

Elsewhere on northern Luzon, Companies A and B of the 43rd Infantry Regiment (Philippine Scouts) were garrisoning the town of Baguio under U.S. Army Lt. Col. John P. Horan. After the Japanese entered Baguio, these companies moved north, with Horan eventually organizing them and other guerrillas into the 43rd Infantry, Philippine Scouts, with the sanction of USAFFE Headquarters. Wainwright promoted Horan to full Col. two days before the fall of Bataan and authorized him to organize the 121st Infantry Regiment and continue fighting in northern Luzon. Horan’s force succeeded in harassing Japanese forces and eventually incorporated Walter Cushing’s guerrillas. However, following Wainwright’s order to USAFFE forces to surrender to the Japanese after the fall of Corregidor, Horan, despite some misgivings, surrendered to the Japanese and became a POW for the remainder of the war. Walter Cushing and his bodyguards were attacked on their way to meet another guerrilla commander on September 19, 1942, with Cushing killing six Japanese with his .45-caliber pistol before committing suicide with his last round. Although several Filipino officers subsequently took charge of the 121st

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59 Ibid., 120.
60 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 617.
61 Horan had received an order from USAFFE on December 24, 1941 to save his command by retreating on mountain trails. “Diary of COL Horan,” RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II.
62 Norling, The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon, 89-90.
Infantry, they were each in turn captured by the Japanese and the group could only conduct very limited operations by the end of 1942.\textsuperscript{64}

Despite the fate of the 121\textsuperscript{st} Infantry, members of the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry, along with a number of USAFFE stragglers, determined to fight on. American army Captain, later Major, Parker Calvert eventually commanded the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry after the fall of Corregidor, organizing it into a guerrilla group in the vicinity of Benguet.\textsuperscript{65} By the autumn of 1942, Calvert decided to place his unit under the command of U.S. Army Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble, escapees from Bataan and formerly of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Division, Philippine Army, and the highest ranking USAFFE officers in northern Luzon who had not surrendered.

Moses, as the senior officer, decided to take command of all of the guerrillas in northern Luzon, dubbing this unified command United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL).\textsuperscript{66} The command included what remained of the 14\textsuperscript{th}, 43\textsuperscript{rd}, and 121\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Regiments, as well as the signal officers from the 11\textsuperscript{th} Division, Captain Russell Volckmann and Lt. Donald Blackburn.\textsuperscript{67} However, coordination and communications were poor between the groups, resulting in ineffective actions against the Japanese and poor command and control. Robert Lapham, an American officer and guerrilla leader who will be discussed in the next section, refused to

\textsuperscript{64} Agoncillo, \textit{The Fateful Years}, 618.  
\textsuperscript{65} Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon}, 106.  
\textsuperscript{66} Agoncillo, \textit{The Fateful Years}, 619.  
\textsuperscript{67} Norling, \textit{The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon}, 176.
submit to Noble and Moses, and there was little the two colonels could do to change his mind. 68  After launching an uncoordinated, though effective, attack into the Itogon mining district on October 15, 1942, the guerrillas drew significant Japanese attention, with the latter flooding northern Luzon with thousands of troops. 69  As 1942 came to a close, the guerrillas in northern Luzon would find themselves in a difficult situation, with many of their civilian supporters gone, supportive towns razed, and civilians cowed into at least tacit support for the Japanese.

Central and Southern Luzon

In contrast to the guerrillas in northern Luzon, who largely had U.S. Army officers as their leaders, those in the southern and central parts of the island often coalesced around Filipino troops or even charismatic civilians. Yay Panlilio, a Filipina-Irish woman who was born in the United States, was working as a reporter for the Philippine Herald in Manila when the assistant chief of intelligence at Fort Santiago, Captain Ralph Keeler, swore her in as an intelligence agent for the United States. 70  During the Japanese invasion, she continued in this role, broadcasting coded messages to USAFFE forces via radio station KZRH. Eventually, the Japanese ordered her arrest in

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68 As noted in his memoir Lapham’s Raiders, Lapham would remain opposed to centralization and consolidation of guerrilla forces on Luzon for the entirety of the war. He would succeed in foiling the efforts of Russell Volckmann in northern Luzon and Bernard Anderson nearby to control his group.  
70 Panlilio, The Crucible, 7.
March 1942, and she promptly fled the city. She became involved with the guerrillas when a small group of fighters from Marcos Augustin’s group sought shelter in a house in which she was staying, and eventually became Augustin’s lover and second-in-command.71

Marcos Augustin, a shadowy former boxer and taxi driver, had been serving USAFFE as a driver before he was cut off from Bataan and captured by the Japanese in 1942. After suffering beatings from the Japanese, he made a dramatic escape from a Japanese truck by hitting the Japanese guard in the gut and then jumping off the Kalumpit Bridge into the Rio de Grande de Pampanga.72 He eventually made his way to Antipolo and formed a guerrilla group to fight the Japanese, using his organizational skills and charisma to attract followers.73 By the end of 1942, Marking’s guerrillas would affiliate with the Fil-American Irregular Troops (FAIT) under U.S. Army Col. Hugh Straughn.74 Although the affiliation would not last, Marking’s group had enough strength and influence as 1943 began to put them in conflict with the Hunters ROTC group, which operated in the same geographic area.

Initially, the U.S. Army activated cadets from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) and Filipino Reserve Officers Training Corps for military service, but MacArthur disbanded them on December 23, 1941, in order to preserve the younger generation of

71 Ibid., 15-16. The relationship between Yay and Marcos was far from perfect, as he would beat her periodically.
72 Ibid., 102-104.
73 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 651.
74 “A Brief Historical Sketch of the [sic] Marking’s Fil-American Troops,” RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258 “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
Filipinos from the “ravages of war.”\textsuperscript{75} Disappointed by this order and in the fact that their studies were being cut short due to the Japanese invasion, several PMA cadets sought to help relieve pressure on the Filipino and American forces fighting on Bataan, and conducted a number of informal planning meetings in February and March 1942. Under cadets Miguel “Mike” Zabala Ver and Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso, the group gradually began collecting weapons (mostly by ambushing Japanese bicycle couriers), conducting clandestine training, sabotaging Japanese communication lines, and conducting reconnaissance missions in preparation for moving their base of operations from the urban San Juan area to the mountains of Rizal Province.

On April 5, 1942, Adevoso led thirteen cadets to the mountains of Antipolo and Teresa to establish the group’s first field headquarters, followed by Mike Ver and sixty more cadets the following day.\textsuperscript{76} Upon discovering that their initial basecamp was barely one hundred yards from a national road with frequent truck traffic, the men moved to a more remote location at Banaba. Meanwhile, deeming it unpatriotic to exclude those who were not PMA or ROTC cadets, the group opened membership to all like-minded Filipinos who wanted to oppose the Japanese.\textsuperscript{77} The Hunters continued their recruitment into 1943, building a robust organization that would end up fighting other guerrillas as


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 39.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 40.
well as the Japanese for territory, food, and women, a pattern common during the occupation.

Separate from the raising of the Hunters ROTC, another grassroots organization mentioned earlier, the Hukbalahap (Huk) under Luis Taruc and other Communist leaders, gathered groups of peasant tenants into armed units over the course of 1942, using weapons discarded by the retreating Philippine Army. Previously agitators between rural landowners and their tenants, the Huk leadership, “[b]y appealing to [these people’s] patriotism and loyalty to the Americans,” were able to gain support and convince many of their followers that they were sanctioned by MacArthur and the United States.78 The Huks had also gained some recognition from U.S. Army officer and guerrilla leader Claude Thorp, although this relationship broke down after Thorp’s capture.79 Although they would be competing with the other guerrilla groups in central Luzon, the Huks were well-positioned to carry on resistance to the Japanese going into 1943.

Filipino officers also organized guerrilla groups on Luzon. In the case of the Fil-American Cavite Guerrilla Forces (FACGF), Col. Mariano N. Castaneda decided to create a guerrilla group in Cavite, south of Manila, after his release from a Japanese concentration camp in Tarlac. Although suffering from the effects of malnutrition and bouts of malaria from his time in captivity, Castaneda recovered and was able to enlist some of the officers formerly under his command to organize a guerrilla group, which

78 “Hubalahaps-Hux-Hukbos,” Record Group 407, Entry PAC, Box 257, “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
first met on October 15, 1942. While pledging to accept no positions in the government, the group agreed to recruit former members of the USAFFE, both officers and enlisted men, into their unit, even conducting covert recruitment meetings in Manila while avoiding the Japanese Kempeitai. Early on, FACGF also had some civilian members from Imus, where the group established its headquarters. For the most part, the group decided to remain passive due to a lack of arms, instead covertly gathering followers and soliciting only voluntary logistical support from locals.

More prominent Filipino officers also sought to continue fighting the Japanese. Following the surrender of USAFFE units, Philippine Army Brigadier General Vicente Lim, commander of the 41st Infantry Division and the first Filipino graduate of West Point, endured the infamous “Bataan Death March,” but was subsequently released from Camp O’Donnell. Despite suffering from ill health, Lim sought to lead a united guerrilla resistance on Luzon, and worked to create an intelligence network based in Manila.

While Filipinos led many of the guerrilla groups that formed in central and southern Luzon, there were still a number of prominent groups led by Americans. As early as January 1942, U.S. Army Major, later Col., Claude Thorp, the provost-marshal

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80 “Narrative History of the Fil-American Cavite Guerrilla Forces,” RG 496, Entry 112, Box 600, “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II, 1. Despite agreement that the group would not accept government positions, Castaneda eventually accepted a position as provincial governor in May 1944 with the support of many locals.
81 Ibid., 2.
83 Lim’s efforts were routinely frustrated for a variety of reasons which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
of Fort Stotsenberg, desired to create a unit to infiltrate Japanese lines north of Bataan and conduct sabotage operations, an idea rejected by Wainwright but enthusiastically supported by MacArthur, who authorized Thorp to carry out his plans. Until the guerrillas reestablished contact with SWPA, Thorp could claim that he and his subordinates were the only authorized guerrillas in the Philippines, giving him great prestige and influence among those resisting the Japanese. Eventually, after the fall of Bataan, Thorp and several other USAFFE officers set up a guerrilla headquarters in the vicinity of Mount Pinatubo in the Zambales Mountains. However, despite Thorp’s best efforts to create a united guerrilla force, the Japanese were able to capture him in October of 1942, and his command split under a number of other American officers.

One of those officers was West Point graduate and cavalry officer Captain Joseph Barker, who had been caught behind Japanese lines and escaped from Bataan along with Lt. Edwin Ramsey of the 26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts. As a platoon leader with the 26th Cavalry’s E Troop, Ramsey had participated in the last cavalry charge in U.S. Army history at the village of Morong on January 16, 1942. Thorp gave Barker command of the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA), with Ramsey as his adjutant and U.S. Army Air Corps officer Bernard Anderson as his chief of staff.

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85 Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years*, 632.
88 Ibid., 63-68.
Ramsey and his guerrillas had developed an extensive intelligence network within Manila by the end of 1942.\textsuperscript{90}

Another of Thorp’s officers was U.S. Army officer Lt. Robert Lapham, who had been part of the 26\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry Regiment and was serving as a military police officer under Thorp at Fort Stotsenberg.\textsuperscript{91} Lapham left Bataan with Thorp and became his “inspector general,” but also built his own guerrilla organization which became the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF).\textsuperscript{92} Following Thorp’s capture and execution, Barker assumed nominal command of the remnants of Thorp’s organization, placing Ramsey in charge of the ECLGA, while Lapham’s LGAF became more independent.\textsuperscript{93} Anderson, ever quarrelsome with Ramsey, was left to lead guerrillas in the Bulacan area, a task he had been given by Barker in July of 1942.\textsuperscript{94}

Having helped Thorp organize guerrilla resistance early in 1942, U.S. Army Corporal John Boone, formerly of the 31\textsuperscript{st} Infantry, eventually organized a guerrilla force in the Bataan area, and remained in contact with Ramsey’s force throughout the war.\textsuperscript{95} Boone’s guerrillas did not operate out of a base per se due to intense Japanese police patrolling in their area, but instead mostly stayed in their homes until massing for anti-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{90}{Ramsey and Rivele, \textit{Lt. Ramsey’s War}, 116.}
\footnote{91}{Lapham and Norling, \textit{Lapham’s Raiders}, 13.}
\footnote{92}{Ibid., 36.}
\footnote{94}{1st Lt. J.H. Manzano, “Brief History of the Bulacan Military Area,” dated September 9, 1948, Record Group 407, Box 259, NARA II. Ramsey doesn’t even mention Anderson in his memoir.}
\footnote{95}{Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 452; Ramsey and Rivele, \textit{Lt. Ramsey’s War}, 94.}
\end{footnotes}
Japanese activity. This generally involved intelligence and sabotage operations.

Reflecting the convoluted and confusing guerrilla structure in 1942, Boone on occasion also reported to U.S. Army Lt. Col. Gyles Merrill, who established a guerrilla unit in the Zambales Mountains that Col. Thorp had recognized after some initial friction. Merrill’s unit was the only one remaining in the Zambales area after Thorp’s capture, but its activities were generally limited to passive intelligence gathering.\(^96\) A final associate of Thorp’s was Cpt. Charles Cushing, brother of Walter Cushing in northern Luzon and also a miner. Barker had appointed Cushing district commander of Pangasinan Province by May of 1942, and Cushing would ultimately organize ten guerrilla squadrons, although he did not particularly like life as a guerrilla.\(^97\)

Elsewhere, artilleryman Private Doyle Decker and several other U.S. Army enlisted men eventually escaped from Bataan after the surrender of USAFFE forces, and, aided by friendly Filipinos, linked up with Lt. Clay Conner’s 155\(^{th}\) Provisional Guerrilla Battalion in a Negrito-dominated area of central Luzon.\(^98\) Although this section is by no means an exhausted list of the guerrilla groups in central and southern Luzon, it covers most of the major groups and gives the reader a sense of the complexity of the guerrilla situation at the end of 1942. While sharply divided under a variety of leaders, and under

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\(^{97}\) Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 38, 87.

\(^{98}\) Decker had been in the 200\(^{th}\) Coast Artillery, a federalized New Mexico National Guard unit, before the surrender of Allied forces on Bataan. Malcolm Decker, *On a Mountainside: The 155\(^{th}\) Provisional Guerrilla Battalion Against the Japanese on Luzon* (Las Cruces, NM: Yucca Tree Press, 2004), 25, 110, 115.
immense pressure from the Japanese, the guerrillas in central and southern Luzon attempted to continue organizing their intelligence and support networks going into 1943.

Mindanao

Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippines, southernmost of the major Philippine islands, and the major island in the Mindanao group. Its geography varies from rich plains with fertile soil to mountains, rolling hills, and forests. Often called “The Philippines’ Land of Promise,” Mindanao was considered the country’s major breadbasket along with the Central Luzon Plain, and supplied much of the archipelago’s food during World War II. The major cities on Mindanao included Davao City, the capital on the island’s southeastern shore, Cagayan de Oro and Iligan on the north shore, and Zamboanga jutting out on a peninsula to the southwest.

On Mindanao, the guerrillas benefitted from their distance from the focal point of the Japanese occupation, Luzon, and from the rugged nature of the terrain on one of the largest islands in the archipelago. The guerrillas’ official history noted five “Factors Favorable for Guerrilla Growth” on Mindanao, summarized below:

1) Natural barriers, such as jungles, rivers, mountains, and cliffs, which precluded Japanese movements.

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2) The absence of good roads—while the guerrillas could move via small units on the island’s numerous trails, the Japanese could not easily move large units, especially mechanized or motorized ones, to attack the guerrillas.

3) Plentiful food, given the island’s agriculture, fruit and game available in its forests, and its sparse population that always enjoyed a food surplus.

4) Experienced USAFFE officers and men provided expertise, although only 30 percent of the eventual 33,000 guerrillas on the island were USAFFE veterans, with the other 70 percent being civilian volunteers.

5) A core of 187 American officers and enlisted personnel who were willing to lead the plethora of guerrilla groups.\textsuperscript{100}

After the surrender of USAFFE forces on May 9, with the Japanese only occupying a few main cities along the island’s 1,400-mile-long coastline, a number of guerrilla groups soon formed in Mindanao’s rugged interior.\textsuperscript{101} These groups were initially isolated from one another due to the aforementioned lack of roads which inhibited easy communications through the mountains.

\textsuperscript{100} Tenth Military District Headquarters, “History of the Mindanao Guerrillas- Chapter III Beginning and Growth of the Tenth Military District,” The Wendell Fertig Papers, Box 1, Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA [hereafter referred to as AHEC], 7.

The guerrillas’ first action against the Japanese took place on September 16, 1942, at Tangug in Misamis Occidental. Thirty-four guerrillas under William A. Tate, an “American-Negro-Filipino mestizo” and Japanese-appointed chief of police of Momungan in Lanao, based on an agreement with Filipino Capt. Luis Morgan, sailed from Baroy in Kolambigan to Tangug shortly after midnight. There, although poorly armed, the guerrillas surprised the local Japanese-sponsored government officials, arrested and jailed several of them, and confiscated eighty-seven guns. Having met no resistance, Tate linked up with Morgan two days later and the two leaders began consolidating guerrillas in the northern areas of Zamboanga while forming new groups where none existed.

However, Morgan and Tate recognized their inability to unite the guerrillas on the island, and eventually, through U.S. Army Reserve Captain Charles W. Hedges, sought out U.S. Army Lt. Col. Wendell Fertig to fill this role. Fertig was an American mining engineer and U.S. Army Reserve officer before the Japanese invasion. After working on Luzon and being called to active duty with the Corps of Engineers in early 1941, he fought on Bataan before making his way to Mindanao in March 1942 to oversee airfield construction.

In a meeting with Morgan on October 4, 1942, Fertig agreed to head the “Mindanao-Visayan Forces,” as the guerrillas were calling themselves. The 106th

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102 Tenth Military District Headquarters, “History of the Mindanao Guerrillas,” The Wendell Fertig Papers, Box 1, AHEC, 8. Tate had been working at the Mindanao Autobus Company before the outbreak of hostilities, while Luis Morgan had been in the Philippine Constabulary.
Regiment, the first guerrilla regiment formed under Fertig, was activated on November 12, 1942, and was based in Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga.\textsuperscript{103} Fertig also sent U.S. Army Captains Jordan Hamner and Charles M. Smith to Australia via boat in order to pass on reports and statements about his forces. They successfully arrived in November 1942, sparking a great deal of interest and planning on the part of MacArthur and SWPA, who were eager to make contact with and support the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{104} Going into 1943, Fertig would find himself in a good position to continue consolidating the guerrillas on Mindanao under his command while working to contact SWPA GHQ via radio.

\textbf{Negros}

Negros is a boot-shaped island approximately 120 miles long, with the toe pointing southeast towards Mindanao. Like other islands in the Visayas, Negros’ geography varied from coastal plains to mountains in the north-central area of the island.\textsuperscript{105} Japanese forces landed on the island of Negros on May 20, 1942. Ostensibly opposing them was the Negros Force, hastily raised in late December 1941, and consisting of the 74\textsuperscript{th} and 75\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiments of the Philippine Army initially under Filipino Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador and later U.S. Army Col. Roger Hilsman.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 527.
\textsuperscript{105} Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 605.
\textsuperscript{106} Baclagon, \textit{They Chose to Fight}, 4.
However, following the receipt of Lt. General Wainwright’s order to surrender in early May 1942, and despite the reluctance of Col. Hilsman, Brigadier General William Sharp, commander of the Visayas-Mindanao Force, sent a messenger to convince Hilsman to surrender the Negros Force to avert a threatened massacre of American and Filipino troops on Corregidor. Hilsman did what he could to assemble the Negros Force in the island’s lowlands, and several of the sub-sector commanders complied. They then surrendered to the Japanese as ordered.

However, despite Hilsman’s efforts to maintain order and surrender in an expeditious manner, civilians and some soldiers began looting Japanese and Chinese businesses. More significantly, many of the USFIP troops of the Negros Force did not surrender, particularly those under Majors Salvador Abcede (2nd Battalion, 74th Regiment) and Ernesto S. Mata (3rd Battalion, 74th Infantry). Only about 1,000 men of the 4,500-man Negros Force actually surrendered, the balance either going home or taking to the mountains to continue to resist the Japanese. Meanwhile, Alfredo Montelibano, who later became the guerrilla governor of Negros, and other civilians who were “sympathetic to the [guerrillas’] cause” stayed in the lowland areas of the island to maintain foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrillas. Prior to the Japanese

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107 Sharp was promoted to Major General just before he surrendered to the Japanese. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 500.
108 Ibid., 581.
110 Victor L. Shumaker, Investigation Section, Adjustment Division “Interrogation,” dated 1949, in “7th Military District Statements and Reports,” Box 250, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II. This document is the transcript of the testimony of Alfredo Montelibano regarding the postwar claims for reimbursement of a Mr. Manuel Galatas.
invasion, Major Abcede was serving as the ROTC commandant at Silliman University, and he formed the officers, enlisted men, and cadets under him into the 74th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, while the 1st Battalion consisted of volunteers and teachers who were officers in the reserves.\textsuperscript{111}

At Silliman University, the university president and faculty were sympathetic to the guerrillas and assisted in the preparations for war but did not initially join the resistance. In particular, history professor and missionary Roy Bell became more involved with the war effort and was appointed the civil affairs officer for the local town of Dumaguete in order to “‘mediate disputes and keep good relations between the Army and civilians.’”\textsuperscript{112} Bell decided to send weapons and supplies to the guerrillas but did not join them at first. Although he had served as an enlisted soldier in Texas in the U.S. Army Medical Corps during World War I, Bell, at over forty years old, felt he was not qualified to serve as a guerrilla.\textsuperscript{113} However, having served as a football coach at the university, and urged on by his former students and players, Bell felt obligated to provide leadership to the guerrillas and joined them as an officer in the late summer of 1942.

The guerrillas declared Alfredo Montelibano Military Governor of Negros and Siquijor on December 16, 1942. Montelibano would prove an able administrator, ensuring the guerrillas’ base areas were well-run and able to support their operations.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} Baclagon, \textit{They Chose to Fight}, 4.
\textsuperscript{112} Mills, \textit{Stranded in the Philippines}, 9.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., ix.
\textsuperscript{114} Baclagon, \textit{They Chose to Fight}, 84.
As 1942 ended, Abcede controlled most of the guerrillas on the island as commander of an organized 72nd Division. Those outside of Abcede’s control were in two groups led by Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, former commander of the Negros Forces under General Sharp who wanted to control all guerrillas in the Philippines, and Major Placido Ausejo, who had decided to align with Wendell Fertig. While Ausejo would eventually submit to Abcede’s authority, the conflicts between Gador and Abcede continued. Nevertheless, Abcede was running an effective guerrilla organization on Negros, with little Japanese interference, by 1943.115

Panay

Panay, a downward-pointing triangle-shaped island approximately 100 miles wide, has a variety of terrain ranging from low-lying coastal areas to rugged mountains in the south-central part of the island. Iloilo City was and still is the island’s principal city, and during World War II it possessed excellent port facilities and was the Philippines’ third largest commercial center.116 On Panay, American Brigadier General Albert Christie commanded the 61st Infantry Division of the Philippine Army, and on May 19, 1942 was told to surrender his forces by Lt. Col. Allan Thayer from Wainwright’s headquarters. Christie’s staff was sharply divided on whether to obey the orders, with the

115 Several guerrilla commanders had previously agreed to submit to Gador’s authority earlier in 1942, but he declined for reasons which are hard to discern. However, when Gador later heard that Abcede and Mata had made contact with MacArthur, he decided to try to reassert himself. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 686-689.

116 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 601.
division G-3 (Operations Officer), Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, saying he would rather be court-martialed than surrender, while Christie ultimately followed orders and surrendered the division.\textsuperscript{117}

Insisting on continuing hit-and-run attacks on the Japanese through guerrilla resistance, Peralta was able to secure 60,000 Filipino pesos from Christie to support his underground army. Christie then had Peralta and other Filipino officers promise that they would not organize guerrillas or conduct guerrilla activity for two months from the date of surrender.\textsuperscript{118} Immediately after receiving orders to surrender, roughly 5,000 troops from the 61\textsuperscript{st} Division fled to the hills and formed the core of the guerrilla group on the island. They were able to bring with them most of the division’s weapons and supplies.

The guerrillas quickly agreed to make Lt. Col. Peralta their leader, and on June 10 he promptly issued General Order No. 1 assuming command of the “Free Panay Force.”\textsuperscript{119} As its undisputed head, Peralta quickly consolidated the Panay guerrilla organization, reactivated the 61\textsuperscript{st} Division, instituted intensive training programs, and made radio contact with SWPA GHQ in Australia by November 1942. Similarly to guerrillas on other islands, fighters on Panay benefitted from relatively secure base areas in the rugged interior of the island, but had to contend with a small Japanese garrison which by late 1942 was restricted to the built-up areas of San Jose, Capiz town, and Iloilo.

\textsuperscript{117} Agoncillo, \textit{The Fateful Years}, 667-668.
\textsuperscript{118} “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands,” dated 27 November 1944, in “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II.
Given such base areas and the substantial amount of weapons and supplies that the guerrillas were able to stockpile, Peralta was able to train and organize his guerrillas to the point that they could withstand periodic and brutal Japanese punitive raids into the island’s interior. The initial lack of interference from the Japanese also allowed Tomas Confesor, the island’s prewar governor, to maintain much of his infrastructure, and although he and Peralta clashed on several occasions, Confesor was able to run a well-functioning government for much of the Japanese occupation. Going into 1943, the guerrillas on Panay were well-positioned to conduct effective harassment attacks on Japanese forces.

Cebu

Cebu is a long, thin island some 150-miles long north to south with Cebu City on its eastern shore, which during World War II was the second-largest city in the Philippines by population and possessed port facilities second only to those in Manila. After conducting demolition of supplies and installations in Cebu City, USAFFE forces on Cebu and surrounding areas surrendered to the Japanese on May 15, 1942. As the Japanese were able to occupy much of the island with little effort, they soon sent many of their troops elsewhere, using local constabulary troops and co-opting pre-war mayors and

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120 “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands,” NARA II.
121 Ibid.
122 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 608.
other officials to maintain control. There was no organized resistance to the Japanese until September, when former American and Filipino officers organized the first Cebu guerrilla forces. These troops benefitted from the fact that USAFFE forces were able to bring large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies into the hills before the surrender to the Japanese.

Two major groups emerged. The guerrillas in southern and central Cebu were under James M. Cushing, an American-born mining engineer who had been commissioned a U.S. Army captain by Brigadier General Bradford Chynoweth, commander of units in the Visayas, before the surrender of USAFFE forces. Meanwhile, by mid-1942, Harry Fenton, who was reportedly born as Aaron Feinstein, led the guerrillas in northern Cebu. Noted as “bold and outspoken,” Fenton had been an enlisted American soldier in Manila before his discharge from the army and had gone on to serve as a radio announcer, transmitting anti-Japanese messages before the USAFFE surrender. Early in the fall of 1942, the two groups merged, with Fenton assuming administrative duties and Cushing serving as the group’s combat leader. While initially this arrangement worked well, resulting in many successful attacks against Japanese troops (and a number of deaths of innocent civilians by the overzealous guerrillas),

conflict between Fenton and other guerrilla leaders eventually split the organization. However, the guerrillas were largely able to infiltrate the cities on Cebu and won many of the government officials back to their side while eliminating or cowing into neutrality those who would not cooperate. This development set up the guerrillas for significant gains in 1943 and 1944.

Leyte

An irregularly-shaped oblong island running northwest to southwest just east of Cebu and north of Mindanao, Leyte, like many of the Visayas, includes a central mountainous area surrounded by coastal plains and ringed with a coastal road. The Japanese were able to occupy Leyte without resistance following their landing there on May 24, 1942. U.S. Army Col. Theodore M. Cornell commanded the meager forces on both Leyte and Samar, and initially resisted surrender instructions from General Sharp before receiving and complying with written surrender orders on May 20 before the Japanese arrived. Cornell had previously made preparations to break up his command in preparation for anti-Japanese guerrilla operations, and only about a third of the 1,800 USAFFE troops on Leyte surrendered to the Japanese, the rest either taking to the mountains or returning to their homes. Soon after the Japanese occupation began, a number of armed groups emerged, some acting as vigilantes seeking to protect the

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127 Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 499.
128 Ibid., 502, 581.
129 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 691-692.
population from Japanese privations, and others acting merely as bandits for personal gain. As on other islands, the few troops the Japanese left to garrison Leyte were wholly inadequate to prevent either the formation of organized resistance to the Japanese occupation or the lawless actions of criminals exploiting the population.

Despite rampant banditry, several guerrilla groups formed which focused on opposing the Japanese and restoring civil order, all led by former members of the U.S. military, Philippine Army, or Philippine Constabulary. These included the groups listed on Table 1 below. Even though there were a number of conflicts between them, the groups were disbanded, eliminated, or gradually consolidated under the leadership of Filipino Col. Ruperto Kangleon with the exception of Miranda’s group, after a conference among a number of former officers from the United States Forces in the Philippines in 1943.130

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130 Ibid., 694.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Leader(s) and Backgrounds</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balderian Group</td>
<td>Alejandro Balderian; former Philippine Army Second Lt.</td>
<td>Northern Leyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centino Group</td>
<td>Cericaco and Isabelo Centino; former Philippine Army soldier and a former member of Balderian’s Group, respectively (Isabelo was Cericaco’s son)</td>
<td>Northeast Leyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinco Group</td>
<td>Antonio C. Cinco; former USAFFE soldier</td>
<td>Tanauan, Dagami, Tolosa, and unoccupied portions of Burauen, Dulag, and La Paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lang-Jain Group</td>
<td>Gordon A. Lang; former U.S. Navy yeoman and Porfirio Jain; a former Philippine serviceman from Samar</td>
<td>Southern Leyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miranda Group</td>
<td>Blas E. Miranda; former Philippine Constabulary Lt.</td>
<td>Northwestern Leyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pabliona Group</td>
<td>Filemon Pabilona; former first sergeant in the USAFFE Leyte Provisional Regiment</td>
<td>San Miguel, Babatngon, Alangalang and Tacloban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamanian Group</td>
<td>Felix Pamanian; former Technical Sergeant (Leyte Provisional Regiment).</td>
<td>Vicinity of Mount Capolocan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Leyte Guerrilla Groups and Leaders.\(^{131}\)

Samar

Wide in the north and tapering somewhat as one moves south, Samar sits just northeast of Leyte and southeast of Luzon. In January 1942, under the direction of Col. Teodore Cornell, commanding the Leyte-Samar Sector, the three Samar Constabulary Companies were organized into the Samar Constabulary Battalion under Filipino Captain

Pedro V. Merritt for use in the defense of the island. Although Cornell issued an order for all units to surrender on May 23, 1942, with the exception of Major Andres Bartolome, the sub-sector commander, no other officers surrendered their commands.

Similar to the situation on Leyte, on Samar a number of different guerrilla groups emerged following the surrender of USAFFE forces and the dissolution of the Philippine Constabulary. These were largely led by former Philippine Army or Philippine Constabulary officers. Given that Samar possessed little strategic value when compared to islands like Luzon or Mindanao, the Japanese garrison there was quite small. Therefore, guerrilla groups were able to increase their control relatively unhindered. Despite this advantage, differences between them proved difficult to overcome, and, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, no one leader emerged to control all of the groups on the island until 1944. The two largest groups were led by Philippine Army Captain Pedro V. Merritt in the north and Manuel Valley, or Vallei, a former policeman in Manila, in the south. By the end of 1942, Merritt had reduced the brigandage of a number of small independent guerrilla bands in his sector, consolidating the Constabulary Battalion into the 93rd Samar Area Command and working to contact other guerrilla leaders on neighboring islands.

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132 “A Brief Historical Sketch of the 93rd Division, Samar Area Command- The Samar Constabulary Battalion,” Box 413, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II, 1.
135 “A Brief Historical Sketch of the 93rd Division,” 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Leader(s) and Backgrounds</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merritt Group</td>
<td>Pedro V. Merritt; Philippine Army Captain</td>
<td>Northern Samar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Group</td>
<td>Manuel Valley; former Manila policeman</td>
<td>Southern Samar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abia Group</td>
<td>Luciano Abia; former Philippine Constabulary Captain</td>
<td>Basey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arteche Group</td>
<td>Manila lawyer and prior governor of Samar, removed by Quezon for election irregularities but later reelected</td>
<td>Sta Rita-zumarraga Area, Western Samar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recote Group</td>
<td>Emilio Recote; origins unknown</td>
<td>Southwest Samar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Samar Guerrilla Groups and Leaders.  

**Conclusion**

As 1943 began, a number of significant guerrilla groups the Philippines were organizing to resist the Japanese. The coming years before the liberation of the islands would see them make significant territorial gains in the Visayas and southern Philippines due to the limited Japanese troop presence in those areas, but would also see notable setbacks on Luzon as the Japanese tightened control over the main island in the archipelago. Meanwhile, MacArthur’s headquarters would work to obtain detailed information on the guerrillas, decide which groups to support, and then work to supply

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136 The majority of this information comes from Willoughby’s *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*. Willoughby lists a Sulci Group as well, but given the very limited information on the group, which was supposedly led by an ex-governor of Samar, its existence is suspect. He also lists a group under a Captain Canon on southwestern Samar that was absorbed into the Arteche Group, but again there is limited information.
the guerrillas with desperately needed weapons and munitions. MacArthur and his staff would also have to decide how to best utilize the guerrillas while trying to prevent Japanese reprisals against civilians and develop communications networks to gain some semblance of control while also supporting intelligence-gathering operations. The next two years before liberation would be a busy and dramatic time for those involved in the guerrilla movement.
Chapter 2: The Allied Intelligence Bureau and the Philippine Regional Section

Planet, Fifty, Tenwest, Spyron, and MACA would all seem to be unrelated words to the casual observer, but to members of MacArthur’s staff from 1942 to 1944 these words, codenames for clandestine operations, represented tangible efforts to ascertain information on the guerrillas in the Philippines, support them with supplies, and gain intelligence on the occupying Japanese. Infiltrating the Philippines aboard cramped U.S. Navy submarines, the shadowy figures for operations like Planet and Fifty included Filipino pilots, American entrepreneurs, and Navy reservists, risking death or worse at the hands of the Japanese if caught. Behind them, and in some ways standing in their way, were members of MacArthur’s SWPA General Headquarters, among whom there was no shortage of infighting. As they scrambled to understand and then support the guerrillas, MacArthur’s staff and their operatives to the Philippines built an impressive record of spectacular successes and notable failures.

While the guerrillas in the Philippines struggled to consolidate and organize themselves in 1942, SWPA GHQ was organizing itself to support them as best it could. The primary American organization concerned with contacting, coordinating, and liaising with the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines was the Allied Intelligence Bureau, or AIB. Operating under the operational control of the G-2 section of the General Headquarters, SWPA, the AIB was formed in June 1942 and incorporated clandestine
services from Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States in MacArthur’s area of operations, performing roughly the same role as the American Office of Strategic Services in other parts of the world.\footnote{Allison W. Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan: The Allied Intelligence Bureau in World War II} (1958; repr., North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 9.} Although MacArthur was offered the services of the OSS, he declined, preferring to create an intelligence organization that could incorporate existing Allied intelligence units in his theater and which was more responsive to his needs than a Washington, D.C.-based organization like the OSS.\footnote{According to historian David Hogan, “MacArthur and his staff were apparently suspicious of semi-autonomous agencies with a separate chain of command back to Washington, and they also believed themselves to be quite capable of handling special operations in the Philippines without any help from the OSS.” David W. Hogan, “MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan,” \textit{Parameters}, Spring 1995, 105.}

Headed by Australian Col. C. G. Roberts, AIB initially reported directly to Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2 and Chief of Intelligence for SWPA Headquarters, with American Col. Allison W. Ind as its Deputy Controller.\footnote{Steven W. Chadde, “Preface,” in Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, iii.} By May 1943, AIB was operating as an “independent agency responsible directly to GHQ [SWPA],” but the now divided intelligence efforts between AIB and G-2 would provide a source of some friction for the remainder of the war.\footnote{Courtney Whitney, “Subject: Clarification of AIB Responsibility; To: Controller, AIB,” dated 29 May 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. Willoughby would often butt heads with the AIB and especially its Philippine Regional Section under American Col. Courtney Whitney, as the latter would not always forward relevant messages and intelligence to SWPA G-2. Charles A. Willoughby, “From: G-2; To: A.I.B. (P.R.S.),” dated 14 Aug 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA; Charles A. Willoughby, “From: G-2; To: A.I.B. (P.R.S.),” dated 21 Aug 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. Jesus Villamor’s memoir also makes light of the conflict between Willoughby and Whitney.} Although AIB documents would be forwarded to the G-2 for comment, this did not “imply any measure of command or control in G-2
over AIB” according to SWPA GHQ Chief of Staff Major General Richard K. Sutherland.141

AIB contained four sections, A through D, which specialized in different activities.142 Section A, also known as Special Operations Australia (SOA), specialized in general intelligence gathering and commando operations, while Section B, or Secret Intelligence, Australia (SIA), was concerned with signals intelligence and codebreaking.143 Section C, the Combined Field Intelligence Service or Coast Watch Organization, used civilians and a network of coastwatchers to gather information on Japanese movements. Finally, Section D, the Far East Liaison Office (FELO), distributed military propaganda.144

Specifically for the Philippines, AIB established a separate Philippines Sub-Section outside of Sections A, B, C, and D in October of 1942.145 The Sub-section dealt exclusively with supporting the guerrillas in the Philippines with money and supplies.146 It also devised a plan to funnel intelligence information from the Philippines back to Australia and SWPA GHQ.

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141 Courtney Whitney, “Subject: Clarification of AIB Responsibility; To: Controller, AIB,” dated 29 May 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. Sutherland would eventually be promoted to Lt. General in 1944.
142 Steven W. Chadde, “Preface,” in Ind, Secret War Against Japan, iii.
143 SOA was formed with assistance from the British Special Operations Executive, while SIA was a branch of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, MI6.
144 For more details on the Australian side of the AIB, see Alan Powell, War by Stealth: Australians and the Allied Intelligence Bureau 1942-1945 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1996).
146 Ibid.
One of AIB’s, and the Philippines Sub-Section’s, first missions was the Planet Project. As was discussed in Chapter 1, following the escape from Japanese captivity of several Allied servicemen in the Philippines, as well as the receipt of a number of faint radio messages from the archipelago, SWPA Headquarters became aware of Japanese atrocities against Allied servicemen and civilians as well as the various efforts to form guerrilla groups in the Philippines.147 AIB, with directives from General MacArthur, decided to infiltrate agents back into the Philippines, initially to gather intelligence on Japanese movements and dispositions but later expanding its mission to also bring the Philippines “token signs of hope…and [collect] data that would enable MacArthur to delegate official responsibility to the most reliable guerrilla leaders.”148

Figure 2. Gen. MacArthur awards Jesus Villamor the Distinguished Service Cross. (Library of Congress)

148 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 104.
Choosing the head of this mission took some deliberation, but ultimately the AIB leadership selected Filipino fighter pilot Captain, later Major, Jesus Villamor to run Planet. General MacArthur had personally decorated Villamor during the defense of the Philippines for his efforts flying obsolete P-26 fighters against the Japanese. Villamor had made his way to Australia from the Philippines aboard a B-25 bomber and was serving as an instructor in a pilot training unit when the AIB selected him for Planet. A directive signed by General MacArthur ordered Villamor to establish an intelligence and radio network in the Philippines as well as “Develop an organization for cover subversive activities and propaganda” and “Locate and contact individuals known to be loyal.”

“Planet”

After being notified of his directive for the Planet mission, Villamor decided he wanted five men to accompany him on his mission, three to man a clandestine radio station and two others to escort him to Manila and other parts of Luzon. Villamor conducted interviews with potential candidates for almost a week, eventually narrowing down the list to eight men. Under the tutelage of Australian Army Captain Allan Davidson and a mixed group of American, European, and Chinese instructors, Villamor

149 Ind., *Secret War Against Japan*, 105.
151 Ibid., 66-67.
152 Ibid., 67.
and the candidates underwent grueling survival and close combat training as well as receiving instruction in such diverse topics as vehicle recognition, coding and ciphers, and navigating using the stars.\footnote{Villamor referred to Davidson as “Davison” in his memoir, but the former name is more likely accurate. Allison Ind writes the name as Davidson in his history of the AIB and that name is also more common.} They also trained on how to load rubber rafts from a submarine at night in heavy seas, which would prove important during their infiltration.\footnote{Ind, \textit{They Never Surrendered}, 67.} Finally, Davidson also made the agents perform manual labor, chopping wood and working farming plows to support their cover stories as Filipino farmers.\footnote{Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, 106. Such work was, in part, intended to give the men rougher, calloused hands.}

Although purposely misinformed of their date of departure for security reasons, Villamor and his five agents boarded the fleet submarine USS \textit{Gudgeon} (SS-211) on December 27, 1942.\footnote{Ibid., 108.} On January 14, 1943, \textit{Gudgeon} landed Villamor’s party and one ton of supplies, including quinine, vitamins, medical supplies, cigarettes, and candy, in two boats near Catmon Point on Negros.\footnote{Breuer, \textit{MacArthur’s Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions} (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2005), 51; Theodore Roscoe, \textit{United States Submarine Operations in World War II} (1949; repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 272. While this mission was successful, with the party landing undetected, \textit{Gudgeon}’s commander, William S. Stovall, Jr., suggested in his action report that “future parties be limited to not more than two men per submarine. More than this seriously crowds [sic] the already crowded facilities of the submarine if they are to be cared for with any degree of comfort.” This demonstrates the aforementioned difficulties in using fleet submarines as transports and emphasizes the importance that the much larger \textit{Nautilus} and \textit{Narwhal} later assumed because of their more robust carrying capacities. Stovall also emphasized that help from shore parties was essential if large numbers of supplies were to be off-loaded. He observed that items should be waterproofed prior to transport and rubber boats with plywood stiffeners were better than wooden boats when transporting supplies and personnel to shore. Outside of the recommendation for smaller parties, these suggestions, while minor, were adopted by later special mission submarines on subsequent operations to the Philippines. “Action Report: USS Gudgeon Special Mission Reports, Forwarding of,” dated September 11, 1945. Record Group 38, Box 743, “WWII Action and Operation Reports: SUBPAC, 4/15/43 To 3/30/44,” NARA II.}
MacArthur, Villamor began setting up an intelligence and radio network on Negros separate from the guerrilla chain of command, organized to report on the Japanese as well as guerrilla situations.\footnote{158 Uldarico S. Baclagon, \textit{They Chose to Fight: The story of the resistance movement in Negros and Siquijor Islands} (Manila, P.I.: Capitol Publishing House, 1962), 79. Baclagon calls the network that Villamor set up the “Allied Intelligence Bureau,” but clearly the network was just operating under the Allied Intelligence Bureau headquartered in Australia.} Looking for competent operatives in setting up the network, Villamor turned to fellow Philippine Army Air Corps pilots still in the Philippines to fill his ranks, eventually appointing Lt. Col. Edwin Andrews to head the network. Andrews, who had been a pilot since 1937, had been serving as guerrilla commander Wendell Fertig’s chief of staff on Mindanao before he journeyed to Negros to assist Villamor.\footnote{159 Ibid., 80. As discussed, most of the agents initially working for Villamor and Andrews had been Philippine Army Air Corps pilots, including a number of L.t.s, but the organization later encompassed a number of prominent civilians, including guerrilla governor Alfredo Montelibano.} On January 27, 1943, GHQ finally received contact from Villamor, to great elation from G-2 Charles Willoughby as well as Allison Ind and Richard Sutherland.\footnote{160 Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, 121; General Headquarters, Far East Command, \textit{Reports of General MacArthur}, 305.} In the meantime, Villamor had sent agents to make contact with guerrillas as far away as Luzon, and began sending daily reconnaissance reports to SWPA GHQ.\footnote{161 Villamor, \textit{They Never Surrendered}, 67.}

In the late summer of 1943, with Villamor’s network running smoothly, PRS/AIB decided it was time for Villamor to return to Australia and report his findings, but had trouble getting in contact with him. By August 1943, PRS was concerned because Villamor had not contacted the sub that was supposed to evacuate him from Mindanao. At this point, men in PRS assumed Villamor might be shirking his duties for any number
of “probable” explanations. U.S. Navy officer and A.I.B. agent Chick Parsons posited that Villamor may have married into the Pleider family and his new wife was not letting him leave, while Ind thought Villamor may have become involved with two separate Chinese girls in Brisbane and was trying to avoid both of them and any friction the situation might cause. For his part, Villamor did not recall receiving an order to rendezvous with a submarine on Mindanao until September 20, but requested that he be picked up on Negros because the journey to Mindanao would be dangerous. The navy agreed with Villamor’s recommendation, although they deemed it infeasible to pick up Villamor off Negros in September of 1943 as planned, but assured SWPA GHQ that they could do so the following month.

Villamor left Negros on October 20, boarding the fleet submarine USS Cabrilla (SS-288) and arriving in Perth on November 7 before reporting to MacArthur’s headquarters in Brisbane on November 10. Upon his return to Australia, Villamor compiled a report on the situation on Luzon and the Visayas. He recommended officially recognizing guerrilla leaders as early as possible, and that area representatives be appointed by SWPA Headquarters to coordinate the actions of district commanders.

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162 Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff” dated 31 August 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
163 Ind theorized that the two Chinese girls in Brisbane, one of them the daughter of the consul, were “crossed up.”
164 Villamor, They Never Surrendered, 201-202.
165 Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 28 Sept 43, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
166 Villamor, They Never Surrendered, 208-210. Cabrilla was of the Balao-class.
167 Jesus Villamor, “Allied Report on Enemy Situation on Luzon and Visayan Island [sic],” RG 496, Box 617, NARA II.
In particular, he recommended the area representative for the Visayas be a Filipino, not an American, because the former would better understand the local population and its interests. For Luzon, Villamor thought SWPA should appoint someone “who is already there and who has been there from the very beginning.” Villamor submitted the names of a number of Filipino officers who he recommended serve in these positions. Despite the importance of these recommendations, however, the report was held by Courtney Whitney and never made it to General MacArthur, although SWPA G-2 Charles Willoughby did see it and gave it his approval.

In Australia, after submitting his report, Villamor urged consolidation of the Filipino guerrillas in the Philippines into larger districts, but was thwarted by a number of prominent SWPA staff officers, including Courtney Whitney and General Sutherland. At SWPA Headquarters, Whitney argued that consolidation of the various guerrilla units in the Philippines would be disastrous because there would be little control from SWPA and the geography and scattered nature of the guerrilla groups would not support it. Villamor became increasingly exasperated by “an indifference to his findings and even glances down long noses that bespoke outright questioning of his sincerity,” but had to

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169 Ibid., 10.
170 Villamor, They Never Surrendered, 219, 228.
172 Toland, “Introduction,” They Never Surrendered, xv.
cease arguing his case when he received orders to fly to Washington, D.C. to brief Filipino president-in-exile Manuel Quezon on his recent mission and observations.\textsuperscript{173}

Villamor never returned to the Philippines, and in a tense conversation with President Quezon, who was on his deathbed, the Filipino president expressed concerns that SWPA GHQ was not doing all it could to support the guerrillas and people of the Philippines. In particular, Quezon told Villamor that some leaders in SWPA GHQ were making it difficult for Filipino guerrilla leaders whom they deemed difficult to control.\textsuperscript{174} Quezon’s comments proved fairly accurate, and Villamor himself ended up losing credibility at SWPA GHQ. Significantly, despite the support of both Allison Ind at AIB and SWPA G-2 Charles Willoughby, Villamor lost the fight to keep Andrews’ intelligence network as an entity independent of guerrilla chains of command.\textsuperscript{175} General MacArthur agreed with Whitney’s urgings to bring the Planet net under guerrilla (and therefore direct SWPA GHQ) control, and Andrews and his network complied with orders to place themselves under the command of guerrilla commander Salvador Abcede on Negros.\textsuperscript{176} Villamor described this as the “death” of Planet. Despite this, Villamor’s net was eventually credited with sending some 469 messages from the Philippines to

\textsuperscript{173} Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, 138. Eventually, well after the end of World War II, President Dwight D. Eisenhower personally apologized to Villamor for how he had been treated, and handed Villamor the official file of his case for him to review.

\textsuperscript{174} John Toland, “Introduction,” in Jesus Villamor, \textit{They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in World War II} (Quezon City, PI: Vera-Reyes, Inc. 1982), xi, 226

\textsuperscript{175} Villamor, \textit{They Never Surrendered}, 243-248.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 249.
GHQ, and his agents provided crucial intelligence on Japanese naval movements before and during the decisive 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf.177

**Philippine Regional Section**

While Villamor conducted his journey through the Philippines, there was a shakeup in the way SWPA Headquarters organized to support the guerrillas. Headed by U.S. Army Col. Courtney Whitney, the Philippine Regional Section (PRS), as it came to be called, was established in May 1943 using personnel from the Philippine Sub-Section.178 PRS operated as a semi-autonomous agency, tasked with “handling operations to assist the guerrillas,” including sending monetary and material support, delineating areas of responsibility for various guerrilla commanders, and creating communication networks to send information from the Philippines to Australia.179

Whitney remained insistent during most of the war that GHQ try to coordinate the guerrillas itself, as opposed to appointing an autonomous or semi-autonomous commander for the guerrillas based in the Philippines. Shortly after the establishment of

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177 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 139. In addition, while under Abcede, Andrews’ radio station sent more than double the number of messages for which Villamor is credited.

178 General Headquarters, Far East Command, *Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. I*, 304; Biographer William Manchester noted that “from the standpoint of the guerrillas he [Whitney] was a disastrous choice. Undiplomatic and belligerent, he was condescending toward all Filipinos, except those who, like himself, had substantial investments in the Philippines... and by the time MacArthur was ready to land on Leyte, Whitney had converted most of the staff to reactionarism. At his urging the General [MacArthur] barred OSS agents from the Southwest Pacific, because Whitney suspected they would aid leftwing guerrillas.” William Manchester, *American Caesar* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1978) 378-379.

the PRS, Whitney argued “a high ranking officer should be dispatched to the Philippines, as the personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief,” in order to “deliver to and thoroughly impress upon local leaders the policies and instructions of this headquarters [SWPA]” and “make ‘on the ground decisions’ as required’” as well as “arrange and preside over a conference of local leaders on all phases of the problem of mutual interest and develop proper coordination of effect.” In effect, Whitney wanted to send a high-ranking officer (perhaps himself) from SWPA headquarters to the Philippines to ensure that the guerrillas themselves were acting in concert, dispelling the notion that such a leader could emerge among the guerrillas themselves and increasing the amount of direct control that MacArthur and the United States could exert over them.

Significantly, in August of 1943, Whitney recommended the establishment of forward intelligence bases on Mindoro and Samar, with himself commanding the base on Samar and Navy Lt. Commander Charles “Chic,” or “Chick,” Parsons commanding the base on Mindoro. Whitney intended these bases to “control the very nerve center of Philippine intelligence” and “constitute the advanced echelon of the Philippine Regional Section, Allied Intelligence Bureau, and… GHQ,” synchronizing the coming Allied offensive in the Philippines with the intelligence obtained. In addition, distrustful of Macario Peralta on Panay and the guerrillas in general, Whitney also recommended that SWPA GHQ conduct a “periodic inspection of the several military districts by a

180 Courtney Whitney, “Subject: Philippine Operations; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 27 May 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 1, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
181 Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff” dated 25 Aug 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
representative of this headquarters” to obtain “much needed factual information” on the guerrilla leaders in the Philippines.\(^{182}\) Whitney later asserted that “desired results are more dependent on competent [sic] American direction at key points, than on any other combination of factors.”\(^{183}\) These recommendations were not followed, but demonstrate Whitney’s desire to more closely tie the guerrillas to GHQ SWPA while also increasing his responsibilities and prestige.

Whitney tempered his desires for a GHQ representative in the Philippines by September of 1943, noting that “It is premature to send any officer to the Philippines to take ‘charge,’” but also stating “…as our offensive action in the Philippines draws near, it will… be necessary to establish a Philippine command to coordinate the guerilla movement…,” presuming this would be done by sending out an “echelon of GHQ.”\(^{184}\) As mentioned earlier, it is likely that Whitney may still have wanted to command the guerrillas himself. Indeed, due to accusations by personnel at the War Department in Washington, D.C., Whitney found it necessary to disavow any statement by himself reflecting a desire to command forces in the Philippines, but also noted, in this regard, “if it be a crime to aspire to increasingly heavy responsibilities in the service to which we are all committed, then I must plead guilty.”\(^{185}\) Whitney also had to deflect criticism by

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\(^{182}\) Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff” dated 27 August 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{183}\) Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff” dated 16 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{184}\) Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Gen. Willoughby” dated 13 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{185}\) “From: Courtney Whitney: To: Gen. C.A. Willoughby,” dated 19 September 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. In his response to Whitney’s message, Willoughby began with “My dear Whitney” and was very sympathetic to Whitney, telling him to ignore
some in the war Department G-2 that he was “anti-Filipino.”\textsuperscript{186} Regardless, in keeping with his push for greater GHQ control over the guerrillas, by the fall of 1943 Whitney noted with pride “a distinct transition in the Philippine [guerrilla] situation… to a stronger, better coordinated movement under the C-in-C’s [MacArthur’s] direction.”\textsuperscript{187}

Although he had a limited ability to influence leaders at GHQ to allow him to take command in the Philippines, Whitney did wield authority in the selection of district commanders among the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{188} His recommendations on which guerrillas to recognize carried some weight with GHQ and were generally followed. For instance, due in part to the influence of Parsons and Whitney, General MacArthur appointed Ruperto K. Kangleon head of the Leyte Area Command.\textsuperscript{189} Official recognition was significant in that it gave guerrillas prestige while also allowing them to receive material aid from
SWPA GHQ, although it also meant that they were more directly tied to GHQ and nominally lost some independence.\textsuperscript{190}

Aside from questions of organization between the guerrillas and SWPA GHQ, gathering intelligence in the Philippines, and sending arms and other supplies, another large focus of PRS in 1943 was the sending of a variety of American and Filipino currency to the guerrillas. The guerrillas needed this cash to fund a number of purposes such as salaries and reparations, which will be covered in the chapter on logistics. Additionally, Courtney Whitney intended to infuse large amounts of counterfeit Japanese currency into the Philippines, hoping to "destroy the enemy’s economic hold on the Islands through the carefully planned and systematic injection of large amounts of enemy currency… gradually rendering the spurious currency… worthless."\textsuperscript{191}

As PRS increased the scope of its operations in 1943, it also looked to take advantage of the intelligence and radio network developed by Villamor and expand it. PRS planned to dispatch another group of agents into the Philippines via submarine, this time carrying a large resupply of ammunition and cash. Interestingly, PRS would use Americans, not Filipinos like Villamor, to head this second penetration, likely reflecting Whitney’s distrust of Filipinos and his desire to more tightly control PRS operations from Australia.

\textsuperscript{190} Douglas MacArthur, "Subject: Appointment; To: Lieut. Col. Ruperto A. Kangleon, P.A.," dated 21 October 1943; Record Group 16, Box 63, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
\textsuperscript{191} Courtney Whitney, "Subject: Procurement of Jap Currency; To: Chief of Staff," dated 26 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
“Fifty”

The next penetration into the Philippines was codenamed Fifty. Initially planned to expand the network established by Planet, the focus of Fifty shifted to the delivery of needed supplies to the guerrillas on Mindanao under Wendell Fertig, who had been communicating with Australia regarding their needs via the radio network established on Negros by Villamor. The AIB/PRS staffs correctly assumed that the relatively secure nature of areas under Fertig’s control would assure safe delivery of the requested supplies, and some officers at GHQ further hoped that Mindanao could serve as a potential base of operations in the future liberation of the Philippines. In addition to supplies for Fertig, “Fifty” also had supplies intended for Macario Peralta’s guerrillas on Panay.

Unlike “Planet,” which was headed by a Filipino officer in the person of Jesus Villamor, two American officers headed “Fifty.” The first, U.S. Army Captain Charles M. “Chick” Smith, was an American mining engineer who was working in the Philippines when American and Filipino forces surrendered to the Japanese in 1942. After escaping to Australia from the island of Mindanao in 1943 on a small sailboat at the direction of Wendell Fertig, he accepted a commission as a captain in the U.S. Army

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192 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 143.
Corps of Engineers, seeking to fulfill a promise to fellow engineer Wendell Fertig to
request supplies for the Mindanao guerrillas.193

The other American officer leading Fifty, the aforementioned U.S. Navy Lt.
Commander Charles “Chick” Parsons, was also in the Philippines when the Japanese
invaded in 1941. Parsons had been working as a manager in an importing and trading
company and a separate stevedoring company, living in Manila along with his wife Katsy
and their three sons.194 With the bombing of Pearl Harbor, authorities had seized Danish
ships in Manila and reflagged them as Panamanian, and, due to his previous associations
with the Panamanian government, Chick Parsons was appointed as an honorary
Panamanian consul with associated paperwork to oversee the ships until the official
representative arrived.195

Figure 3. Lt. Cdr. Charles Parsons, Gen. MacArthur, and Cpt. Charles M. Smith
(MacArthur Memorial Archives)

193 Bob Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 22-23; General
194 Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in
195 William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of “Spyron” & The American-Filipino
With the Japanese closing in on Manila in 1942, Parsons burned his U.S. Navy Reserve officer’s uniform and, due to previously serving as temporary Panamanian consul, was able to successfully claim diplomatic immunity and remained relatively free from Japanese harassment.\(^{196}\) Although Parsons was eventually detained by the Japanese, who rounded up all foreigners, Parsons was later released and he and his family were able to make their way back to the U.S. aboard a passenger ship. Importantly, before leaving, Parsons organized an intelligence organization in Manila comprised of USAFFE reserve officers, a group of contacts with whom he continued to work throughout the war.\(^{197}\) Parsons would eventually make several trips to the Philippines under a project called “Spyron,” short for “Spy Squadron.”\(^{198}\)

More than keeping his promise to Fertig, after departing Australia in February of 1943, Smith and his companions returned to Mindanao in March aboard the fleet submarine USS *Tambor* (SS-198), delivering ammunition and cash to Fertig’s guerrillas.\(^{199}\) Accompanying Smith and Parsons to Mindanao were two Filipino Moros who had escaped Mindanao by boat. The Moros were brought along because of their

\(^{196}\) Ingham, *Rendezvous by Submarine*, 33-35. Parsons had been listed as “Missing in Action” by the U.S. Navy before he returned to the United States.

\(^{197}\) Charles Parsons, “From: C.P.; To: Col. Whitney,” dated 2 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. The story of this network, which included a female American civilian named Claire Philips as a prominent figure, is detailed in Peter Eisner’s *MacArthur’s Spies: The Soldier, The Singer, and the Spymaster Who Defied the Japanese in World War II* (New York: Penguin Books, 2017). Philips was known as “Agent High Pockets” and wrote an account of her exploits in 1947 entitled *Manila Espionage*.


\(^{199}\) Parsons and Smith delivered 50,000 rounds of .30-caliber and 20,000 rounds of .45-caliber ammunition as well as $10,000 in cash to the guerrillas on Mindanao. Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations*, 272; Stahl, *You’re No Good to Me Dead*, 24-25. *Tambor* was the lead submarine of its class.
ability to speak the local dialect and knowledge of Mindanao’s terrain. After landing, Smith proceeded to establish a radio station which could observe harbor traffic at Davao. Parsons for his part discussed MacArthur’s concept of guerrilla activities with Fertig and conducted a fact-finding mission on other islands in the Philippines before following Smith back to Australia.

With the success of the “Fifty” mission, Chick Parsons returned to Brisbane in July 1943, by which time operations of the PRS had expanded tremendously to include subsequent penetrations, including “Tenwest” (Sulu Archipelago) under Jordan Hamner. Hamner’s party was to watch the Sibutu Passage in the western Philippines near Borneo. Fatefully, AIB and PRS also agreed to send a party to Mindoro under American Major J.H. Phillips, a rather jovial officer who had been a planter on Mindanao before the war.

Mindoro and Mission I Shall Return-MacArthur (ISRM)

Leading the first AIB/PRS infiltration to Mindoro, Major Phillips was under orders to establish a coastwatcher network at Cape Calavite in order to observe traffic entering and exiting Manila Bay to the north. Whitney also intended Phillips to

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200 Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine, 54.
201 General Headquarters, Far East Command, Reports of General MacArthur, 301. With Charles M. Smith, Hamner had previously left Mindanao for Australia at the direction of Wendell Fertig.
202 Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 13 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
203 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 160.
“correlate the development of information from MANILA and Central LUZON,” and potentially “assemble a fishing fleet, manned by PHILLIPS’ agents, to patrol the entrance to MANILA BAY and the west coast of Luzon,” and even perhaps make contact with Ralph Praeger’s guerrillas on Luzon. Phillips would head a radio control station with the call letters ISRM, for “‘I Shall Return- MacArthur.”

The party bound for Mindoro was able to make use of the V-boat USS Narwhal (SS-167), one of two submarines that were larger than the fleet submarines used previously. Chick Parsons had been requesting these submarines for PRS missions from the U.S. Navy for some time and their use had finally been approved. With the Narwhal and its huge cargo capacity now available to AIB/PRS, Chick Parsons and Courtney Whitney, despite protests from Col. Ind, were able to push for the insertion of the Phillips party as soon as possible. This commenced a very rushed training program for Phillips

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204 Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 13 Sept 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. Whitney saw to it that Phillips was adequately financed to fund such a fleet if the opportunity arose.

205 Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 14 Oct 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

206 The U.S. Navy’s V-boats were conceived in the immediate aftermath of World War I, with nine submarines of varying designs eventually being built under this program. Norman Friedman, U.S. Submarines Through 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 292. One, the very large USS Argonaut (initially designated V-4 and later SM-1), was the only American submarine designed specifically as a minelayer. Argonaut did not participate in operations supplying the Filipino guerrillas but did carry a large number of U.S. Marines for a raid on Makin Island. Unfortunately, the Argonaut was destroyed near New Britain by Japanese destroyers in 1943 with the loss of 105 officers and men, the largest single loss by the American submarine force during the war. John D. Alden, The Fleet Submarine in the U.S. Navy: A Design and Construction History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 28-30; Clay Blair, Jr. Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 372-373. Two other V-boats, inspired by the long-range German cruiser submarines of World War I, were the scout/cruiser submarines USS Narwhal (initially designated V-5 and later SS-167) and USS Nautilus (V-6; SS-168). These two submarines were designed to operate at moderate speeds while surfaced, had long-range radios, and had very long endurance with a large capacity for fuel and supplies. Maximum surface speeds for these boats were just over 17 knots, and cruising range was an impressive 18,000 miles with a patrol endurance of ninety days. Approved for construction for the
and his operatives, which continued aboard the *Narwhal* under Parsons during the submarine’s run into the Philippines.

![Map of Philippine Islands Communications, 15 December 1943](image)

Figure 4. Philippine Islands Communications, 15 December 1943

A sizeable reception party, arranged in advance via radio, greeted Phillips and his party as they landed on Mindoro in late November of 1943. According to Ind, this “doomed” Phillips from “the moment he set foot ashore,” as such a large gathering could not fail to attract the attention of the Japanese, who were headquartered on Luzon.

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1926 Fiscal Year and laid down in 1927, V-5 (*Narwhal*) was commissioned on May 15, 1930 and V-6 (*Nautilus*) was commissioned on July 1 of the same year. Friedman, *U.S. Submarines Through 1945*, 167-168, 179-181, 176-179, 292.

nearby.\textsuperscript{208} Besides this misstep, however, it later became obvious that one of Philips’ men had betrayed the party and led the Japanese to Phillips’ location.\textsuperscript{209} On top of this betrayal, there were also suspicions that Phillips’ party used the same code keys to send multiple messages instead of varying them, thus allowing the Japanese to crack Phillips’ codes and track his station.\textsuperscript{210} This may have enabled them to know the location of an upcoming submarine resupply mission destined for Phillips.

Regardless of how the Japanese located Phillips’ party, a Japanese ground force attacked Phillips on February 26, near a site where he was to rendezvous with the USS \textit{Narwhal} on another resupply mission.\textsuperscript{211} Japanese troops shot and killed Phillips and several members of his party while they were bathing in a stream. However, as one could expect, word of Phillips’ fate took time to reach GHQ, and caused some confusion and consternation in AIB/PRS.

By March 1944, despite the intensity of Japanese operations on Mindoro and lack of contact from Phillips, Whitney remained confident that Phillips and his party would survive. Whitney wanted to send a second party into Mindoro to assume duties on the island’s west coast, retransmitting information from Luzon radio stations.\textsuperscript{212} Willoughby

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{208} Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, 161.
\bibitem{209} Dixon Earle, \textit{Mission ISRM “I Shall Return, MacArthur”: Al Hernandez and Guerrilla Operations in the Central Philippines} (1961; repr., North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014) 161. The man, given the name “Ortega” by the guerrillas, was eventually caught, put on trial by the guerrillas, and found guilty of the betrayal. He was then given the opportunity to fight the Japanese on a dangerous raid or face execution. Choosing the former, he died during an assault on Japanese forces.
\bibitem{210} Stahl, \textit{You’re No Good to Me Dead}, 76.
\bibitem{211} Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan}, 163.
\bibitem{212} Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 14 March 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
\end{thebibliography}
agreed to the second party, and MacArthur approved the preparation of a directive to organize it.\(^{213}\)

Gaining more complete information in May 1944, AIB and PRS finally found out that the Japanese had discovered and partially destroyed Phillips’ party on Mindoro, killing Phillips and several others. At this point, the G-2 section, and Major General Willoughby specifically, wanted Macario Peralta to assume command of the remainder of Phillips’ party on Mindoro, continuing the mission to watch the Verde Island Passage and Apo East Pass and “Correlate the development of information from Manila and Central Luzon.”\(^{214}\) The G-2’s intention was to not repeat the mistakes of Phillips’ party, but to give local autonomy to the operatives on the ground.

Courtney Whitney and the PRS were vehemently opposed to this plan, arguing that the importance of Phillips’ mission to the coming invasion of the Philippines required it to be “under close GHQ control and direction” as the mission was originally intended.\(^{215}\) Doubtless reflecting his disregard for the Filipinos, Whitney distrusted Peralta and refused to believe that Peralta “can do a job that this headquarters is unable itself better to do” in overseeing the party on Mindoro.\(^{216}\) As he always did, Whitney instead proposed three potential solutions which would maintain GHQ’s control over the

\(^{213}\) Charles Willoughby, “From: G-2; To: PRS,” dated 23 March 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{214}\) Charles Willoughby, “To: C/S; Re Peralta 91, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216,” dated 15 May 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{215}\) Courtney Whitney, “PRS to Chief of Staff,” dated 18 May 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

\(^{216}\) Courtney Whitney, “PRS to Chief of Staff,” dated 18 May 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
guerrillas: 1) Phillips’ party should be reinforced; 2) Peralta’s agent on Mindoro, a Major Jurado, be placed under direct PRS supervision; or 3) Col. Manzano, an AIB/PRS agent who was to direct an intelligence network on Luzon, be sent instead to Mindoro to take charge there.

Partially in accordance with Whitney’s recommendation, U.S. Navy Lt. Commander George F. Rowe’s Mission ISRM inserted into Pandan Island off Mindoro in order to set up a new radio net on Mindoro and provide intelligence on Japanese movements in and around Manila Bay.217 In addition to the nineteen men intended to accomplish those missions, four trained weather observers were also to accompany Rowe’s party, to be dropped off on Bohol and Leyte.218 The establishment of stations there, in addition to those already in existence, were deemed adequate to gather “reliable weather data” on the Philippines by the SWPA Air Force staff.219

On July 8, 1944, Lt. Al Hernandez and Sergeants Peter Aguilar and Julio Balleras conducted the initial reconnaissance for Mission ISRM, going ashore in a small life raft to confirm the weather and security situation were suitable for landing the rest of the party and their fifteen tons of supplies on Pandan.220 Hernandez eventually signaled that the area was clear, and around midnight the rest of the party landed with their supplies

218 Stephen J. Chamberlin, “From: G-3; To: Chief of Staff” dated 30 June 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
219 With the addition of these two new stations, SWPA GHQ had coverage of Luzon, Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Mindanao, Bohol, Leyte, Samar, and Palawan.
following several harrowing trips in the rubber boats. In contrast to the landing of Phillips’ party, Rowe’s more covert landing helped ensure greater secrecy for this subsequent mission to Mindoro.

The fate of Major Phillips provided a cautionary tale to Mission ISRM as Rowe assumed the duties of GHQ representative on Mindoro. By carefully avoiding direct contact with the Japanese and using more secure message codes, Mission ISRM turned out to be a success, with the intelligence network providing crucial information on Japanese movements, including the threats from Japanese suicide boats and Japanese reinforcements bound for Leyte. Eventually, the agents and guerrillas were placed under Brigadier General William C. Dunkel, commander of the Mindoro Landing Force, on December 15 when American forces landed.

Charles M. Smith and the Mission to Samar

Following the “Fifty” mission, AIB sent Charles M. Smith on a trip to the United States to acquire supplies for further clandestine missions. After returning to Australia from his trip to the mainland, Smith, now promoted to major, began organizing another party to conduct a penetration into the Philippines. Intending to get further north in the

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221 Ibid., 31.
archipelago than his last mission, Smith sought to land on Samar and southern Luzon to set up a radio and intelligence network.225 The network would assist GHQ in planning the coming Allied invasion of the Philippines.226 With him were two other Americans, Captain James L. Evans (a doctor, but along because of his skills as a radio operator) and enlisted radio operator and cryptographer Bob Stahl, as well as nine Filipinos selected by Courtney Whitney from the First and Second Filipino Infantry Regiments in California.227 The Filipinos were all fluent in Visayan and Tagalog, the most common languages on Samar and Luzon.228

On December 2, 1943, the USS Narwhal surfaced at Butuan Bay off the northeast coast of Mindanao to drop off Smith’s party as well as supplies for the guerrillas.229 Smith’s diligence allowed him to set up a radio control station and make contact with SWPA GHQ by December 20.230 By the end of December, Smith’s party departed from Mindanao after spending time with Wendell Fertig, undertaking the hazardous journey to Samar but arriving safely. Once on Samar, Smith began setting up a series of ten stations

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225 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 25.
227 Although they would eventually see combat in 1944, these regiments were undergoing repetitious basic training by the fall of 1943 and suffered from declining morale. Selection for penetrations into the Philippines by Whitney was thus very desirable. Courtney Whitney, “From: P.R.S.; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 16 Oct 43, Record Group 16, Box 63, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
228 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 46.
229 This was the Narwhal’s eighth war patrol, during which she also stopped off the coast of Negros and embarked evacuees. The Narwhal also shelled and sank the Japanese merchantman Hinteno Maru on December 5, 1943, before returning to Australia. USS Narwhal, “Deck Log Operational Remarks (War Diary), 2 December 44,” Record Group 24, Box 6476, Entry P-118-A1 “Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, USS Nautilus, Deck Logs 1941-1950,” NARA II; USS Narwhal, “Deck Log Operational Remarks (War Diary), 5 December 43,” Record Group 24, Box 6476, Entry P-118-A1 “Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, USS Nautilus, Deck Logs 1941-1950,” NARA II.
230 General Headquarters, Far East Command, Reports of General MacArthur, 305.
to watch the sea lanes running between Luzon and Samar. The call sign for Smith’s station was MACA, a reference to the way General MacArthur signed papers, “MacA.”231 Besides serving on Samar, agents manned locations on Masbate, Cebu, and south and central Luzon.232 The MACA stations were well-established and running smoothly by March 1944, but the humid climate began to short-out critical parts, and while Smith’s party had brought spares with them, the need developed for more.233

By April 1944, Smith was requesting from SWPA “all radio equipment and operators you can give me” and cryptographic equipment, as well as weapons, “propaganda supplies,” and morale items like cigarettes, magazines, and books.234 He put particular emphasis on the need for additional radio equipment, and Col. Whitney agreed to honor this request with the approval of the SWPA Chief of Staff Major General Richard K. Sutherland.235 Whitney and Sutherland also approved a shipment of 500,000 units of Japanese currency, $50,000 U.S., and 100,000 Filipino pesos to Smith. SWPA GHQ also dispatched a number of agents to augment Smith’s operations in May of 1944.236

Similarly to Villamor, Smith recommended keeping the intelligence net he was developing on Luzon separate from those developed by Parsons and Fertig because “by

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231 Stahl, You're No Good to Me Dead, 69.
233 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 76-77.
234 “To: Gen MacArthur; From: Smith, NR 84,” dated 16 April 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
235 Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Regional Section, “PRS Action Sheet No. 1638,” dated 16 April 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
this method we can get information which can be checked against other sources” and it would “also eliminate the possibility of the capture of one or two people causing the stoppage of all sources of information.”237 This proved largely correct, and despite some difficulties, Smith’s agents were generally able to avoid Japanese patrols and operations and send their reports unhindered, avoiding the fate of Phillips’ party on Mindoro.238

Ultimately, Smith’s network was successful in providing SWPA much-needed timely and accurate intelligence on Japanese movements, while also assisting the guerrillas by transmitting requests for needed supplies to MacArthur’s headquarters. Significantly, coastwatchers gave reports that contributed to the American victory at the Battle of the Philippine Sea.239 They also assisted in locating and rescuing downed Allied pilots.240 Although not all requested supplies were sent, those that did arrive were crucial to sustaining intelligence-gathering and guerrilla operations. As will be discussed in a subsequent chapter on guerrilla conflicts, Smith’s party, in large part due to Smith’s larger-than-life personality, was also successful in managing the competing guerrilla factions on Samar, which in part validates Whitney’s view that GHQ representatives should have managed the guerrillas.

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237 “To: Gen MacArthur; From: Smith, NR 84”, dated 16 April 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
238 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 122-123.
239 Ibid., 100-102.
240 Ibid., 152-153.
Chick Parsons

A prominent figure who has been mentioned previously, Charles “Chick” Parsons eventually undertook eight submarine missions to the Philippines to supply the Filipino guerrillas and liaise with them in the central and southern Philippines under the “Spyron” program, which among other accomplishments developed a system of coastwatchers to monitor Japanese naval movements.\(^{241}\) Parsons also used his talents to improve and oversee the use of naval facilities to transport supplies to the Philippines via submarines.\(^{242}\) According to Courtney Whitney, Parsons was able to make the most of the space available to him to transport supplies to the Philippines, noting “It is impossible to visualize the quantity of stores that he succeeds in forcing into the available space, at best extremely limited.”\(^{243}\) These supplies were much appreciated by the guerrillas and PRS agents in the Philippines.

Following Parsons’ first mission to the Philippines, Manuel Quezon had sent Philippine Army Major Emigdio Cruz to the islands after consultation with MacArthur and his staff. Landing on Negros on July 9, 1943, Cruz made his way to Manila to gain insight into the Filipino puppet government, arriving there on October 22.\(^ {244}\) Cruz proceeded to contact General Manuel Roxas, a Filipino politician with a detailed knowledge of the Japanese puppet regime in the Philippines. After several meetings with

\(^{243}\) Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 19 May 1944, Record Group 16, Courtney Whitney Papers, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
Roxas, Cruz gained sufficient detail on the puppet government to journey back to Australia, which he successfully did by early 1944, bringing valuable intelligence to SWPA GHQ. Meanwhile, Parsons had established contact with Roxas by the late summer of 1943 via his own private agents in Manila and was working to evacuate Roxas from the Philippines. Whitney made it clear that he thought Roxas should stay, and Roxas remained in the Philippines through the Allied liberation of the archipelago.

Parsons eventually made a second trip to the Philippines in October of 1943, staying on Mindanao for several months to expand his network of contacts in the Philippines and assist Wendell Fertig in consolidating the guerrillas on the island. Parsons would return to the Philippines a total of six more times, each time bringing supplies to the guerrillas, liaising with their leaders, and bringing intelligence and evacuees, including U.S. civilians, back to Australia. On January 29, 1944, Whitney recommended that Parsons be sent on the Narwhal’s fourth mission to the Philippines to deliver supplies to the guerrillas on Sulu, Cebu, and the 10th Military District on Mindanao, as well as supplying Major Philips on Mindoro while obtaining intelligence documents from him. As always, Whitney also recommended increasing SWPA GHQ’s span of control by making the Ozamiz Intelligence Net in Manila directly responsible to...

245 R.K. Sutherland, “To: Col. Courtney Whitney, Allied Intelligence Bureau,” 31 August 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. MacArthur, through Sutherland, made it clear that Parsons should have relayed to MacArthur the fact that he, Parsons, had established contact with Roxas.


MacArthur’s headquarters, ostensibly to “organize [the net] toward greater efficiency and utility.”\textsuperscript{248} The following month, Parsons did return to the Philippines, bringing supplies to Mindanao, Tawi, and Mindoro in partial accordance with Whitney’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{249}

In May 1944, Parsons recommended that he join the first round trip to the Philippines undertaken by the \textit{Narwhal}’s sister submarine \textit{USS Nautilus} (SS-168) to assist its crew with his experience, as requested by the \textit{Nautilus}’s commander.\textsuperscript{250} Although Whitney supported Parsons’ recommendation, General Sutherland disapproved it due to the pending reorganization of the Philippine Regional Section.\textsuperscript{251} This reflected the continued rivalry between Sutherland and Whitney, and showed that the latter’s influence was not absolute. Nevertheless, GHQ would continue to value Parson’s expertise and experience.

Because of concerns about civilian casualties on Leyte, SWPA GHQ reluctantly decided to infiltrate Parsons back into the Philippines, as there were concerns that radio messages to Ruperto Kangleon’s guerrillas could be intercepted.\textsuperscript{252} The area around Leyte had been heavily mined, making a submarine insertion difficult. Therefore, on

\textsuperscript{248} Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 29 January 1944, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
\textsuperscript{250} Chick Parsons, “Subject: First Trip Nautilus, From: Comdr Parsons; To: Col Whitney,” dated 18 May 1944, Record Group 16, Courtney Whitney Papers, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
\textsuperscript{251} Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 21 May 1944, Record Group 16, Courtney Whitney Papers, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA. Sutherland’s reply was handwritten on this message.
\textsuperscript{252} Wise, \textit{Secret Mission to the Philippines}, 146-149.
October 1944, on the eve of the American landings, Parsons flew into Leyte and conducted a secret evacuation of all civilians near Tacloban (the target of the coming pre-invasion naval bombardment) right under the noses of the Japanese. Following this success, Parsons became ill with malaria and after the American landings flew back to the U.S. for leave with his wife and children. After recovering, he returned to the Philippines and liaised with guerrillas on Luzon until the end of the war, following on the heels of the liberation of Manila.

Training for PRS Agents

Prior to Courtney Whitney’s appointment as head of the PRS, Allison Ind directed the training of AIB agents by the Australian Army in schools that had been training coastwatchers for assignment to New Guinea and other areas north of Australia. This included instruction in “intelligence gathering, commando skills, amphibious operations, radio operation, ship and aircraft recognition, weather observation, and other skills essential to combat intelligence work.” In September of 1943, Whitney was requesting U.S. Navy instructors to give classes to AIB/PRS agents on ship recognition and Navy blinker signaling, for use by such agents at coastwatcher stations.

253 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 24.
255 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 26.
256 Courtney Whitney, “Subject: Navy Instructors; To: Captain McCollum, U.S.N.,” dated 3 September 1943, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
By May 1944, Whitney was pushing for the training of his Filipino agents in sabotage, for while “prevailing policy [was] opposed to sabotage…as but provocative of increased enemy pressure upon the people and guerilla forces,” he wanted the agents ready to execute sabotage operations when the time came that SWPA desired such action.257 As of July 1944, SWPA agents under Whitney were being trained at Australia’s Fraser Commando School, headed by the Services Reconnaissance Department under Col. F. Chapman-Walker. Similar to previous training iterations, the typical course of study involved instruction in aircraft and ship recognition, sailing and navigation, map reading and compass employment, “jungle craft,” horse transport, and medical and weapons training.258 All-in-all, the training provided to PRS agents was generally sound, with the possible exception of the hurried training of Phillips’ party to Mindoro.

PRS Disbanded

By mid-1944, the intelligence and radio network in the Philippines was largely established. With the invasion of the Philippines imminent, it became clear to MacArthur’s staff that PRS had to coordinate with all of the various staff sections involved with planning the upcoming invasion. With that in mind, PRS was inactivated,

257 Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 14 May 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
258 F. Chapman Walker, “To: Col. Courtney Whitney, GHI, GHQ: Courses Carried Out at Fraser Commando School,” No. T806/N/26, dated 21 July 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
its personnel going to relevant staff sections while a small staff stayed on in an advisory capacity.\(^{259}\)

The G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Surgeon General, Adjutant General, and Chief Signal Officer at SWPA Headquarters assumed a variety of tasks that had previously been conducted by the PRS. Among administrative duties like handling mail brought back from the Philippines, the G-1 more importantly assumed responsibility for maintaining relations with the Filipino government in exile and determining how to provide relief for the Philippines once the liberation commenced.\(^{260}\) Importantly, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby’s G-2 Section assumed responsibility for maintaining the radio net, coast watcher system, and weather observation system in the Philippines and consolidating all intelligence coming from the archipelago, making it the staff section most actively involved with coordinating and directing the guerrillas. The G-3 Section maintained records of operations and guerrilla strengths and wrote operations orders, but had little to no operational control of liaisons to the guerrillas or the guerrillas themselves.

In accordance with SWPA GHQ Staff Memorandum No. 18, PRS was disbanded at noon on June 5, 1944. Courtney Whitney, far from happy with the disbandment, acknowledged that PRS was “viewed as saint by few and sinner by many” in his memorandum to the chief of staff regarding the disbandment, but closed by noting PRS’s


\(^{260}\) “Distribution of Responsibilities Concerning Internal Philippines: Both Military and Civilian, Prior to and Subsequent to D-Day,” dated 28 May 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Box 6, Folder 10, Record Group 16, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
“guiding spirit, infused in the hearts of many will carry on.”  Whitney continued to serve in an advisory capacity and was eventually promoted to brigadier general in January 1945.

Conclusion

The success of the AIB and PRS was mixed. While AIB provided significant and needed support to the guerrillas in the Philippines, it also had its share of missteps. Chief among these was Whitney’s insistence that the guerrillas be coordinated by SWPA GHQ, whether from Australia or through American representatives tightly controlled by SWPA. As Jesus Villamor made clear, the problems which GHQ would and did encounter in trying to directly control guerrilla operations from Australia would have been quite challenging, and a better course of action would have been to allow GHQ representatives, specifically Filipinos with knowledge of the islands, in the Philippines a great deal of local autonomy in coordinating and leading guerrilla operations. Whitney’s continual attempts to do otherwise hampered the efforts of the AIB/PRS and the guerrillas themselves, although Whitney eventually had to bow to reality. The fate of Phillips’ party on Mindoro was also an indication that infiltrating units to take a more direct role in the Philippines could be disastrous.

261 Courtney Whitney, “From: PRS; To: Chief of Staff,” dated 5 June 1944, Record Group 16, Box 64, File 7, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
For all its missteps, AIB/PRS did generally select good candidates to lead its special missions in the Philippines, benefitting from a number of personnel with extensive knowledge of the archipelago. Jesus Villamor was obviously very well qualified for his mission, given the number of contacts he possessed in the Philippines and his familiarity with the islands. So too were Charles M. Smith and George Rowe, as was Chick Parsons. The quality of AIB training was also good, a credit to the Australians and their established standards for instructing coastwatchers.

Despite Courtney Whitney’s attempts to tightly control operations from Australia, the PRS and AIB did achieve some success when infiltrating operatives into the Philippines but then allowing them to operate independently while providing needed supplies. The experience of Charles M. Smith’s party, and that of Villamor himself, bears this out. AIB and PRS also did eventually succeed in creating a strong network of radio stations to monitor Japanese movements and provided material support to the guerrillas in the Philippines. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, SWPA GHQ had a mixed record when trying to understand and resolve conflicts among the guerrillas during the Japanese occupation. More often than not, issues in the Philippines were solved locally.
Chapter 3: "Quarreling Among Themselves" - SWPA and Guerrilla Conflicts

The Filipino guerrillas fighting the Japanese during World War II were not a unified movement, but rather consisted of a wide variety of groups. They came from all walks of life and represented the entire spectrum of Filipino society, including those from different ethnicities, political ideologies, and socio-economic statuses. Given such variety, it is not surprising that individual groups would also have different goals. While most were ostensibly anti-Japanese, not all groups wanted to restore the previously-existing Filipino government. The Hukbalahap, or Huks, for example, ultimately wanted to institute a Communist regime in the Philippines, and they would continue to fight for this goal until the 1960s.262 Other groups remained loyal to the Filipino government-in-exile and eventually took orders from General Douglas MacArthur’s faraway Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) headquarters in Australia.

With the existence of conflicting loyalties and goals, problems and conflicts were bound to arise, especially as many, even most, guerrilla commanders sought

to increase their span of control and unite smaller groups under their own leadership. The guerrillas in the Philippines cannot therefore be viewed as a unified movement, but as a collection of disparate groups with competing goals, even if most sought to fight the Japanese. The process of consolidating guerrilla groups took a number of paths on various islands. On islands like Mindanao, Panay, and Bohol, those resisting Japanese occupation came to a consensus within a few months on who should lead a consolidated guerrilla movement; although, as will become apparent, there were sometimes still difficulties and disagreements in civil administration.\footnote{American Reserve officer Wendell Fertig became commander of guerrillas on Mindanao, while Filipino officers Col. Macario Peralta and 3rd Lt. Ismael P. Ingeniero became commander on Panay and Bohol, respectively. As will be discussed later, Peralta came into conflict with the guerrilla civil governor, Tomas Confesor, although fortunately for the movement on Panay their feud did not become violent. The various groups on Bohol agreed to become united under Ingeniero in November of 1942. Charles A. Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines} (New York: Vantage Press, 1972), 80.} On other islands like Leyte, there were power struggles, sometimes violent, between different groups before one emerged to dominate the others. Uniquely, on Luzon, there never was a single guerrilla commander for the entire island during the Japanese occupation, because “the obstacles of nature, the widely differing conditions in various parts of Luzon, and the sharply contrasting characters, personalities, and purposes of guerrilla leaders rendered effective centralized control over Luzon irregulars impossible.”\footnote{Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, \textit{Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945} (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 117-118.} This is not to say that there were not attempts to consolidate all of the guerrillas on Luzon, for leaders like American Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann tried several times to unite the guerrillas, but were uniformly unsuccessful for the above reasons.
From Australia, MacArthur’s headquarters encouraged and supported some guerrilla groups at the expense of others, even granting some commanders official recognition using the pre-war system of military districts, but generally continued to direct the groups from afar versus setting up a unified command in the Philippines. On Samar and Negros, SWPA did manage to have its own representatives set up a radio and intelligence network and unite a number of groups, but even these efforts resulted from agents on the ground taking the initiative to alleviate conflict. SWPA never appointed a united commander because there was consensus that a single commander would have great difficulty controlling groups throughout the archipelago given geographical considerations, not to mention differences in leadership philosophy, unit culture, and organization among existing groups. After returning from his mission to the Philippines at the end of 1943, during which he was able to liaise with many of the prominent guerrilla leaders, Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) agent Major Jesus Villamor noted that “Each major leader [was] professing to high heaven nothing but cooperation and goodwill to other units but actually working and maneuvering for control of the whole.” No one guerrilla leader possessed the resources or authority to dominate all of the others, with the result that it fell to SWPA to try to mediate conflicts and provide

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some kind of overarching command over the various groups. Given that situation, on Villamor’s recommendation guerrilla commanders were restricted to their respective islands.\textsuperscript{267}

U.S. military leaders decided it would be best for SWPA Headquarters to try to oversee the guerrillas and leverage the oversized personality of Douglas MacArthur as well as the authority of the Filipino government in exile to influence and control the guerrillas, although direct involvement would be limited. After examining case studies from the major islands in the Philippines, it is clear that SWPA had a mixed record with halting or minimizing inter-guerrilla conflicts. SWPA was most effective when it could provide a mediator on the ground or otherwise exert its authority directly, no easy task given the distances involved.

\textbf{Samar}

The guerrilla groups on Samar remained divided through much of 1943 and 1944. Philippine Army Col. Pedro V. Merritt, whose mother was Filipino and father was an African-American veteran of the Spanish-American War, controlled the guerrillas in the northern part of the island, while Manuel Valley (or Valle), a veteran of the Bataan Campaign, controlled the guerrillas in the south.\textsuperscript{268} In September of 1943, Ruperto Kangleon, guerrilla commander on Leyte, dispatched Filipino Lt. Col. Juan Causing to

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\item \textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
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Samar to try to get Merritt and Valley to submit to his authority and unite the Leyte and Samar guerrillas.\textsuperscript{269} This bid failed, and a subsequent attempt by Merritt to get Valley to submit to his command also failed and soured relations between the two groups.\textsuperscript{270} Merritt may even have been considering at one point accepting assistance from the Japanese if they offered him material support in the form of food and supplies.\textsuperscript{271}

Meanwhile, there were two other small groups which never submitted to either Merritt or Valley’s authority, demonstrating the difficulty of uniting groups even on individual islands. Interestingly, one of these organizations, the Pulhanes Group, was reputed to be receiving material support from the Japanese.\textsuperscript{272}

However, in early 1944, SWPA representative Lt. Col. Charles M. Smith, stationed on Samar to run an intelligence and radio network focused on Luzon and the Bicol islands, succeeded in convincing Merritt and Valley to accept him as their “co-coordinator.”\textsuperscript{273} Valley was open to cooperation, but according to Smith’s companion U.S. Navy Lt. Bob Stahl, who witnessed a meeting between Merritt and Smith, Merritt had to be convinced at gunpoint to stay out of Smith’s way as he united the guerrillas. Not one to mince words, Smith reportedly said, “Listen to me you \textit{black bastard!} I’m in control of this island. If you do anything to try to stop me, or to help the Japs stop me, I’ll cut off your balls and ship them back to Africa!”\textsuperscript{274} Merritt and Valley agreed to

\textsuperscript{269} Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 447. Interestingly, the guerrilla commander on Panay, Macario Peralta, also tried to get Merritt to submit to his command, but later confined himself to Panay after he was appointed commander of the 6th Military District.
\textsuperscript{270} Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 448.
\textsuperscript{271} Stahl, \textit{You’re No Good to Me Dead}, 75.
\textsuperscript{272} Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 448-449.
\textsuperscript{274} Stahl, \textit{You’re No Good to Me Dead}, 75.
submit to the command of whoever was appointed over them by SWPA Headquarters, and requested official recognition. 275 On October 4, 1944, SWPA Headquarters appointed Smith commander of the guerrillas in the Samar area. 276 The outcome on Samar demonstrated the fact that SWPA could effectively manage competing groups if it could provide a credible leader to unite them. In this case, that leader was an AIB agent, but on other islands, like Panay, guerrilla commanders already in the Philippines were able to unite the guerrillas in their location with little to no SWPA intervention.

Panay

On Panay in the Central Philippines, Col. Macario Peralta served as the principal commander of several thousand guerrillas. In February 1943 SWPA Headquarters appointed him commander of the Sixth Military District, which included Panay and outlying islands, adding a great deal of legitimacy to Peralta’s organization while also providing significant material support to Peralta via submarine. 277 Unlike guerrilla leaders on other islands, Peralta did not fight a long drawn-out power struggle in order to gain command of all of the guerrillas on Panay, as he created a strong organization by 1942 and “welded the people of the island of PANAY under his leadership into a

275 According to Col. Allison W. Ind of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, the guerrillas themselves proposed to Smith that he be their leader, a proposal to which he eventually agreed. Allison W. Ind, Secret War Against Japan: The Allied Intelligence Bureau in World War II (1958; repr., North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 200-201. Stahl later reported that after the aforementioned meeting between Smith and Merritt, the latter “…gave Smith very little help. Nor did he ever give him any trouble.” Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 75.


277 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands, 27 November 1944,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II.
solidarity of which no other guerrilla leader can boast.”  However, conflict on Panay still occurred, most prominently between Peralta and Governor Tomas Confesor, who headed the underground civilian government on Panay. Both Peralta and Confesor remained loyal to the Filipino government-in-exile, but the two men had significant disagreements on how the civil government should be administered on Panay, an island which was largely guerrilla-controlled except for occasional Japanese punitive expeditions.

Correspondence between Confesor and Peralta remained cordial from 1942 to 1943, but by late 1943 the relationship between the two men became strained. A significant source of disagreement was who was authorized to print money to pay both civilian and military (guerrilla) officials. While Peralta wanted to “assume full control and responsibility to print money,” Confesor argued that this was primarily a civil function that was authorized through President Quezon in exile, and the chairman of

280 Guerrilla groups printed a wide variety of currency during the Japanese occupation, including American, Filipino, and counterfeit Japanese bills. In many cases, the Filipino government in exile authorized these activities and sent plates for printing currency to the guerrillas via submarine. See Neil Shafer, *Philippine Emergency and Guerrilla Currency of World War II* (Racine, WI: Western Publishing Co., 1974).
Panay’s currency committee, appointed by Quezon, also reported to Confesor as civil
governor, and not to Peralta.\footnote{Letter to Lt. Col. Macario Peralta from Tomas Confesor, dated Nov. 6, 1943, Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 259, NARA II, 15.}

Conflict between Peralta and Confesor became even more heated in 1944 as Confesor received word from several of his deputy officials that Peralta’s guerrillas were abusing civilians. Although Peralta’s supporters acknowledged some abuses, such as theft, they argued that some of Confesor’s officials were also corrupt, and that the guerrilla leadership and local civilian leaders had often successfully dealt with misconduct among Peralta’s men at the local level.\footnote{Gamaliel L. Manikan, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island in the Philippines} (Manila, P.I.: The Sixth Military District Veterans Foundation, Inc., 1977), 496-497.} However, such measures did not satisfy Confesor, who argued that Peralta was allowing his men to abuse civilians for their own personal gain.\footnote{General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands, 27 November 1944,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II, 15.} Peralta had no qualms arguing in turn that Confesor was corrupt, informing MacArthur by radio “…Confesor does not practice what he preaches. I [Peralta] do not wish to see the prostitution of democratic principles and mockery of justice which we see… spread to other areas… if Confesor stooges are appointed to govern such areas.”\footnote{“Message NR 386, To: General MacArthur, From: Peralta,” dated 13 July 1944, Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 257, NARA II.}

Beyond issues over civilian-guerrilla relations, pay for civil officials also was a thorny issue. Peralta, operating under orders from President Quezon in exile, instituted a plan whereby civilian officials would draw their pay from Peralta’s finance officers, who received cash from MacArthur’s headquarters via submarine as well as through voluntary
civilian contributions. Confesor accused Peralta of trying to “sabotage” the government by having civilian officials draw their pay from guerrilla authorities.285

Allocation of troops was another source of friction. By May 1944, Confesor had requested a 200-man infantry rifle company from Peralta in order to protect himself from Japanese troops, a request which Peralta denied on the grounds that Confesor already had a 50-man personal bodyguard and Peralta’s troops could not be spared from operations against the Japanese.286 Confesor then appealed to President Quezon in exile to direct that Peralta supply the requested troops, although he had to use Peralta’s radio network to transmit the request and Peralta withheld the message for some time. SWPA Headquarters believed that Confesor’s request should be honored and argued that Peralta should support Confesor with a platoon, but not 200, guerrilla soldiers, which seemed to settle the matter.287 This was another case that demonstrated the convoluted nature of the Allied military and political command structure between Panay and Australia while also showing the complex relationships between different Filipino resistance factions ostensibly pursuing the same goals.

The controversy on Panay did not escape the attention of high ranking members of the staff at SWPA Headquarters. In assessing the controversy in July 1944, MacArthur’s Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Brigadier General Stephen J. Chamberlin,

285 Manikan, Guerrilla Warfare on Panay, 629-630.
287 Col. Courtney Whitney, “Memo 2166, Philippine Regional Section,” dated 01 May 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers. MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, VA.
noted “From this distance fair and impartial judgment of the matter upon its merits is impossible,” while acknowledging that both parties were likely at fault given that Peralta and Confesor were “strong willed, arrogant, and politically ambitious.”

The staff generally hoped Confesor and Peralta would resolve their issues on their own, realizing there was little they could do from afar. Chamberlin did recommend that a small shipment of supplies be allocated to Confesor directly to give him more leverage in dealing with the civilian population, as Peralta had generally been the sole recipient (and dispenser) of supplies from SWPA Headquarters.

Peralta’s Office of Civil Affairs (OCA) for the Sixth Military District (Panay) conducted a thorough study of the controversy in August 1944, concluding that the conflicts resulted from “(1) Obstructionism resulting from undue influence in military affairs and (2) Too much politics [sic] on the part of Gov. Confesor.”

The report went on to accuse Confesor of interference in intelligence gathering activities, attempting to create disharmony in the armed forces on Panay, failing to live up to promises to provide supplies and money to the guerrillas, and not properly representing the people of Panay or supporting the government in exile because of a refusal to replace corrupt officials—likely just officials who disagreed with Peralta and supported Confesor. The OCA ultimately recommended that “harmonious relations should be restored compatible with the military missions” of the guerrillas, and if Confesor were to be punished, it “should

288 “Re. PERALTA-CONFESOR conflict,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 257, NARA II.
289 Office of Civil Affairs, Sixth Military District, “Subject: Staff Study on the Present Conflict Between the District Commander On One Hand and Mr. Tomas Confesor and His Political Faction on the Other,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 257, NARA II.
be left to superior authority” in order to prevent violence.\footnote{Ibid. Interestingly, the report also recommended that “The safety of Gov. Confesor should be ensured as much as possible. It is necessary that he be alive after this war to answer for his conduct.”} Despite the obvious bias against Confesor in this report, it reveals some of the problems on Panay, such as factionalism within the guerrilla government and lack of supplies or an arbitrator within the Philippines, which perpetuated the conflict between the guerrilla commander and governor who were both trying to combat the Japanese while maintaining civil order.

The disagreements between Peralta and Confesor came to a head in December 1944, when Confesor outright accused Peralta of “the grave crime of SEDITION [sic]” for attempting to undermine the civil government on Panay after guerrillas under Peralta arrested a number of Confesor loyalists who plotted an attack on Peralta.\footnote{Tomas Confesor, “Proclamation,” dated December 16, 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Record Group 16, Box 11, File 3, “Tomas Confesor,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, VA.; Manikan, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare on Panay}, 632-633.} The accusations against Peralta included failure to comply with court orders; undermining the civil government by appointing officials who were not approved by Confesor; persecuting civil officials whom Peralta disliked; paying civil authorities directly with army funds to make them answerable to Peralta’s group; and allowing his men to participate in banditry, murder, and unlawful trafficking of goods.\footnote{Tomas Confesor, “SUBJECT: Charges Against Col. Macario Peralta, Jr., Commander of the 6th MD, PA, USAFFE,” dated December 24, 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Record Group 16, Box 11, File 3, “Tomas Confesor,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, VA.} These accusations were not entirely unfounded as Peralta became frustrated with Confesor and those loyal to him and tried to encourage replacement of officials who supported Confesor.\footnote{Manikan, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare on Panay}, 630.}
At this point, the potential for violence was high. However, officers in SWPA Headquarters, as well as officials under President Sergio Osmeña, the Philippines’ new president, decided to evacuate Confesor from Panay early in 1945 to prevent a clash of arms. Confesor then submitted documents charging Peralta with sedition to the new Secretary of National Defense in the Philippines but there seems to have been no action taken against Peralta, likely because he was busy preparing to support the upcoming American landings.

Ultimately, SWPA Headquarters and the Filipino government were able to effectively resolve the issues between Peralta and Confesor without bloodshed, with the evacuation of Confesor from Panay allowing Peralta to focus on paving the way for the American landings in March 1945. Shortly after the landings, General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, awarded Peralta the Distinguished Service Cross for his work as a guerrilla commander. Peralta later became the Thirteenth Secretary of National Defense in the Philippines. After World War II, Confesor served as the Philippines’ Secretary of the Interior and as a Senator in the Filipino Congress.

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294 Ibid., 636-639.
295 Major General Basillo J. Valdes was the new secretary of National Defense. Memorandum, Tomas Confesor to Basillo Valdes, dated January 15, 1944, Courtney Whitney Papers, Record Group 16, Box 11, File 3, “Tomas Confesor,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, VA.
297 Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, 280.
While the situation on Panay was resolved rather peacefully, with both men going on to successful postwar careers, other conflicts between guerrilla groups were not ended so easily. On Leyte, there were two primary groups struggling for recognition by MacArthur’s headquarters: Philippine Constabulary Lt. Blas E. Miranda’s Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces (WLGWF) and Philippine Army Lt. Col. Ruperto Kangleon’s Leyte Area Command. Although initially WLGWF was the stronger and better organized of the two groups, ultimately it did not receive recognition from SWPA Headquarters. Instead, SWPA Headquarters granted official recognition to Kangleon’s guerrilla group in October of 1943, with MacArthur designating Kangleon commander of “all loyal forces on the Island of LEYTE.”

The reasons for the conflicts between the two groups originated with the confused command situation among the Filipino guerrillas at this point in the war, which partially reflected the paternal relationships within Filipino society. MacArthur’s Headquarters had recognized Macario Peralta as commander on Panay and Wendell Fertig as the head guerrilla commander on Mindanao, granting them authority to appoint guerrilla leaders on nearby islands. Both men claimed Leyte in their respective districts. While Peralta supported Miranda, Fertig supported Kangleon. In part because Fertig was closer to

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302 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay and Neighboring Islands, 27 November 1944,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 258, NARA II.
SWPA Headquarters and in better communication with it, as well as the fact that influential U.S. Navy Lt. Commander Chick Parsons also supported Kangleon, SWPA agreed with Fertig’s choice of Kangleon as commander on Leyte.\textsuperscript{303}

In contrast to the situation on Panay, disagreements between Miranda and Kangleon on Leyte turned violent. In December 1943, fighting broke out between Miranda’s and Kangleon’s groups in the “Baybay Affair.”\textsuperscript{304} A Captain de Gracia, serving under Kangleon, had been in Baybay with some of his guerrillas to see a girl and decided to hold the barrio for Kangleon after hearing reports of Miranda’s activities in the WLGWF area. Miranda sent his fighters to expel de Gracia from Baybay, a town in “his” jurisdiction, and while de Gracia’s men resisted and allegedly killed some two hundred of Miranda’s men in exchange for eight killed and thirty captured, de Gracia and his troops were forced to retire when Miranda deployed two .50-caliber machine guns in the firefight.\textsuperscript{305} Relations between the two groups then broke down completely, although Kangleon’s men refrained from fighting their countrymen and left Miranda’s group alone for the time being.\textsuperscript{306} Shortly thereafter, Miranda’s base was destroyed by Japanese raids

\textsuperscript{303} Lear, “The Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces,” 90. Parsons conducted a number of resupply and liaison missions to the guerrillas in the Philippines aboard U.S. Navy submarines sailing from Australia. For more on his missions, see Travis Ingham, \textit{Rendezvous by Submarine} (1945), recently republished as \textit{MacArthur’s Emissary: Chick Parsons and the Secret War in the Philippines in World War II} (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., 91, n30.

\textsuperscript{305} Ira Wolfert, \textit{American Guerrilla in the Philippines} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 141-142. This work, although authored by Wolfert, is a memoir by Kangleon’s chief of staff, American officer Iliff Richardson.

\textsuperscript{306} In a slightly different account of the battle, historian Elmer Lear notes that Kangleon’s forces “were decisively repulsed” during their incursion into Miranda’s territory despite “initial successes.” Lear does agree that a Japanese reoccupation of Leyte broke up Miranda’s group. Conversely, M. Hamlin Cannon, in the official U.S. Army history of the Leyte Campaign, writes that Miranda was “routed” by Kangleon’s men and his surviving followers joined Kangleon. M. Hamlin Cannon, \textit{United States Army in World War II: The War in The Pacific- Leyte: The Return to the Philippines} (1953; repr., Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S Army, 1993), 17.
tipped off by collaborators, and although he evaded the Japanese, Miranda himself was later captured by Kangleon’s men.\textsuperscript{307}

By 1944, Miranda’s group was effectively dissolved and many of his supporters began working under Kangleon. That summer, Kangleon, besides acting as the chief guerrilla commander on Leyte, had even “assumed supervision and control of [the] provincial government” after the Japanese captured the Filipino governor.\textsuperscript{308} The conflict on Leyte was only solved through force of arms and the complete elimination of one group to the benefit of the other. In this case, SWPA Headquarters did little to mediate the conflict between Miranda and Kangleon. One might speculate that the Miranda-Kangleon conflict can account for the fact that the Leyte guerrilla movement was not nearly as effective as those on Panay and Mindanao, as the infighting between rival groups likely diverted guerrilla efforts away from operations against the Japanese and wasted valuable resources including men and ammunition.

\textbf{Cebu}

Following the withdrawal of most Japanese forces after the landing of a strong invasion force in 1942, two primary guerrilla groups emerged on Cebu, divided geographically. The shadowy American Harry Fenton, a radio announcer and former


\textsuperscript{308} General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, “Philippine Activities: Significant Messages from P.I., Received 23 June, with G-2 Comments, No. 8,” dated 23 June 1944, Record Group 496, Entry 115, Box 611, NARA II.
U.S. Army enlisted man, led guerrillas on the northern part of the island, while Lt. Col. James M. Cushing, a mining engineer commissioned into the U.S. Army at the outbreak of the war, led the guerrillas in the southern and central regions of Cebu. In the middle of 1942, realizing that they could be most effective against the Japanese if they cooperated, Fenton and Cushing created a dual command, with Fenton overseeing the administrative headquarters and Cushing acting as the head of the combat headquarters.

While the dual command structure was successful, by early 1943 rumors about Fenton’s private life emerged and began to discredit him. Additionally, Fenton had taken a heavy hand in trying to eliminate those he suspected of collaborating with, supporting, or spying for the Japanese, ordering dozens of summary executions. Fenton also denied the need for outside support, and did little to alleviate a growing problem with food shortages on the island. A final lapse which turned many guerrillas against Fenton was the fact that he refused to print guerrilla currency to pay his troops. This drove many guerrillas and civilians to support a unified command under Cushing.

311 Upon his return from the Philippines, AIB agent Major Jesus Villamor reported that “It was not until FENTON began to get scandalously involved with women that his popularity began to decrease.” Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement*, 265, 477.
Disagreeing with Fenton on the need for outside support, Cushing made his way to Negros in July 1943 to confer with AIB agent Major Jesus Villamor in order to secure aid. Cushing and Villamor discussed Fenton’s many issues, including the fact that Fenton was broadcasting wild and vitriolic anti-Japanese radio messages that reached all the way to San Francisco and leaked valuable intelligence to Japanese forces. Cushing and Villamor went over a number of solutions to the issues with Fenton, but concurrent events on Cebu would make these discussions moot.

During the meeting between Cushing and Villamor, Lt. Col. Ricardo Estrella, Cushing’s executive officer who was left in charge on Cebu, took matters into his own hands and convinced several guerrilla battalion commanders of the necessity to eliminate Fenton. With little opposition, a force from several battalions captured Fenton and several officers loyal to him. Tried for violating several Articles of War, Fenton was found guilty and summarily executed on September 15, 1943.

Upon his return from Negros, Cushing was rather displeased with Estrella’s handling of the situation. Estrella was put on trial and executed on January 2, 1944, although some sources dispute whether this occurred under Cushing’s orders. Regardless, the situation on Cebu revealed the importance of maintaining the support of the local people and one’s own guerrillas and demonstrated that violence could occur

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314 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 125.
among guerrilla leaders if SWPA was unaware of problems and did not intervene.

Appointed commander of the 8th Military District by SWPA Headquarters in January 1944, Cushing remained the sole guerrilla commander on Cebu until the liberation of the Philippines by Allied forces.  

Negros

Although the guerrillas on Negros, who eventually comprised the Seventh Military District, formed “one of the best organized guerrilla units that operated in [the Philippines] during World War II,” they did take some time to get organized due to the fact that the various groups on the island were initially quite fractured. Soon after the surrender of American and Filipino forces on Luzon, most of the 4,500 Filipino forces on Negros went home or moved to the mountains in preparation for conducting a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese.

Major Salvador Abcede, the ROTC Commandant at Silliman University, had refused to surrender to the Japanese, as did Major Ernesto S. Mata, an honor graduate from the Philippine Military Academy. Both organized guerrilla groups in the immediate aftermath of the surrender, as did Lt. Herminigildo Mercado in Negros Oriental. As mentioned earlier, at the urging of some of his former students and athletes he coached,

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318 Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I, 313.
320 Baclagon, They Chose to Fight, 12-13, 10.
321 Ibid., 17.
Professor Henry Roy Bell, a professor at Silliman University, also organized a guerrilla unit consisting of Silliman alumni and others at an American evacuation camp in Malabo, although given his academic background Bell did not feel qualified to command such a unit.322

By 1942, Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, who had been in nominal command of the forces on Negros before the surrender, was the ranking Filipino officer on the island, but initially Gador did not want to be associated with the guerrillas, as he thought that their presence would invite Japanese reprisals.323 Gador initially turned down offers from Roy Bell and Abcede to command their organizations.324 However, Gador changed his mind in late 1942, deciding that he wanted to assume command of all guerrillas on Negros, perhaps in response to word that the guerrillas had made contact with MacArthur’s headquarters. Gador also tried to bring guerrillas led by Lt. Mercado under himself, but Mercado was unwilling to relinquish his autonomy despite multiple orders to do so. The conflict turned violent in November 1942 when some of Mercado’s men, attempting to assess damage caused by the Japanese at La Libertad, were fired on by guerrillas under Gador, killing one of Mercado’s guerrillas.325

Abcede meanwhile had been consolidating control of most of the guerrilla units in northern and central Negros, issuing directives on the size of guerrilla units and rules of

322 Baclagon, They Chose to Fight, 18; Scott A. Mills, Stranded in the Philippines: Professor Bell’s Private War Against the Japanese (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 51-52.
323 Ibid., 69.
324 Baclagon, They Chose to Fight, 19.
325 Ibid., 71.
engagement in September 1942. The next month, Abcede received orders from Col. Macario Peralta, commander of the IV Philippine Corps on Panay, announcing formation of the Negros Island Command (answerable to Peralta) around the Filipino 72nd Division with Abcede as commander. Gador, however, contested Peralta’s authority, and later issued his own directive assuming command of the corps in the Visayas. Elsewhere, on Negros Oriental, Philippine Constabulary Officer Major Placido Ausejo placed himself under the command of Wendell Fertig on Mindanao, who derived his authority from SWPA headquarters. By February 1943 Ausejo and Abcede would find themselves at odds with each other over the command of the Negros guerrillas. This confusing situation, with commanders on other islands overseeing different commanders on Panay, partially resolved itself when Fertig relinquished command of Ausejo’s group to Abcede in November of 1942. Eventually, SWPA Headquarters settled the convoluted nature of the command on Negros when it approved the revival of the pre-war system of military districts, with Negros designated the Seventh Military District under SWPA agent Jesus Villamor and then Abcede independent of Peralta and Fertig.

Despite such developments, as 1942 came to a close the guerrillas on Negros remained divided between a number of groups, the most prominent led by Gador, Mata,

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326 Ibid., 28.
327 Ibid., 29.
328 Ibid., 74.
329 Ibid., 55.
330 Major Douglas C. Murray, “Alfredo Montelibano (Governor of Negros, appointed by Quezon, during the occupation),” dated 13 June 1947, RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 298, NARA II. This document was part of a guerrilla unit recognition file for a unit in northern Negros.
331 Baclagon, They Chose to Fight, 62. Fertig initially wanted to maintain control of Ausejo’s group, but an appeal from Abcede persuaded him to yield.
Mercado, and Abcede. In January 1943, AIB agent and SWPA representative Major Jesus Villamor arrived on Negros with orders to establish an intelligence network in the Philippines, but he was disturbed by the lack of unity among the Negros guerrillas, which would impede the creation of a reliable network. Villamor established himself in Abcede’s headquarters and brought in prominent guerrilla leaders, including Gador, Abcede, Mata, for a conference in May 1943. Villamor went so far as to temporarily assume command of the 7th Military District, to the approval of most of the guerrilla factions, who respected his authority as a SWPA agent. While Mercado did not submit to Villamor’s command initially, not being satisfied with the position as a subordinate commander that was offered to him, he eventually provided his roster of troops to Villamor’s staff and agreed to serve under him.

Suddenly in command of the guerrillas on Negros, Villamor oversaw a peace accord among the warring guerrilla groups, appointed a civil administrator in the person of Professor Bell, and established a civil government under Alfredo Montelibano, pre-war governor of Negros Occidental. Significantly, Villamor also instituted regular pay for the guerrillas, which did much to increase his base of support among both fighters and the civilian population. Despite such progress, however, Gador refused to submit to Villamor’s authority, at one point asserting that he remained the ranking guerrilla on

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333 Baclagon, *They Chose to Fight*, 34.
334 Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I, 312.
336 Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines*, 126. Montelibano had also been Mayor of Bacolod City. President Quezon approved Montelibano’s appointment as civil governor on June 9, 1943. Baclagon, *They Chose to Fight*, 14, 71.
Negros and should be commanding all of the guerrillas in the Visayas. Ignoring such assertions, Villamor was able to leverage his authority when Gador requested weapons and ammunition that Villamor had received via submarine. Villamor refused to supply Gador because he “had severed himself from the 7th [Military District].” The newfound efficiency that Villamor sparked in the Negros guerrillas convinced a number of Gador’s subordinates to join Villamor. With the loss of much of his support, Gador eventually left Negros for the island of Cebu and then Bohol. After returning to Australia in October, Villamor recommended Captain Abcede as commander of the 7th Military District, with SWPA Headquarters approving Abcede’s appointment in March 1944. In this case, SWPA managed to effectively unite the Negros guerrillas through the initiative of one of its own agents, Jesus Villamor, even if it was more through Villamor’s actions on the ground than any prior planning by SWPA Headquarters.

Luzon

Given its large size and population, one might assume, rather correctly, that the island of Luzon had the widest variety of groups resisting Japanese occupation, and therefore had the most potential for guerrilla conflict. Such was most certainly the case, as groups of different military and socio-economic backgrounds, political ideologies, and leadership styles clashed over resources, land, and populations while also trying to exert

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338 Baclagon, *They Chose to Fight*, 77.
authority over other groups, even those with ostensibly the same goals. As in its dealings with and between groups on other islands, SWPA again had a mixed record handling conflicts between guerrilla groups on Luzon, and this record revealed the difficulties of influencing an insurgency from a distance.

On Luzon, a first case of note was the conflict between Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso’s Hunters ROTC guerrillas and ex-boxer and bus driver Marcus Augustin’s (also known as “Marking”) group, known as Marking’s Guerrillas or the Marking Regiment. As one could imagine, Adevoso’s group had at its core a number of former Filipino ROTC cadets, while Marking’s Regiment included a broader segment of society mostly from the lower classes. Although initially MacArthur’s headquarters viewed Marking’s unit, including his love interest and second-in-command female reporter Yay Panlilio, as “unscrupulous,” both Marking’s guerrillas and the Hunters ROTC would earn the respect of American forces during the Allied liberation of Luzon in 1945.341

Despite the fact that the Hunters ROTC and Marking’s guerrillas eventually became bitter enemies, for several months in the spring and summer of 1942 they cooperated to eliminate informants for the Japanese.342 Despite disagreements over resources, in the fall of 1943 the Hunters tried to collaborate with Marking’s Regiment, but these efforts failed.343 However, in early 1944, a shooting incident occurred between

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342 Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance, 461-462.
343 Ibid., 462.
the two groups over the alleged mistreatment of civilians over confiscation of a gun, with the Hunters executing a small party of Marking’s men who were threatening Hunter supporters at gunpoint. Marking vowed revenge, and from then on the two groups became openly hostile toward one another. American officer Ray C. Hunt, leader of another guerrilla group on Luzon, noted in a postwar memoir that the two groups “quarreled a great deal among themselves.” While Hunt had a somewhat subdued opinion of the matter, Robert Lapham, another American officer leading the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) on Luzon, cited the conflict between Marking and Adevoso as the “fiercest feud between rival guerrilla groups on the whole island,” with “gunfights, kidnapping, and executions” being common events between the two groups operating in close proximity to one another.

Lapham accurately attributed the conflict to the fact that the two groups were competing for the same base of support in Rizal Province, including supplies, trails, recruits, and even female companionship, as well as the class and age differences between the Hunters and Marking’s men. The Hunters were often young, educated members of the upper or middle class, while Marking’s guerrillas were commonly older members of the less-privileged classes. Early friction between the two groups in 1942

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344 While the details of the incident are not fully clear, it appears the Marking detachment was seeking to punish a Hunter supporter named Igme who had beaten an older man while trying to acquire the old man’s pistol. The Markings were in Igme’s house threatening him when a squad of ten Hunters arrived, forcefully disarmed the Marking guerrillas, led them outside, and shot them. One of the Markings was a relative of a prominent Hunter and was made a prisoner. Proculo L. Mojica, Terry’s Hunters (The True Story of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas) (Manila, P.I.: Benipayo Press, 1965), 303-304.
345 Ibid., 462.
348 Ibid., 109; Mojica, Terry’s Hunters, 272-273.
stemmed from the shortages of weapons available to the guerrillas, with Marking’s men in several cases trying to or succeeding in confiscating arms that were in the hands of Hunters.\textsuperscript{349} Other controversies involved the delineation of boundaries between the two groups, which determined where each group could acquire food and in what quantities.\textsuperscript{350}

After the shooting of the Marking guerrillas in February, the next major fight between the Hunters and Marking’s troops occurred a month later when a force of 300 “Markings” attacked the headquarters of Hunter leader Terry Adevoso at the town of Mayamot, forcing Adevoso to flee and capturing a number of Hunters and supplies including the Hunters’ standard.\textsuperscript{351} The Marking force was in turn routed by a large Hunter patrol which recaptured Mayamot. The Hunters proceeded to acquire a large number of arms from Lapham’s ECLGA and other groups and prepared for more fighting.

Hostilities between the groups continued throughout the spring and summer of 1944, in the “last and longest feud between the Hunters and the Marking Guerrillas.”\textsuperscript{352} A force of 80 Hunters surprised a 300-man Marking unit in April, killing fourteen Markings while taking four seriously wounded men prisoner.\textsuperscript{353} In May, Marking’s guerrillas, the Hunters, and Japanese troops were involved in a three-way firefight outside the town of Ermita, with the Hunters withdrawing to the Antipolo Mountains while the

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 277-278, 280.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., 315-317.
\textsuperscript{352} Major Vicente Novales, “History of the San Juan ‘Hunters,’ 3rd Battalion, 44th Regiment, 44th Division,” circa January 1946, Record Group 407, Entry 1093, Box 496, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{353} Mojica, \textit{Terry’s Hunters}, 323-324.
Marking unit withdrew to the southeast with the Japanese in hot pursuit. Eventually, the Japanese would take advantage of the conflict between the Markings and Hunters and attack Marking’s lightly defended main base camp in the town of Baras. Although many of Marking’s troops and noncombatant supporters managed to escape, this disruption clearly demonstrates the fact that the inter-guerrilla conflict was counterproductive.

Nevertheless, while the feud between these two groups was vicious, neither managed to destroy the other, and with the intervention of another guerrilla leader, American Bernard Anderson, on behalf of MacArthur’s headquarters, the feud ceased in August 1944. Both the Hunters ROTC and Marking’s Regiment managed to survive to the end of the war, making significant contributions to Allied success in liberating the Philippines by assisting American forces in seizing key terrain on Luzon. In this case, benefitting from the fact that there were a number of guerrilla groups on Luzon, SWPA

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354 Ibid., 327-329.
355 Ibid., 332-333.
356 Willoughby, *Guerrilla Resistance*, 462; Mojica, *Terry’s Hunters*, 336. Willoughby stated that the feud lasted until April, but the Hunters’ records indicate fighting continued until at least June, after which Anderson intervened to halt the fighting in August. The author has taken Willoughby’s April date as a misprint.
was effective in using a third-party guerrilla leader as an intermediary to stop conflict, an effort which was ultimately successful.

Not all conflicts on Luzon were violent, however. In the absence of a clear chain of command, American officers leading guerrilla groups often argued over who should lead whom. Marking’s unit became closely associated with a unit led by American officer Col. Hugh Straughn, the Fil-American Irregular Troops. Under an agreement between Straughn and Marking made in June 1942, their units would fuse if either leader were ever killed or captured, with the remaining leader assuming command of the amalgamated guerrillas.358 However, following Straughn’s capture in 1943, some of his units refused to fall under Marking’s command and preferred to remain independent.359 Marking, preoccupied with expanding his organization in other sectors as well as fighting the Japanese, was unable to bring these units into his organization, demonstrating the difficulty of uniting guerrilla groups on Luzon.

Further north, Lt. Robert Lapham, an American officer who commanded the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) to the northwest of Manila, was in a contest over authority with a guerrilla leader to his north, Col. Russell Volckmann, commander of the United States Army Forces in the Philippines- Northern Luzon (USAFIP-NL) during most the occupation. While Volckmann outranked Lapham, the latter disagreed with many of Volckmann’s policies, and because Volckmann could not exert any direct

358 “A Brief Historical Sketch of the [sic] Marking’s Fil-American Troops,” RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 258 “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
359 General Headquarters, Fil-American Irregular Troops, “Brief History, Activities, and Accomplishments, Etc. of the FAIT,” RG 407, Entry 1094, Box 257, “Guerrilla Narratives and Historical Reports,” NARA II.
authority over Lapham due to the distances involved, Lapham remained independent until the Allies landed on Luzon.

Lapham also had disagreements with Lt. Edwin Ramsey, commander of the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA). Ramsey’s memoir claimed that Lapham agreed to bring his group under the ECLGA and serve as Ramsey’s second in command in 1943.\(^{360}\) Lapham denied that this agreement occurred and in the event it would not have been practical, as the ECLGA and LGAF, and each group’s respective areas of operations and lines of communication, were too far apart to make consolidation possible.\(^{361}\) As Ramsey later left the countryside for Manila proper, Lapham was left to his own devices.

A final case presented an interesting problem for SWPA Headquarters as well as many of the guerrilla groups on Luzon. This was the Communist group known as the Hukbalahap, or Anti-Japanese Army, commonly referred to as the Huks. The Huks grew from a small band in 1941 to a force numbering some 100,000 guerrillas and supporters by 1945, and while they were at odds with the Filipino government prior to the Japanese invasion, they sought to create a unified front with Communist and non-Communist guerrilla groups at the outset of the Japanese occupation.\(^{362}\) Initially, despite ideological differences, relations between the Huks and guerrilla groups supported by SWPA and the Filipino government-in-exile were cordial. American Col. Russell Volckmann, who


\(^{361}\) Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 59.

would later command the large guerrilla group U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines-Northern Luzon, was able to safely traverse Huk territory in 1942, the Huks even providing him with guides and supplies.363 Under the direction of SWPA Headquarters, American-supported guerrillas of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) led by U.S. Army Col. Charles A. Thorp attempted to bring the Huks under the USAFFE umbrella in May 1942.364 This effort, however, failed to come to fruition as the Huks, while eager to receive American assistance and recognition as well as fight the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Philippine Constabulary, refused to relinquish control of their operations and sought to put themselves in a position to gain power in the postwar Philippines.365 Thorp, focused on military objectives, could not oblige them to fall under his command. From that point on, the Huks and various American-supported groups on Luzon remained wary of one another.

Therefore, unlike most other guerrilla groups examined here, the Huks remained outside the structures implemented by SWPA Headquarters. Relations between the Huks and groups that drew support from the Filipino government-in-exile and/or the United States were quite violent in a number of cases as groups fought over bases of support. In one example, the Huks competed with American Lt. Col. Bernard Anderson’s guerrillas

365 The Japanese-supported Philippine Constabulary (PC) was often under attack by American-supported guerrilla groups as well as the Huks and was in many cases infiltrated by guerrilla sympathizers. The Huks attacked the PC whenever they knew they could score a public relations victory while acquiring PC arms, as in an attack on a PC patrol in Arayat in September 1944. Jose Y. David, Senior P.C. Inspector, “Encounter against Hukbos in Balite, Arayat on September 6, 1944,” dated September 11, 1944, Record Group 407, Box 257, NARA II.
of the Bulacan Military Area (BMA) for arms and supplies. Anderson’s guerrillas were often ambushed by the Huks when they tried to obtain arms from the population in Bataan, with the result that Anderson’s men often went away empty-handed. In another case, the Hunters ROTC, who had previously worked with the Huks in 1942, fought them in the Bulacan area two years later because the Huks were harassing and attacking local civilians.

For the ECLGA forces under American Lt. Edwin Ramsey, the Huks represented an irreconcilable enemy. Ramsey noted that the leader of the Huks, Luis Taruc, put a price on his head as a “Japanese sympathizer and traitor. The ECLGA guerrillas fought the Huks almost as much as they did the Japanese, waging an “all-out war.” In one incident, the Huks feigned a parlay with one of Ramsey’s units and then ambushed and killed all of them. In another confrontation, a group led by Ramsey himself found their way forward blocked by a heavily-armed Huk detachment shortly before American forces landed on Luzon. Ramsey convinced the Huks to let his group pass by saying that anyone who harmed his group would have to answer to General MacArthur when he arrived.

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American officer Robert Lapham’s Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) to the north of the ECLGA also came into violent conflict with the Huks, and Lapham later acknowledged “Early in the war we spent as much time fighting the Huks and various pro-Japanese individuals and groups as we did combatting the Japanese themselves.”

Lapham’s first encounter with the Huks, a friendly meeting, saw the Huks steal weapons and supplies from Lapham and his men, which set the tone for subsequent interactions. Thenceforth, combat occurred between the LGAF and Huks over bases of supply and support. Sometimes the Huks would outright ambush Lapham’s patrols in order to acquire weapons and supplies, and in one case attempted to kill Lapham’s executive officer. Neither group was strong enough to destroy the other, although low-level violence continued throughout the occupation.

Despite these violent conflicts, the Huks cooperated with other groups and U.S. Army troops when it suited them, especially when it helped them gain publicity and support for their cause. During the aforementioned Los Baños prison camp raid, which saw a combined guerrilla-U.S. Army force liberate prisoners in Japanese captivity, a number of Huk squadrons guarded the drop zone used by American paratroopers of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment tasked to assault the camp. The Huks also served

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373 Lapham and Norling, Lapham’s Raiders, 98.
374 Ibid., 134.
375 Ibid., 134, 135.
as guides and interpreters for the U.S. Army’s 37th Infantry Division during the drive to liberate Manila, capital of the Philippines, in early 1945.377

During the period before Allied forces landed in the Philippines, SWPA was unable to bring the Huks under its control, nor was it able to prevent the guerrilla groups it supported from fighting with the Huks and diverting efforts away from the Japanese. Only when American troops landed on Luzon in large numbers, serving as a military juggernaut that could not be ignored, did the Huks cooperate with and assist pro-American guerrilla groups and U.S. Army units.

Conclusion

Given all of these events, how effective was MacArthur’s headquarters at managing conflicts between guerrilla groups? Suffice it to say that its record was mixed, which demonstrates the difficulties of trying to influence rival groups from afar. SWPA proved effective at resolving conflicts when it could provide a mediator to work with warring groups, as in the case where American officer Bernard Anderson negotiated an end to the feud between the Hunters ROTC and Marking’s guerrillas. This proved beneficial and allowed each group to devote its efforts to fighting the Japanese versus combatting each other. In this case, SWPA benefitted from having a third-party guerrilla, Anderson, on Luzon who was willing to take orders from MacArthur’s headquarters. In

the case of the Hunters-Marking conflict, SWPA exploited existing circumstances effectively.

On Negros and Samar, SWPA representatives trying to develop intelligence and radio networks, Jesus Villamor and Charles M. Smith, found the inter-guerrilla conflicts so counterproductive to their missions that they intervened on behalf of SWPA to stop infighting and foster unity. This was not by design, as SWPA Headquarters seemed largely unaware of these conflicts, but instead involved these AIB agents negotiating as they saw fit with the rival factions by leveraging their authority as SWPA representatives, and potential sources of supply. SWPA was fortunate that these men took the initiative to resolve conflicts and ultimately foster successful and effective units which severely hampered Japanese pacification efforts.

SWPA success in dealing with conflicts elsewhere was less apparent. On Panay, SWPA Headquarters, along with the Filipino government in exile, used radio messages to clarify its positions and resolve disagreements between Peralta and Confesor, but ultimately it was only through removal of one of the feuding parties that conflict ended. While this solution was less than ideal, SWPA Headquarters was able to prevent outright violence in this case, perhaps because the two factions were fighting over mainly administrative and governance issues versus outright control.

Such cannot be said for SWPA involvement on Leyte, where fighting broke out between Miranda and Kangleon’s men. SWPA ultimately “resolved” this conflict by choosing to support one group, Kangleon’s, over the other. However, it was not SWPA support which allowed Kangleon to prevail- the Japanese were the ones who destroyed
Miranda’s group. This demonstrated the ability of the Japanese to operate effectively on Leyte, something they may not have been able to do had Miranda and Kangleon cooperated with one another. SWPA’s involvement in choosing sides may have been a catalyst for conflict, although it is likely that infighting may have broken out anyway between the two big personalities of Kangleon and Miranda.

Cebu also saw its share of conflict, although it was more a top-level power struggle for control of an already-unified organization overseeing the entire island versus a fight between two separate groups. SWPA had little direct involvement in this matter. Instead, through advice from Jesus Villamor and the initiative of mid-level guerrilla leadership, Fenton was arrested and executed, paving the way for Cushing to take sole control of the Cebu guerrillas.

A final case on Luzon demonstrated the fact that SWPA’s success in dealing with guerrillas that did not acknowledge its leadership, in this case the Huks, was limited. SWPA was also unable to prevent or mediate conflicts between the guerrillas it was supporting and the Huks. It was only when SWPA was operating on Luzon proper with the U.S. Sixth Army that SWPA was able to successfully influence the Huks and gain their cooperation.

The ultimate success of many guerrilla groups in the Philippines during World War II in part hinged on SWPA support, material and otherwise, and an examination of the conflicts listed here help clarify what that support looked like and how effective it was. SWPA was only successful in resolving about half of the cases highlighted here, because it was limited by the distances involved and because it was best able to influence
groups through direct intervention, either through AIB agents or when it arrived in force. Otherwise, SWPA had great difficulty in getting the warring factions to come to terms with one another, and often had to sit on the sidelines as the groups fought. SWPA’s experience is cautionary to those who would try to influence and support a dispersed and fractured guerrilla campaign from afar.
Chapter 4: Setbacks and Successes: The Guerrillas from 1943-1944

On December 7, 1944, an exchange of gunfire between a young guerrilla and a combined Japanese Army-Filipino militia raiding force interrupted the morning silence near the Calubcob Hospital of the 2nd Battalion, 44th Regiment, Hunters ROTC guerrillas on Luzon. Likely guided by local Japanese sympathizers, the raiders had infiltrated past most of the guerrilla guards and were intent on seizing the hospital and the nearby guerrilla headquarters. The guerrilla, a sixteen-year-old on probationary status with the Hunters, was mortally wounded, but the gunfire warned his comrades of the approaching raiding party. Captain Felix “Paul Jones” del Rosario, the local guerrilla commander, quickly deployed his troops to defend his headquarters while ordering others to protect the hospital located across a stream. Intense Japanese fire drove back Rosario’s troops, and the raiding force seized the hospital, capturing several prisoners and a prized guerrilla typewriter. In a pattern repeated hundreds of times during the Japanese occupation, however, the guerrillas broke up into smaller groups, evading the Japanese dragnet and eventually conducted hit-and-run attacks on the raiding force. These attacks resulted in five Japanese dead. The Hunters were bloodied but survived, an experience
replicated by many of the guerrillas elsewhere on Luzon and other islands from 1943 to 1944.378

The period from 1943 to the return of Allied forces under Gen. Douglas MacArthur was challenging for the guerrillas as they worked to utilize and preserve their limited resources while surviving Japanese counter-guerrilla efforts. In addition to encouraging the guerrillas to gain popular support by maintaining civil order, MacArthur ordered them to refrain from taking direct actions against the Japanese to reduce the chance of reprisals against the civilian population.379 Not all groups heeded this directive, and those that did not had varying degrees of success in attacking Japanese forces and installations. As MacArthur predicted, attacks against the Japanese brought severe reprisals, with the Japanese often conducting punitive expeditions which targeted guerrillas and civilians alike.

Several figures and organizations in MacArthur’s headquarters, especially the AIB and PRS, preferred the guerrillas gather intelligence and prepare to fight the Japanese once American forces returned to the Philippines. Supported by AIB/PRS agents, the guerrillas were successful in gathering intelligence. Besides tracking Japanese troops and ship movements and reporting them to SWPA GHQ via radio, the guerrillas also captured Japanese documents and forwarded them to MacArthur’s headquarters by sending them back on submarines which brought in agents and supplies.

An intelligence coup by the guerrillas on Cebu, which provided valuable information on Japanese naval forces prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, is probably the best example of guerrilla success in intelligence gathering. However, intelligence provided by the guerrillas could be misleading when it came to Japanese troop numbers, as one could expect of intelligence collected by amateurs with little training in intelligence gathering. Nevertheless, in the case of Luzon, guerrilla intelligence on Japanese numbers provided a more accurate predictor than that provided by ULTRA intercepts alone. Regardless of any inaccuracies, the intelligence the guerrillas provided to SWPA GHQ on Japanese dispositions and plans was crucial to the success of the Allied invasion.380

While the policy limiting direct action may have been prudent in not drawing attention to the guerrillas and reducing the possibility of Japanese reprisals, to maintain the support of the local population many guerrilla groups had to periodically conduct some kind of direct action against the Japanese. On Leyte, for example, Ruperto Kangleon was compelled to fight Japanese forces in early 1944 because of widespread outcry following Japanese punitive expeditions. The Huks on Luzon were fairly adept at attacking Japanese forces at opportune times and quickly following up with newspapers and pamphlets proclaiming their exploits to their largely peasant support base.381

381 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45, Volume Two (1965; repr. Diliman, Quezon City, P.I.: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 704-705.
such as these allowed the guerrillas to gain recruits and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace.

During this period, guerrillas were not restricted to conducting intelligence-gathering missions or direct attacks and sabotage against the Japanese. Guerrillas also produced a variety of newspapers to send out their messages, counteracting Japanese propaganda and working to raise and maintain Filipino morale. The first, New Era, a single-sheet daily newspaper covertly produced in Manila, was published in February 1942.\(^{382}\) Col. Guillermo Nakar’s Matàng Lawin (Hawk’s Eye), enjoyed some prominence in Northern Luzon until Nakar’s capture ceased publication.\(^{383}\) From 1943 to the end of the occupation, the Huks, Hunters ROTC, and Panay guerrillas published a number of papers which gained widespread distribution in their areas. The most commonly distributed paper in central Luzon, and one cited most often by Filipino historians, was Leon O. Ty’s Liberator, which had been formerly edited by Vicente Umali of the PQOG.\(^{384}\) The Japanese would arrest and often execute those possessing guerrilla papers, and some leaders, like Bernard Anderson, refused to produce newspapers or distribute SWPA-printed pamphlets for fear of Japanese retaliation against civilians.\(^{385}\)

\(^{382}\) John Lent, “Guerrilla Press of the Philippines, 1941-1945,” Asian Studies 41, Retrospective Issue No. 2 (1970; repr. 2005), 117. The editor, Manuel Buenafe, used a mimeograph machine to produce the paper for some six months, but after the Japanese required the registration of all mimeograph machines, the paper was produced less regularly.

\(^{383}\) Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 704.

\(^{384}\) Lent, “Guerrilla Press of the Philippines,” 118-119; Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 706.

During this period, the Japanese also inaugurated the nominally independent Philippine Republic on October 14, 1943 under the leadership of President Jose P. Laurel.\textsuperscript{386} Intended to gain allegiance from Filipinos, the majority of whom had rejected the Japanese occupation, the granting of independence garnered the Japanese little support. This was largely because the path to Philippine independence, already prepared for in large measure by the Philippine Commonwealth government, was not in doubt, and many Filipinos saw the Japanese occupation as disruptive to progress towards that goal.\textsuperscript{387}

Therefore, from 1943 to 1944, continued faith in the return of the United States and the Commonwealth government by the majority of the Filipino populace made it difficult for the Japanese to root out the guerrillas entirely. Despite harsh punitive measures, the Japanese were rarely able to succeed in completely destroying guerrilla units, with the guerrillas, especially the leadership, often escaping to other areas. Even when the Japanese did succeed, an example being their capture of colonels Noble and Moses in northern Luzon, the basic guerrilla organizations were remained intact. In this case, Moses and Noble were merely succeeded by another American army officer from within their organization, Russell Volckmann. The Japanese lacked the troops to secure a single major Philippine island in its entirety, much less all of them, and by 1944

\textsuperscript{386} The Japanese chose Laurel in large part because of a guerrilla assassination attempt against him on June 6, 1943. Wondering why the guerrillas had not targeted more prominent collaborators, such as Jorge Vargas, the Japanese wrongly concluded that Laurel was very pro-Japanese. This led the Japanese to elevate him in hopes of installing a leader favorable to them who could win support away from Manuel Quezon’s government-in-exile. David Joel Steinberg, \textit{Philippine Collaboration in World War II} (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), 75.

\textsuperscript{387} Steinberg, \textit{Philippine Collaboration}, 71.
guerrillas controlled the majority of territory on Panay and Mindanao, with significant abilities to affect Japanese forces on Luzon, Negros, Cebu, and to a lesser extent on Leyte and Samar. These capable guerrilla forces remained a significant factor during the liberation, providing intelligence, seizing key nodes, and fighting alongside their Allied counterparts. The Japanese failure to destroy the guerrillas during the occupation meant Japanese troops would face a sophisticated hybrid conventional/guerrilla threat when MacArthur’s forces began their invasion of the archipelago in October 1944.388

Luzon

For the guerrillas on Luzon, 1943 began tenuously. The Japanese used their extensive number of troops on Luzon, eventually totaling some 267,000 soldiers, to secure areas in which the guerrillas operated, all the while recruiting informants to ascertain the guerrillas’ whereabouts.389 However, for the guerrillas there were some hopeful developments. Captain Ralph Praeger of the Cagayan Apayao Force had managed to salvage a radio transmitter from a mine in Kapugao and was able to send messages to SWPA GHQ in Australia, including transmissions from colonels Moses and Noble of the USFIP-NL.390 The contact with SWPA GHQ raised morale and allowed the

388 For more on hybrid warfare, see Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
389 The figure of 267,000 troops was as of December 1944. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA, Table 7.1, 182.
390 Lapham and Norling, Lapham’s Raiders, 140.
guerrillas to pass along updates on themselves, give intelligence on the Japanese, and request aid.

Unfortunately, such developments could not offset Japanese counterguerrilla measures, and by the end of 1943 key leaders of the guerrillas in Northern Luzon had been killed or captured, including American Lieutenant Colonels Arthur Noble and Martin Moses as well as Major Praeger. The Japanese captured Noble and Moses on June 2, 1943, and several days later the guerrilla leaders were forced to sign a letter to the USAFFE guerrillas at large imploring them to surrender to the Japanese. The letter was largely ignored by the guerrillas, and Russell Volckmann, formerly a signal officer with the 11th Division, took command of the USFIP-NL. The Japanese executed Noble and Moses soon after.

Subsequently, and likely spurred by intelligence from the capture of Noble and Moses, the Japanese undertook increased patrols in USFIP-NL’s area of operations, searching for Volckmann and one of his trusted subordinates, U.S. Army officer Donald Blackburn. However, the Japanese were unable to locate either leader. Japanese patrols lessened by the end of June to focus on other areas. Volckmann then took it upon himself to reorganize the USFIP-NL, placing emphasis on intelligence-gathering and avoiding

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391 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 320. Praeger had been promoted to major over the course of 1943.
contact with the Japanese in compliance with SWPA directives.\textsuperscript{394} Volckmann divided north Luzon into seven districts, each with its own regimental commander, reducing the number of commanders reporting to him directly.\textsuperscript{395} These men commanded all military leaders in their districts and were also responsible for maintaining civilian support in their areas. He also formed a general staff along the lines of an American division headquarters to manage the operations of USFIP-NL.

Volckmann’s main actions after June 1943 focused on espionage and counterespionage, building up intelligence-gathering on Japanese forces while eliminating Japanese spies and informants within the USFIP-NL area. USFIP-NL combat forces continued to expand as well, growing from 2,000 to 8,000 active guerrillas in less than a year, with a reserve of additional personnel able to bring Volckmann’s forces to 15,000 combat troops supported by 15,000 service personnel.\textsuperscript{396} Besides these combat troops, who could occupy sections of the front line, Volckmann stood ready to provide MacArthur’s forces with accurate and timely intelligence.\textsuperscript{397} No doubt helped by the rugged terrain, which made Japanese penetration into his base areas difficult, Volckmann would be well-prepared to support Allied forces with troops in the front lines when the U.S. Sixth Army landed on Luzon early in 1945.

\textsuperscript{394} Volckmann, \textit{We Remained}, 122.
\textsuperscript{395} Subsequent reorganizations would see one district detached to the Central Luzon guerrilla forces and two others combine under one commander. Ibid., 124. The five regiments were designated 14th, 66th, 121st, 11th, and 15th Infantry Regiments. Headquarters, USFIP North Luzon, “Subject: Amendment of Date of Recognition of ‘United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon’,,” NARA II, 10.
\textsuperscript{396} Volckmann, \textit{We Remained}, 154.
\textsuperscript{397} Volckmann’s directive to his field units on the eve of the Allied invasion of Luzon directed them to, among other things, observe Japanese reactions to Allied diversionary bombardments and track Japanese routes of withdrawal away from Allied forces. GHQ, USFIP, NL, “Subject: D-Day Intelligence; To: All District Commanders,” dated 4 December 1944, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 251, NARA II.
While Volckmann worked to increase the organization and effectiveness of USFIP-NL, Lt. George Barnett, another American mining engineer, managed to incorporate remaining elements of the 121st Infantry Regiment into his La Union Regiment and breathed new life into it. Continuing direct action against the Japanese, despite MacArthur’s orders to the contrary (orders which, plausibly, Barnett claimed to have never received), Barnett’s force “became the best-organized and best-armed unit in North Luzon” according to one noted historian.398 Russell Volckmann was eventually able to merge Barnett’s force with his own USAFIP-NL in 1944.

Meanwhile, to the south, Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim, while imprisoned at Camp O’Donnell and after his release, sought to assemble a guerrilla network, ultimately hoping to command a “home army” that could take back control of Manila and Central Luzon from the Japanese.399 However, Lim, as a prominent Filipino military leader, was under constant surveillance and felt pressure to swear an oath to the Laurel government. According to some reports, Lim was even forced to make anti-American statements, drawing the ire of the Filipino government-in-exile and the American government. Lim was unable to create any kind of substantial guerrilla unit, much less consolidate the Luzon guerrillas under his command.

Foiled in uniting the guerrillas on Luzon, and feeling pressure from the Japanese Kempeitai, Lim attempted to escape from the archipelago to Australia in June 1944.400

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400 Meixsel, Frustrated Ambition, 258-259.
Unfortunately, while sailing from Manila to rendezvous with an American submarine off Negros, Lim’s boat was stopped by a Japanese patrol craft. Finding a pistol and a radio in the boat, the Japanese incarcerated Lim and his companions, first on Mindanao and then at the infamous Fort Santiago in Manila on Luzon. The Japanese tortured Lim and his companions for several weeks using a number of methods, including sleep deprivation, beatings with a lead pipe, and driving sharpened bamboo between the prisoners’ fingernails. Following this rough treatment, a court-martial on November 24, 1944, convicted Lim of treason and sentenced him to death. Although the exact date is unknown, the Japanese likely executed Lim a few days later.401 His body, thrown into an unmarked grave in Manila North Cemetery, was never found.

Guerrilla units in South and Central Luzon, including those near Manila, also felt pressure from Japanese forces. Several of the guerrilla squadrons under Bernard Anderson in the Bulacan area had to surrender to the Japanese in January 1943 because of a series of Japanese “punitive expeditions.”402 Nearby, the ECLGA under Edwin Ramsey also had its share of setbacks. The Japanese captured the group’s initial leader, Captain Joe Barker, on January 13, 1943 after torturing his bodyguard into revealing his whereabouts.403 Brevet Major Augustín Aquino, Jr., commander of the ECLGA’s 4th

401 Ibid., 262.
403 Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lt. Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander (1990; repr., Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 150-151. Barker’s bodyguard, nicknamed “Tarzan,” did not reveal Barker’s location outright. Instead, under torture, he revealed the location of ECLGA propaganda officer Alejandro Santos. Santos and his staff were subsequently captured, and one of Santos’ staff officers let on that Tarzan was Barker’s bodyguard. The kempeitai then tortured Tarzan into revealing Barker’s location.
Battalion, Guerrilla Service Troops in the vicinity of Manila, died of gunshot wounds sustained in a May 9, 1944 raid on his headquarters by a Philippine Constabulary company augmented by six Japanese soldiers. The Japanese located and attacked Edwin Ramsey’s headquarters on Mount Balagbag on January 2, 1945, after finally triangulating his radio transmitter. Despite an intense firefight where the ECLGA made good use of its .50-caliber machine guns, Ramsey and the ECLGA headquarters staff displaced to the town of Tala.

However, Ramsey’s group in particular still enjoyed some successes against the Japanese. Ramsey continued to develop an extensive espionage network in Manila, despite the fact that the Japanese captured many of his agents and at times dismantled large parts of the network through intelligence from captured guerrillas and spies. While Ramsey generally refrained from direct actions against the Japanese to prevent reprisals against or collateral damage to the civilian population, his operatives conducted limited low-risk sabotage operations. These included actions like pouring sugar into vehicle gas tanks or setting fire to supply depots. Significantly, in the summer of 1944, feeling bolder as Allied forces approached the Philippines, Ramsey ordered a large-scale sabotage operation, having agents place a series of homemade explosives at key infrastructure targets on the docks in Manila on July 15. While a few of the would-be saboteurs were caught, tortured for information, and executed, a number of the devices detonated in dramatic fashion, destroying several oil tanks and even a Japanese tanker.

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404 Brevet Major Antonio E. Ventura, “General Orders No. 3,” dated 9 June 1944, East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area, Manila Military District, Box 246, Entry 1087, RG 407, NARA II.
ship. However, such incidents, while raising morale among the guerrillas and civilians, had little actual effect on the ability and effectiveness of Japanese forces. Nevertheless, despite disease, malnutrition, and Japanese pressure, the ECLGA remained a force in being and continued to pass vital intelligence to American forces on the eve of the invasion.

Unlike other groups, Robert Lapham’s LGAF was able to grow during this period with relatively little Japanese interference. Lapham’s group succeeded in setting up its own radio transmitter and transmitting through AIB agent Col. Charles Smith on Samar to make contact with SWPA GHQ on July 1, 1944. With SWPA finally aware of their needs, the LGAF received shipments of weapons, equipment, and medicine on August 31, 1944, via the submarine USS *Narwhal* (SS-167), and again in October via the *Narwhal*’s sister submarine USS *Nautilus* (SS-168). By the end of 1944, after distributing the weapons delivered by the submarines, Lapham could boast of several additional squadrons of troops, including a seventy-man Chinese unit, and his forces totaled several thousand fighters. Unlike other guerrillas on Luzon, Lapham’s LGAF

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406 Ibid., 255-261.
408 Ibid., 144-145, 148. Smith sent Capt. Robert V. Ball to the LGAF and Ball helped Lapham immensely in setting up the transmitter.
409 Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 152, 155; Theodore Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II* (1949; repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 517. Under the direction of Lapham and AIB agent U.S. Navy Commander Charles “Chick” Parsons, the guerrillas built a number of bamboo rafts to unload the supplies from the *Narwhal* and bring them ashore.
410 Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 157, 185. Lapham would claim some 10-12,000 active guerrillas by June 1945.
did not suffer greatly from a shortage of food, because the LGAF was positioned in Luzon’s main agricultural area.411

The Hunters ROTC guerrillas under Terry Adevoso underwent several reorganizations during 1943 and 1944. At the beginning of 1943, the unit had established itself in ten towns and three bases camps in Rizal and Laguna Provinces, with command divided between two districts corresponding to each province.412 Besides local units, Adevoso found it necessary to establish a number of mobile forces which could attack fast and quickly escape from Japanese counterguerrilla operations. Despite the betrayal of a number of Hunter leaders by two traitors, Hunter units also organized in Cavite in the first six months of 1943.

The second half of 1943 saw especially harsh Japanese counterguerrilla operations characterized by population relocation, but the Hunters continued to disperse and expand throughout the countryside in accordance with Adevoso’s directives. Japanese forces conducted large-scale patrols into guerrilla base areas in Central Luzon near Manila while also forcibly relocating the population in a policy the Filipinos referred to as the “zona.”413 The Japanese also formed village defense units armed with bamboo spears, which accounted for a number of guerrilla losses. In more urbanized areas, the Japanese would cordon off a city block with plainclothes police and kempeitai officers, segregate the males in the block, and proceed to search it for contraband, including firearms and guerrilla documents, while arresting suspected guerrilla supporters. While

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411 Ibid., 144.
412 Mojica, Terry’s Hunters, 69-70.
413 Ibid., 349-351.
these Japanese measures were quite effective, causing the guerrillas the loss of many leaders and underground intelligence operatives and devastating guerrilla morale, many Hunters were able to disperse to other areas with fewer Japanese troops. The ability of the guerrillas to evade Japanese patrols enabled them to retain their strength.

When the Philippine Republic under Jose Laurel convinced the Japanese to grant guerrillas general amnesty in the interests of peace, the guerrillas were granted a crucial respite from Japanese operations.\textsuperscript{414} Few guerrillas took up the offers of amnesty, surmising that the offers were made from a position of weakness and deeming the offers a ruse.\textsuperscript{415} Enjoying a break from Japanese operations, the guerrillas were able to recover their strength, and the Hunters ROTC launched a number of high-profile operations in 1944, including a major raid on the Bilibid Prison.

Operating in close proximity to the Hunters, Marking’s guerrillas also felt the effects of Japanese pressure. An operation that the Japanese launched on April 18, 1943, lasted for three weeks and kept the guerrillas on the run, severely disrupting their operations.\textsuperscript{416} While the Japanese netted few guerrillas and Marking avoided a ruse enticing him to surrender, the Japanese took their anger out on the population of Rizal, arresting, torturing, maiming, and executing suspected guerrilla supporters, but gaining little intelligence. Harsh Japanese measures ensured that the civilian population would continue to support the guerrillas after the occupiers left Rizal to secure other areas.

\textsuperscript{414} Ibid., 357.
\textsuperscript{416} Agoncillo, \textit{The Fateful Years, Volume Two}, 654.
The Huks, after a brief reorganization, continued their previous attacks against Philippine Constabulary garrisons and Japanese supply depots in January 1943. These tactical successes drew them more followers, with their strength doubling from 5,000 to 10,000 fighters between the end of 1942 and March 1943.\(^{417}\) A 5,000-man Japanese operation to isolate and assault the Huks’ Mount Arayat base in March 1943 lasted ten days and netted just under one hundred guerrilla prisoners and several members of the group’s General Headquarters staff, while disrupting fourteen of the Huks’ 100-man squadrons.\(^{418}\) Nevertheless, most Huks escaped the Japanese dragnet, gaining confidence from the Japanese failure to destroy their base and winning further recruits. The Huks continued to grow and developed village defense units, which helped support the main Huk units logistically while helping them form their own local governments. However, by 1944 the activities of the Huk movement slowed due to disagreements between the group’s leader, Luis Taruc, and the Communist Party of the Philippines. While Taruc wanted to continue direct attacks on the Japanese, the party leadership wanted to consolidate their political base.\(^{419}\) Taruc would also fight against units loyal to the Filipino government in exile. By late 1944 the Huks would again conduct more active recruitment and tactical operations, taking advantage of Japanese retreats in the face of American forces.\(^{420}\)

\(^{418}\) Ibid., 21.
\(^{419}\) Ibid., 22, 25.
\(^{420}\) Ibid., 26.
Ultimately, the number of Japanese forces on Luzon prevented full-scale guerrilla offensive action. However, the guerrillas still made their presence felt, so much so that a Japanese reporter would write “The threat of the guerrillas constantly hung over occupied Manila. It constituted the chief problem for the Japanese military administration and cropped up in almost every conversation with Japanese officials and Filipino newsmen.”

Additionally, severe Japanese punitive campaigns, while dealing setbacks to the guerrilla organizations, rarely resulted in the complete destruction of guerrilla units or the capture of their commanders. Guerrilla mobility, and effective, sometimes brutal, counterintelligence measures on the part of the guerrillas largely prevented the Japanese from finding and fixing guerrilla forces. When the Japanese did capture guerrilla commanders, as occurred in North Luzon, competent subordinates, oftentimes other military officers, were able to continue fighting against the Japanese. Going into 1945, the Japanese would have their hands full with the guerrillas on Luzon as well as the formidable Allied forces invading the island at Lingayen Gulf.

Mindanao

Due to the relatively small size of Mindanao’s Japanese garrison and the guerrilla’s greater support from and contact with SWPA, guerrilla groups on Mindanao

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421 This is another quote from Tatsuki John Fujii’s unpublished memoir, an excerpt of which is available in “Manila in June 1943,” from Philippine Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Third Quarter 2000), pp. 415-419. The quote comes from page 417.
were more active than those on other islands in 1943 and 1944. Besides sending Charles Smith, John Hamner, and Albert Smith to Australia via boat to contact SWPA GHQ, Fertig also worked to gain contact with MacArthur via radio. On February 20, 1943, Fertig transmitted to MacArthur that he had organized the Mindanao guerrillas into nine regiments totaling 650 officers and 10,300 men. He emphasized that they were short of arms, and that ammunition levels “cannot sustain the present harassing guerrilla activities.”

MacArthur replied two days later, designating Fertig commander of the Tenth Military District and having the AIB send supplies to him via submarine. Fertig also took advantage of advice provided by Commander Chick Parsons, who counseled Fertig as the Tenth District commander worked to consolidate the Mindanao guerrillas.

Fertig subsequently adopted the table of organization of a Philippine Army Reserve Division for his forces and used a mobile general headquarters because a stationary one would be vulnerable to Japanese attack. Indeed, Fertig’s headquarters came under Japanese direct fire or aerial attack a number of times during the occupation. Later, as the guerrilla force expanded, Fertig established a number of divisions, creating the “A” Corps under his former chief of staff, Col. Robert Bowler, on January 1, 1944, to command and administer the 105th, 106th, 108th, and 109th Divisions in Western Mindanao. By May of that year, Fertig’s forces would include six divisions, numbered 105th to 110th.

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422 Tenth Military District Headquarters, “History of the Mindanao Guerrillas,” The Wendell Fertig Papers, Box 1, AHEC, 30.
Given the level of guerrilla activity on Mindanao, Japanese reprisals were particularly harsh. The 10th Military District’s official history lists ten pages of Japanese atrocities, including mass rapes, the burning of prisoners alive, bayoneting bound prisoners, beheading guerrillas and displaying the heads as a deterrent, and gouging out eyes and amputating appendages.\textsuperscript{425} In and around Davao City, civilians were often killed indiscriminately for no stated cause. As on other islands, the Japanese tortured prisoners to gain intelligence by particularly vicious methods, including cutting a prisoners’ legs with a razor and rubbing salt into the open wounds, pulling out a prisoner’s nails with pliers, burning a prisoner’s genitals or other areas with a lit cigar, sitting a prisoner in a bucket of water charged with electricity, hanging a prisoner by their thumbs, and abusing a prisoner’s wife to make him give up information. Prisoners were literally worked to death at the Davao Penal Colony. Such measures certainly won the Japanese few friends on Mindanao, and given the inability of the Japanese to hold areas for extended periods of time, generally failed to serve as an effective deterrent to end support for the guerrillas.

The popular resentment caused by Japanese punitive measures and lack of Japanese troops on Mindanao allowed Fertig to grow his organization to some 38,000 guerrillas by January 1945. The Mindanao guerrillas provided SWPA with significant amounts of intelligence using their seventy radio transmitter stations and network of coastwatchers.\textsuperscript{426} Controlling 90 percent of the island, the guerrillas were well-

\textsuperscript{425} “Chapter XI: Japanese Atrocities,” in “History of the Mindanao Guerrillas,” The Wendell Fertig Papers, Box 1, AHEC.
positioned to assist Allied forces in the liberation of the Philippines, having also secured four airfields in various locations. Arguably, Fertig had built the most potent guerrilla organization in the archipelago and would be able to achieve complete control of Mindanao with minimal assistance from SWPA forces after they invaded in 1945.

Panay

1943 and 1944 would see Macario Peralta solidifying and expanding the guerrilla forces on Panay, especially after SWPA designated him commander of the 6th Military District in February 1943. However, this period would also see the Japanese increase their pressure on the guerrillas. Beginning in December of 1942, the Japanese launched their first offensive against the guerrillas, moving into southern Iloilo and causing great destruction, but many of the people and guerrillas were able to disperse into the hills and return to the area after the Japanese departure. For the next six months, Japanese forces launched more brutal punitive drives, but in many cases because the Japanese troops were too few in number to attack all areas simultaneously, the guerrillas were able to shift threatened units to quiet areas and preserve their forces.

Japanese attacks into southern Iloilo resumed in July and moved to the northwest of the island near the town of Sara by September, inflicting significant material losses,
aided in large part by excellent intelligence. However, the guerrillas themselves largely survived and maintained their organization, again moving to areas with less Japanese activity. The Japanese launched further campaigns in northwest Panay in November and December 1943 and January and February 1944 in the most “ruthlessly destructive campaign of all,” and “[l]oss of life and civilian property were exceptionally heavy.” However, the brutality of the Japanese only served to harden the civilian population against the occupiers, and the guerrillas were able to reorganize their forces, albeit with decreased efficiency.

Despite Japanese attacks, the guerrillas did not remain completely passive during this period. By November 1943, they were planning to cut off and isolate a number of Japanese garrisons on the island. Detailed plans took into account Japanese strength and sketched out the ranges of guerrilla and Japanese weapon systems in planning attacks on Japanese forces and installations in platoon and company strength. In some cases, Peralta’s troops would support attacks with engineers. Despite Japanese superiority in quality and quantity of weapons, the guerrillas had superior numbers of troops and better knowledge of the terrain around Japanese garrisons. The ability of Peralta’s guerrillas to launch attacks against Japanese units with the goal of destroying, not merely harassing,
Japanese garrisons demonstrated the strength of the guerrillas, even after the Japanese punitive expeditions.

Figure 5. Sketch for Attack Against Sibaloa\textsuperscript{433}

\textsuperscript{433} “Special Report #X: A-1,” NARA II.
Logistically, although some units reported satisfactory supplies of food by early in 1943, food supplies dwindled throughout the archipelago due to Japanese shipment of food to the Home Islands and elsewhere.\(^{434}\) Shortages of food on Panay became critical by June 1944, acknowledged by Peralta’s second-in-command, Lt. Col. L. R. Relunia. He chastised Panay guerrillas who had been commandeering seedlings from local farmers “…under the guise of necessity…”, calling such actions “…nothing short of destroying the hen that lays the golden eggs.”\(^{435}\)

Despite logistical challenges, an effective courier network allowed Peralta’s forces to communicate, as reflected in Figure 5. Passing of intelligence was vital to guerrilla success, especially before major attacks against Japanese positions. By August, Peralta’s intelligence network was able to gather intelligence on Japanese plans as well as the composition, disposition, and strength of Japanese units down to the number of individual weapons. In one example, taking advantage of a debt owed to him by a pro-Japanese Filipino, guerrilla agent Uy Mia was able to obtain information on Japanese plans and activities.\(^{436}\) Other agents would monitor Japanese airfields, reporting on the comings and goings of aircraft as well as their maintenance status. One report discussed

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\(^{434}\) HQ, 64th Infantry, “S-4 Periodic Report,” dated from 16-28 February 1943, in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 253, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II.

\(^{435}\) Lt. Col L. R. Relunia, “Memorandum; To: All CT Cmdrs,” dated 24 June ’44, in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 246, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II.

\(^{436}\) The pro-Japanese Filipino, a Mr. Añga, had previously outed a secret Chinese organization in Capiz which had been sending money to the Nationalists in China, resulting in the death of one of the leaders named Lee Liong. “No. 214; Subject: Daily S-2 Report, To: CO CPO-SC,” dated 14 Aug 1944, in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 253, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II.
the presence of bullet holes in a recently arrived plane, reflecting an ability to get relatively close to Japanese facilities without detection.  

Figure 6. Panay Courier Network circa August 1944

The American invasion of Leyte in late 1944 saw more than half of the Japanese garrison on Panay leave to defend Leyte. Peralta took full advantage of the smaller Japanese garrison to expand his zone of control. With a substantial guerrilla force, robust intelligence network, and few opposing Japanese troops, Peralta was in a strong

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437 “No. 212; Subject: Daily S-2 Report, To: CO CPO-SC,” dated 12 Aug 1944, in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 253, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II.
438 “Annex D to Special Report #X: A-1,” NARA II.
position to support Allied operations during the liberation of the Philippines, and indeed controlled most of the island by the time American forces landed there in the spring of 1945.

Negros

Jesus Villamor’s arrival on Negros in January 1943, helped Salvador Abcede consolidate control over the guerrillas on the island. On May 14, 1943, Villamor effectively assumed command of the 7th Military District, which included Negros and Siquijor, a small 132-square mile island nearby. Villamor’s arrival brought a Japanese attack on the 7th Military District Headquarters soon afterwards, but key guerrilla leaders were able to escape. Villamor departed for Australia in October, and Abcede assumed command of the 7th Military District, with Major Ernesto Mata assuming command of the guerrillas’ 72nd Division and Major Uldarico S. Baclagon assuming command of the 74th Division. Following Abcede’s assumption of command, the Japanese launched a number of punitive raids on the island’s southern coast, especially in areas producing food for the guerrillas. They also attacked the guerrillas’ base areas on the northern part of the island, dealing significant damage although failing to fix and destroy the guerrillas’ core leadership.

440 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 688.
After a brief respite in the fall of 1943, the Japanese reinforced the Negros garrison and launched further raids in January 1944 with the goal of completely eliminating the Negros guerrillas and cutting off their contact with SWPA in Australia. The Japanese managed to locate and attack the command post of Mata’s 72nd Division while simultaneously attacking other areas. Punitive measures were particularly harsh, with the Japanese indiscriminately destroying homes, seizing foodstuffs including seedlings, and killing livestock in an effort to starve the guerrillas. A number of guerrillas surrendered to the Japanese due to these demoralizing blows.

In spite of the Japanese raids, the arrival of supplies from Australia via submarine eventually buoyed the guerrillas on Negros. With their morale raised, the guerrillas were able to continue gaining strength while obtaining detailed intelligence on Japanese forces. Abcede went so far as to limit the personnel of his units to 85 percent of their authorized strength in 1944, reflecting both shortages of weapons and an ability to easily gain recruits. That August, units of the 72nd Division were gaining intelligence on Japanese depots, communication networks, and fighting positions in preparation for upcoming operations. Training continued for Abcede’s guerrillas, even that for specialized units

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443 1st Lieut. N.P. Majarcon, “Subject: Strength of Units, 7MD, To: all Unit Commanders, 7MD,” dated 9 July ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II. One can surmise that the cap on units reflected an inability to arm surplus personnel, and the orders directed commanders to discharge those who were “indifferent” or “physically unfit” for “further rigorous military service.”
444 1st Lieut. Emilio Borromeo, “Memorandum to- All Sector S-3’s (Thru Sector CO’s),” dated 29 August ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
like the machine gun companies in the 72nd Division. By December 1944, the guerrillas numbered more than 12,000 troops.

Logistically, Abcede’s forces were largely able to support themselves with food provided by the local population and even establish surpluses. Civilian officials in areas friendly to the guerrillas agreed to provide them percentages of farmers’ harvests. By December 1944, Abcede ordered all district quartermasters to “[e]stablish and maintain base and forward depots for Class I [food] supplies” in their respective areas as well as “regular trains [supply trains, not locomotives] for loading and unloading supplies.” Networks of civilians moved supplies for Abcede’s forces.

Reflecting the security of most of Abcede’s base areas, staff officers established a significant bureaucracy. In one example, a division G-4 (logistics officer) required the registration of all horses with the 72nd Division’s area of operations. In another example, staff officers were concerned with advance salaries for guerrillas attending training schools in a “student” status. The bureaucracy was fairly effective and allowed Abcede to maintain good relations with the governor, Alfredo Montelibano.

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445 1st Lieut. Emilio Borromeo, “Memorandum to- All Sector S-3’s (Thru Sector CO’s),” dated 21 Sept. ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
447 “Memorandum to All DQM Agents, 3d Bn 76th Inf Area,” dated 11 December ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
448 Major B.L. Hollero, District Quartermaster, on behalf of Lieut. Col. Abcede, “Memorandum for All DQM Agents, 7MD,” dated 23 December ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
449 Maj. Jaime C. Dacanay, “Subject: Civilian Haulers, Use of; To: All Units, 72D,” dated 6 November ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
450 Maj. Jaime C. Dacanay, “Memorandum to All Unit Commanders, 72D,” dated 2 November ’44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
451 1st Lieut. Cesar B. Espino, “Memorandum to- All Sub-Sector Commanders,” dated 11 March 44, RG 407, Entry 1087, Box 249, NARA II.
Although some in the Allied Intelligence Bureau maintained significant misgivings about the Negros guerrillas, saying that the officers in particular appropriated “army supplies for their own purchases and aggrandizement of their positions for after the war,” Abcede’s forces would provide significant intelligence to SWPA before the liberation, and even seized an airfield for use by American forces supporting the Leyte operations on November 24, 1944.\footnote{Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 520; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I, 312; Baclagon, They Chose to Fight, 110.} Abcede would also be able to provide forces to fight with the Allies when they liberated Negros. While initial Japanese attacks in 1943 represented setbacks to the Negros guerrillas, the guerrillas demonstrated the ability to overcome such losses and eventually took advantage of the small Japanese garrison to build an effective organization poised to contribute to the Allied liberation of the Philippines.

Cebu

Following the summary execution of Harry Fenton, American officer James Cushing became the head guerrilla commander for the forces on Cebu. With his forces demoralized by the infighting and the executions of Fenton and Estrella, Cushing found the need to reorganize his command, and did so in December 1943 and into the following January.\footnote{Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 691.} MacArthur’s headquarters officially recognized Cushing as commander of the Cebu Area Command, later the 82nd Division, in February 1944, with a written order from General MacArthur directing Cushing to develop intelligence on Japanese forces.
and receive supplies through Col. Fertig on Mindanao until Allied forces could arrange
direct supply shipments to Cebu.454

The period from 1943 to 1944 on Cebu was not without Japanese interference.
As on other islands, the Japanese conducted raids into guerrilla-held areas, but rarely
stayed to secure the villages they seized. While the raids were not successful in
destroying the Cebu Area Command, they were certainly disruptive to Cushing’s
operations. In one case, the quartermaster of Cebu’s Northern Guerrilla Sector had to
escape to Leyte to avoid capture.455 Japanese movements into guerrilla support areas put
the guerrillas’ suppliers at risk of capture or destruction. In Cebu City, the guerrillas had
to burn their supply procurement records so the names of suppliers did not fall into
Japanese hands.456 In places where records were not destroyed, Japanese raids also
brought fears that the occupiers would use receipts the guerrillas gave to their suppliers to
identify guerrilla procurement officers, so these officers used pseudonyms.457 Japanese
raids were so problematic that Cushing thought the creation of a civil government
infeasible, and never did so. However, despite the Japanese raids, Cushing’s forces were
often able to avoid Japanese columns, and the Cebu guerrilla forces continued to grow

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Box 250, NARA II; First Lt. Walter J. Jasen, AFWESPAC Claims Service, “Certificate,” no date, RG 407,
Enter 1093, Box 250, NARA II.
455 Captain Leonardo J. Espanola, “Affidavit,” dated 31 December 1946, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 250,
NARA II.
456 Captain Paulino T. Ciano, “Letter to Mr. James M. Gassaway, Claim Service Cebu City,” dated 24
January 1947, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 250, NARA II.
457 This occurred in the town of Dumanjug, where a Captain Eutiquio S. Acebes, commander of the 1st
Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, also oversaw procurement of foodstuffs for his guerrillas. “Statement of
Captain Eutiquio S. Acebes,” dated February 8, 1947, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 250, NARA II.
through 1944, eventually totaling some 25,000 guerrillas, half of whom were auxiliaries.458

One of the most important contributions of Cushing’s guerrillas, and indeed of all of the guerrillas in the Philippines during World War II, was their capture of the so-called Koga Papers.459 On March 31, 1944, Admiral Mineichi Koga, who had succeeded Isoroku Yamamoto as Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, and his staff withdrew from the Japanese headquarters on Palau enroute to Davao on Mindanao. Koga and part of his staff was traveling in an Kawanishi H8K “Emily” flying boat, while his chief of staff Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome traveled in another. With them in a briefcase were documents detailing the top secret Japanese “Z Plan” for the defense of Saipan and the other islands in the Marianas. During their flight the two planes encountered a typhoon, resulting in the loss of both aircraft as well as Koga and a number of staff officers. Fukudome survived the crash of his Emily, managed to recover the briefcase, and began swimming toward shore before Filipino fisherman recovered him. Fukudome tried to let the briefcase sink so it would not fall into the wrong hands, but the fishermen were able to recover it and turned it and the Japanese survivors, including Fukudome, over to Cushing’s guerrillas.

Cushing analyzed the documents and arranged for them to be picked up via submarine, along with 40 American civilians to be evacuated to Australia. The USS Crevalle (SS-291) arrived and, despite several depth charge attacks, managed to return

458 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, 691. The auxiliaries were unfit to fight but served in a support role.
with the “Z Plan” to Australia, where the plan was analyzed and quickly translated by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS). MacArthur received a translated copy of the “Z Plan” and quickly forwarded it to Admiral Chester Nimitz. Nimitz was able to use the intelligence to good effect in the ensuing Battle of the Philippine Sea, popularly known to Americans as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.” Quick action by Cushing’s guerrillas helped the Allies win a crucial naval engagement which broke Japanese naval aviation for good.

The story did not end there, however. The Japanese conducted a number of vicious punitive expeditions on Cebu trying to locate the papers, burning entire villages and massacring many civilians, but to no avail. To get the Japanese to cease their reprisals, Cushing agreed to release Japanese prisoners, including Fukudome, to the Japanese forces. The reprisals ceased, but not before Cushing had already sent the “Z Plan” to SWPA GHQ.

Besides such improbable incidents, the guerrillas also provided intelligence in less spectacular ways. On Cebu, as on Luzon, female agents were very effective at performing reconnaissance on Japanese forces, ostensibly because they were less conspicuous and perhaps less threatening than military-aged males. A Miss Tranquilina Leyson provided the guerrillas intelligence on the strength and disposition of Japanese forces.

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460 Cushing sent the papers in two batches, the first with the Crevalle and the second with the USS Nautilus. Dirk Jan Barreveld, Cushing’s Coup: The true story of how Lt. Col. James M. Cushing and his Filipino Guerrillas captured Japan’s Plan Z and changed the course of the Pacific War (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015), Kindle Location 2833-2857, 2904.

461 In describing the battle, one eminent historian noted “the last of Japan’s carrier-based planes and pilots were virtually annihilated at small cost to the U.S.” Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Random House, 1985), 312.
forces around Cebu City and Mandawe, gaining specific information on gun positions as well as supply dumps. Remarkably, Leyson managed to conduct successful intelligence-gathering operations from July 1943 to February 1945, when the guerrillas told her that she could cease operations.

While the Cebu guerrillas were not as strong as those on Panay or Mindanao, they nevertheless managed to weather the Japanese occupation and provided valuable intelligence to SWPA Headquarters. Kept fairly weak by repeated Japanese raids, Cushing’s guerrillas still largely managed to keep their core of resistance fighters alive to fight another day. Despite the brutal effects that Japanese raids had on the population of Cebu, in the end, the valuable intelligence that the Cebu guerrillas provided to the Allied war effort validated their sacrifices.

**Leyte**

Having escaped from a prison camp in December of 1942, Col. Ruperto Kangleon was able to call a conference of guerrilla leaders on Leyte in January 1943. The arrival of Chick Parsons and some communications equipment facilitated the full unification of the disparate groups over the coming months, with Kangleon able to organize the guerrillas into the 92nd Infantry Division (Guerrilla) on April 20, 1943. Gen. MacArthur officially recognized Kangleon’s command, organized into the 94th and 95th Infantry

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462 Captain Roque M. Labata, “Affidavit,” dated 6 November 1947, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 250, NARA II.
463 “Press Release,” no date, from “Leyte Area Command,” RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 285, NARA II.
Regiments, on October 21 of that year. By the beginning of 1944, Kangleon had also effectively absorbed many members of Blas Miranda’s guerrilla group into his own.

However, the Japanese were not idle during this period. By the end of 1943, Japanese officials on Leyte decided to take a conciliatory approach with the guerrillas, encouraging many to surrender by offers of amnesty and job opportunities. A number of Miranda’s followers surrendered under these terms. However, the Japanese also took a harsher approach, reinforcing southern Leyte early in December 1943 and conducting punitive expeditions with intelligence provided by an extensive network of spies. As on other islands, these expeditions resulted in significant destruction of Filipino property and the torture and execution of suspected guerrilla sympathizers.

The harshness of Japanese measures caused the local population to demand action against the Japanese, and Kangleon called a conference of his unit commanders on January 24, 1944. With the agreement of all commanders, he issued orders to fight the Japanese on February 1 while having all officers and men sign an oath of loyalty pledging that they would not be captured or allow their weapons to fall into enemy hands. From January to August, although casualty figures vary widely between guerrilla and Japanese accounts, the guerrillas and Japanese conducted hundreds of engagements, and even though Kangleon’s forces largely remained on the defensive, the Japanese were unable to destroy his group.

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Despite the high operational tempo, in July 1944 the guerrillas were able to form a third regiment, designated the 96th Infantry. Not as robust as the guerrilla units on other islands, Kangleon nonetheless could eventually count 3,000 guerrillas among his various units. His forces mostly conducted reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions against the Japanese, facilitated by agents from the Allied Intelligence Bureau and Wendell Fertig’s command on Mindanao, which provided radio equipment and technical assistance. To maintain morale among his followers and inspire in the population faith in the inevitable victory of the Allies, the guerrillas on Leyte also instituted an education system for youths that included “instruction in the tenets of Philippine democracy, uncensored by an inhibitory collaborationism.” As much as possible, the guerrillas saw to it that the support of the population for the Allies was unwavering.

On the eve of the invasion of Leyte in October 1944, U.S. Sixth Army intelligence agents, including Chick Parsons, infiltrated Leyte to warn Kangleon of the imminent Allied invasion, radio messages having been deemed at risk of interception by the Japanese. Working with Kangleon, the agents were able to send word back to the invasion fleet warning them of potential collateral damage in the initial aerial and naval bombardment. The guerrillas then evacuated civilians from the town of Tacloban before the Allied bombardment, doubtless saving many lives.

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468 “Press Release,” no date, from “Leyte Area Command,” RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 285, NARA II.
Samar

Having retained control of the 93rd Samar Area Command through 1942, Captain Pedro Merritt attempted to contact the guerrillas on Leyte to ascertain the situation as far as a guerrilla chain of command in contact with MacArthur’s headquarters. However, the guerrillas on Leyte were also out of contact with MacArthur’s headquarters, and Merritt remained unable to fully ascertain the overall guerrilla situation until messengers from Col. Peralta on Panay contacted him in January 1943. Peralta’s men informed Merritt that Peralta, who was then acting as the self-appointed overall guerrilla commander in the Visayas, authorized him to organize a guerrilla division on Samar.469

With that, Merritt began working to create a larger force, enlisting USAFFE reservists and creating a training school for officers and non-commissioned officers. The force eventually included four regiments, the 98th, 99th, 10th, and 101st Infantry, as well as an artillery unit and support services under quartermaster, ordnance, medical, and engineer officers.470 Despite such organization, however, Merritt was unable to unite the Samar guerrillas, partially because the various commanders, including Manuel Valley in the south, could not agree as to which command, Peralta’s (Panay), Fertig’s (Mindanao), or Kangleon’s (Leyte) they should subordinate themselves to. In May 1943 Kangleon tried to bring Merritt under his control, but the latter refused, citing Kangleon’s lack of

469 “A Brief Historical Sketch of the 93rd Division, Samar Area Command- The Samar Constabulary Battalion,” Box 413, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II, 3.
470 Ibid., 4.
authority from MacArthur.\textsuperscript{471} Kangleon also unsuccessfully sought to bring Valley’s guerrillas under his Leyte Area Command.

Meanwhile, Merritt tried unsuccessfully to bring Valley under his command and according to AIB agents may have even sought Japanese assistance in boosting his group’s supply stockpiles. Merritt suppressed the Japanese-supported Pulahanes guerrillas and succeeded in eventually absorbing them into his group.\textsuperscript{472} Although his group conducted limited raids and ambushes against Japanese patrols in 1942, Merritt’s forces followed MacArthur’s order, routed through Peralta’s command, to lay low until the Allied liberation of the archipelago. Early in 1944 a large Japanese punitive force searched jungle areas for the guerrillas, torturing and committing atrocities against the few guerrillas that they found as well as civilians. However, as on other islands, the Japanese forces soon withdrew, and the guerrillas returned to reestablish control of base areas and key centers.

In the end, while the guerrillas on Samar were only united by AIB agents under Lt. Col. Charles M. Smith in the fall of 1944, they managed to survive the occupation because Japanese forces were too few to control the entirety of the island’s territory. Although the island was not strategically important to either side, the maintenance of sufficiently strong guerrilla forces thwarted Japanese attempts to pacify it. More

\textsuperscript{471} Ibid., 5-8. Merritt was also unfamiliar with the Leyte guerrillas and therefore did not trust Kangleon. Merritt’s reply to Kangleon was transcribed into this historical sketch.

\textsuperscript{472} The Pulahanes group, estimated at 3,000 guerrillas, was supposedly led by a woman named Bonang and an elderly man named Cubalan, and received supplies and ammunition from the Japanese. Willoughby, \textit{The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines}, 449; “A Brief Historical Sketch of the 93rd Division,” 10.
significantly for SWPA Headquarters, the Samar guerrillas were able to secure Charles Smith’s party, which was able to pass on intelligence from other sectors and gather intelligence itself in preparation for the Allied invasions beginning in October 1944.

Conclusion

On the eve of the liberation of the Philippines, those guerrilla groups which had survived were well-positioned to contribute to the Allied landings in a number of ways. Outside of providing intelligence to Allied forces on the disposition, composition, and strength of Japanese units, thousands of guerrillas were ready to conduct sabotage operations and direct attacks to disrupt Japanese movements and destroy or isolate Japanese outposts. Larger units like those of Russell Volckmann and Augustin Marking on Luzon stood ready to conduct large-scale offensives against Japanese forces and would assume places on the front lines as Allied forces advanced. On Panay, the guerrillas would assist Allied forces by capturing airfields spread throughout the island. All-in-all, guerrilla contributions to the success of the invasion would be varied and significant, the fruit borne from over two years of struggle under the Japanese occupation.

Administration and logistics were critical parts of the guerrillas’ organization. Maintaining a steady supply of weapons, food, and money were among the primary concerns of leaders and ordinary guerrillas throughout the Philippines. Additionally, as many guerrilla units numbered in the hundreds or thousands, guerrilla leaders had to institute effective administration in order to make the most of their limited resources. While food could be donated or purchased from the local population, oftentimes the guerrillas had to resort to a number of other unconventional means to get the weapons, supplies, and equipment needed to sustain operations.

External support from Allied forces, especially General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters, while limited to submarine (and later aerial) resupplies for much of the war, was important in helping sustain the guerrillas and maintaining their high morale from 1943 onwards. Using submarines, particularly the large cruiser submarines the USS Narwhal (initially designated V-5 and later SS-167) and USS Nautilus (V-6, later SS-168), a total of 1,325 tons of supplies were dropped off to American and Filipino guerrillas in the Philippines during World War II, supplies which proved indispensable to
the resistance against the Japanese.\(^{474}\) This chapter provides a brief overview of the methods that the guerrillas used to acquire needed items, as well as the ways they managed pay, promotions, and other facets of military administration.

### Guerrilla Staffs

Many guerrilla groups developed fairly sophisticated military hierarchies, with different staff sections overseeing normal military operations like logistics and finance, intelligence, and personnel management. Interestingly, the organization of the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECGLA) under American officer Edwin Ramsey in May 1942 was initially similar to that of the Communist Huks along Maoist lines, and one its...
first priorities was creating a recruitment cell consisting of five officers. The Hufs themselves began to organize in March 1942, the group at its outset led by a five-man Military Committee with a political adviser named Mateo del Castillo and Luis Taruc as its chairman and commander, respectively. A separate Education Department was charged with training the Huk guerrilla force, which was divided into regiments of two battalions with each battalion organized into two 100-man squadrons.

Elsewhere on Luzon, other guerrilla groups created staffs primarily using American military organizations as models. The Hunters ROTC went through several reorganizations over the course of its existence, and heads of staff sections at various times included chiefs of sabotage, propaganda, procurement, smuggling, and intelligence. By the fourth reorganization, the Hunters had appointed an inspector general, adjutant general, and press relations officer, and when they were finally organized as a pseudo-American infantry division they included general staff sections such as G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Supply). In 1943, Col. Russell Volckmann’s United States Army Forces in the Philippines-North Luzon (USAFIP-NL) also organized a general headquarters along the lines of an

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477 Fuller, *Forcing the Pace*, Location 3587.
479 Mojica, *Terry’s Hunters*, 70, 73.
American division, including a G-5 section to handle civil affairs. Each subordinate
district in the USAFIP-NL had similar staffs down to battalion level.

Guerrilla groups on other islands besides Luzon were similarly organized. On
Panay, Filipino Col. Macario Peralta, formerly Chief of Operations of the 61st Division of
the Philippine Army, had his own staff as well as staffs for each district under his
command, including S-4 (Logistics) officers, surgeons, and quartermaster, medical,
signal, and transport companies. Peralta’s staff even conducted detailed inspections of
subordinate units, assessing the status of weapons, supplies, and even sanitation.
Under Wendell Fertig, the guerrillas on Mindanao initially created a staff modeled on that
of a U.S. Army Reserve division, including a chief of staff, adjutant, and commandant of
headquarters troops. His command would eventually expand to encompass six division-
sized units with their own staffs of Filipino and American officers. Finally, like the
guerrillas on other islands, Lt. Col. James Cushing’s guerrillas on Cebu had a
headquarters staff along American lines, including a G-4 logistics section as well as
special staff like a judge advocate general, chaplain, and even a historian.

One of the more important staff sections for all groups oversaw procurement and
logistics, and most major groups selected trusted individuals to fulfill this vital role.

480 Volckmann, We Remained, 124.
481 Gamaliel L. Manikan, Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island in the Philippines (Manila, P.I.: The Sixth
482 Many of these inspection reports are in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 253, Entry 1093,
NARA II.
483 Kent Holmes, Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines: Fighting the Japanese
484 Cebu Area Command, “G-4 Periodic Report,” RG 496, Entry 112, Box 603, NARA II; First Lt. Marvin
Lerner, AFWESPAC Claims Service Investigating Officer, “Certificate,” no date, RG 407, Entry 1093,
Box 250, NARA II.
Former mining superintendent and U.S. Army reservist Charles Hansen served as the procurement officer for the 110th Division of Wendell Fertig’s command on Mindanao, possessing “authority to obtain fuel oil, gasoline, kerosene, internal combustion engines, launches, et cetera, for the army.” Specifically designated procurement and supply officers were not the only individuals given the vital task of acquiring needed items, however. Besides giving their special agents responsibility for intelligence collection, the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (LGAF) also gave them “authority to collect Government Arms and Ammunition[sic] for the use of the USAFFE-LGAF for the duration of the War.”

The creation of staff sections by the major guerrilla groups reveals a high degree of sophistication and professionalism, whether they were organized along American military or Communist Chinese lines. The level of organization that the guerrillas achieved, made more remarkable under the circumstances of the oppressive Japanese occupation, enabled them to gather resources and men to conduct operations and contributed to their longevity and effectiveness. Once given the authorization to conduct offensive operations against the Japanese shortly before and immediately following the return of American forces, many of the guerrilla staffs proved capable of managing large units alongside or independent of American forces.

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486 Headquarters, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Claims Service “LGAF Commandeering Record: Appointments of Special Agents,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 537 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
Arms and Weapons

Shortly after the fall of the Philippines in 1942, the Hunters ROTC guerrillas on Luzon established a series of covert arms collection points throughout Manila in order to gather weapons and then distribute them to their guerrillas in more remote areas of the island. However, with few weapons forthcoming, a frustrated Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso, leader of the Hunters ROTC, decided in June of 1942 to raid the Union College ROTC armory in Manila, which was guarded by local Filipinos (although a number of Japanese military units were billeted nearby). Through the use of a ruse, Terry and a small number of guerrillas, armed only with a few pistols and a grenade, drove a small jitney onto the campus and overwhelmed and bound the guards and their families. After using a hacksaw to get through several bars securing the door, they emptied the armory of some 500 rifles, including automatic rifles, and, despite the fact that the jitney’s engine broke down, Terry and his men were able to bring the weapons back to their companions outside the city.

This dramatic incident, which did not result in any loss of life, highlights one of the primary sources of arms for the guerrillas—Filipino/American or Japanese armories. After the Union College operation, the Hunters conducted several more raids on other school armories in Manila, including the Mapua Institute of Technology. Robert Lapham, leader of one of the other guerrilla groups on Luzon and a subordinate of Edwin Ramsey, later noted that raids on Japanese forces and installations brought in significant

487 Mojica, Terry’s Hunters, 44.
488 Ibid., 44-52.
489 Ibid., Terry’s Hunters, 53.
numbers of weapons to his group. Ironically, many of the weapons the guerrillas seized had been used by American and Filipino troops before they were surrendered to the Japanese and in turn captured by the guerrillas.490

Despite the existence of such stocks of weapons with which many guerrillas were able to arm themselves, guerrillas throughout the Philippines suffered from an acute lack of arms throughout the Japanese occupation. As one example, the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force, or *Hua Zhi*, which eventually manned an entire squadron of the Filipino Communist Huk group on Luzon, was established with fifty-eight men who possessed only seven rifles and two pistols among them.491 Later, a sub-unit of the *Hua Zhi* formed in 1944 was established with twenty-six men armed with only two sidearms.492 Unfortunately for the guerrillas on Luzon, Allied forces destroyed many weapons before and immediately following the surrender of Allied forces on Bataan and Corregidor to prevent their capture by the Japanese.493 In the central and southern Philippines, many of the main groups could only arm portions of their guerrilla units, even as late as 1945. On Panay, Col. Peralta had some 22,500 guerrillas in his organization when American forces landed in 1945, but only about half of them were

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492 Li, *The Huagiao Warriors*, 86.
493 For a number of accounts of weapons being destroyed to prevent their capture by the Japanese, see Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (1999; repr., Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2005).
Similarly, of the 14,000 guerrillas under Col. Salvador Abcede on Negros, a little more than half were armed by March 1945.

While Japanese or former Filipino/American government stocks were important caches of weapons, the guerrillas acquired weapons from many other sources to try to make up for their shortages. Although weapons captured from the Japanese were important for arming Robert Lapham’s guerrillas, Lapham later acknowledged that most of the weapons, including some 3,000 rifles, used by his men were acquired by salvaging items left behind in earlier battles in western and central Luzon. The Communist Huks were even scavenging weapons from battlefields before the Allied surrender of Bataan, as were leftist Chinese guerrillas in the Philippines associated with the Huks like the *Hua Zhi*. Interestingly, Wendell Fertig’s guerrillas on Mindanao acquired a former Japanese motor launch, the *Nara Maru*, and armed it with a .50-caliber machine gun salvaged from a destroyed American B-17 bomber.

Civilians also provided a source of weapons. Outside collecting discarded weapons themselves, guerrilla groups often paid premium bounties to civilians who salvaged guns and other arms from old battlefields, based on records detailing the uses of cash by guerrillas. However, some civilians donated weapons voluntarily without hope of monetary reward, as when Wendell Fertig issued a request to civilians on Mindanao to

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496 Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 82.
voluntarily give the guerrillas weapons, a plea that was met with some enthusiasm.\footnote{Holmes, \textit{Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines}, Location 2099.} On the other hand, the Huks used intimidation to demand that landlords hand over weapons to their peasants serving as guerrillas.\footnote{Fuller, \textit{Forcing the Pace}, Location 3549.}

Not all weapons had to be captured from the Japanese, salvaged, or acquired from civilians. Filipino Communists were able to acquire weapons from Allied stragglers in the wake of the fighting on Bataan.\footnote{Ibid.} During the Japanese occupation, corruption and infiltration of enemy security forces also provided opportunities for the guerrillas to acquire weapons. Luzon guerrilla leader Walter M. Cushing routinely bought captured American weapons and ammunition from Japanese military personnel in Manila.\footnote{R.W. Volckmann, \textit{We Remained: Three years behind enemy lines in the Philippines} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1954), 34.} The Japanese soldiers and sailors were short on cash after spending prodigious amounts of money on the city’s diversions. The Hunters ROTC were able to infiltrate several officers into the pro-Japanese constabulary, among them a certain Ernesto N. Cortez, who managed to smuggle 40 rifles from constabulary stocks to the guerrillas.\footnote{Mojica, \textit{Terry’s Hunters}, 155.} Ray C. Hunt was able to replace his malfunctioning M1 rifle by convincing a Filipino constabularyman to give him his M1.\footnote{Hunt threatened to forcibly recruit the constabularyman into the guerrillas if he did not give up his rifle. Hunt and Norling \textit{Behind Japanese Lines}, 121.}

Guerrilla weapons were an eclectic mix. Some former members of the USAFFE did not surrender their issued rifles and ended up using them when they became
guerrillas, but not everyone had such weapons. On her first encounter with Marking’s Regiment on Luzon, Yay Panlilio, who would become a prominent commander in the group, recalled seeing guerrillas armed “with anything from army rifles to .22s [small .22-caliber guns], riot guns, shotguns, 44-caliber buffalo guns, one-shot paltiks [Filipino slang for homemade guns], and pistols.” Following his escape from Japanese captivity, U.S. Army officer Stephen Mellnik recalled meeting up with a Luzon guerrilla unit eager to demonstrate its proficiency with spears and bows, as the unit only possessed one firearm for every ten men. Luis Centina, Jr., a Filipino officer on Negros, was armed at various times with a German 9mm Luger pistol, a World War I-era Enfield rifle, and a Thompson submachine gun given to him by a Filipino-American agent.

Guerrilla leaders like Edwin Ramsey often carried sidearms. Ramsey armed himself with a .38-caliber revolver after his army-issue .45-caliber pistol became too heavy to carry on his emaciated frame.

Beyond individual small arms, the guerrillas sometimes possessed crew-served weapons with more significant firepower. On a covert trip to Manila in a boxcar, Edwin Ramsey was accompanied by two bodyguards, each armed with a .30-caliber machine gun and .45-caliber pistol, while Ramsey himself had a Thompson submachine gun and

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his own .45-caliber sidearm.\footnote{Ibid., 184.} Alongside other weapons, two .50-caliber machine guns recovered from a downed American fighter plane defended Ramsey’s headquarters in Balagbag.\footnote{Ibid., 247.} Russell Volckmann was able to organize the USAFIP-NL into subordinate regiments, battalions, and rifle companies, and each rifle company possessed a special weapons platoon armed with machine guns and light mortars.\footnote{Volckmann, \textit{We Remained}, 124.} Generally, the guerrillas preferred to be armed with standard-issue American weapons because they were easier to supply and maintain from a logistical standpoint, especially when MacArthur’s headquarters began sending weapons and ammunition by submarine. The landing of American forces in the Philippines allowed the guerrillas to receive better weapons. After American forces landed on Mindanao, Fertig’s guerrillas acquired larger numbers of machine guns and even bazookas.\footnote{Holmes, \textit{Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines}, Location 2018.}

Besides firearms, the guerrillas commonly used edged and impact weapons as well as explosives, many of them homemade. One of the coastwatchers commissioned by Allied Intelligence Bureau agent Jesus Villamor worked among guerrillas on Cebu who were armed with knives and clubs as well as \textit{paltiks} with barrels made from gas pipes.\footnote{Allison W. Ind, \textit{Secret War Against Japan: The Allied Intelligence Bureau in World War II} (1958; repr., North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 125.} Bolo knives, all-purpose cutting tools possessed by many Filipino peasants commonly worn in wooden belt holsters, were used as primary or secondary weapons.\footnote{Hunt and Norling \textit{Behind Japanese Lines}, 113.} U.S. Army officer and guerrilla leader Russell Volckmann carried a bolo in addition to a
In 1945, during the liberation of Luzon, Private Urbano P. Gadon of Marking’s Regiment killed two Japanese soldiers with a knife, an action for which he received a Silver Star through the U.S. 43rd Infantry Division. In the early stages of the guerrilla movement on Luzon, U.S. Army Lt. Francis A. Camp, serving under guerrilla leader Ralph Praeger, constructed sixty crude hand grenades from dynamite and scrap iron in tubes of bamboo. Later improving on Camp’s design, American Captain James C. Needham, formerly of the 121st Infantry Regiment, wrapped dynamite with shrapnel, affixed a handle, and added a blasting cap, using beeswax to hold the grenade together. Edwin Ramsey’s sabotage units were also successful in creating their own explosives using lead cylinders filled with black powder, devices they used to destroy several Japanese fuel depots and even a Japanese tanker ship during a coordinated sabotage operation in Manila. Of course, the guerrillas could also receive explosives from SWPA Headquarters, as when Volckmann’s men received limpet mines, detonators, and explosive primers via submarine in November of 1944.

To make up for the shortage of guerrilla arms, MacArthur’s headquarters prioritized weapons when supplying the guerrillas via submarine. U.S. Navy Lt. Commander Chick Parsons’ clandestine missions to the Philippines brought the guerrillas

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516 Volckmann, *We Remained*, 121.
517 The Japanese soldiers were armed with “rifles and bayonets.” “Extract of GO No. 458, Hq 43rd Inf Div dtd 12 July 1945, AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR MEDAL,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 259, NARA II.
519 Ibid., 123-124.
a variety of American weapons, including sidearms and pistols, rifles, carbines, and
grenades.522 One submarine mission even purportedly brought in 20-mm cannons for use
by Wendell Fertig’s men on Mindanao.523 By the time of the American landings on
Leyte, American forces were also able to supply guerrilla units by air. AIB agent Bob
Stahl, operating on Samar and southern Luzon, recalled he and the guerrillas with him
received rifles and ammunition dropped via parachute by American C-47 cargo planes on
January 2, 1945.524 Stahl and the guerrillas later secured a small airfield which made
deliveries easier.525 Alamo Scouts, special reconnaissance units of the U.S. Sixth Army,
also brought the guerrillas weapons when they landed in the islands, as when Company I,
88th Infantry Regiment of the Cebu Area Command in the Camotes Islands received
seventy-five M1 rifles, two .30-caliber machine guns, and ammunition to supplement the
eight carbines, ten Japanese rifles, and twelve sidearms with which the company was
equipped.526 Alamo Scouts were also crucial in supplying and arming guerrillas on
behalf of the U.S. Sixth Army on Luzon following the American landings there.527

Besides a shortage of weapons, many groups also suffered from an acute lack of
ammunition during the Japanese occupation. On Negros, Luis Centina, Jr. recalled that
his first mission with the guerrillas saw him armed with an Enfield rifle with only two

522 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 144, 160.
523 Ibid., 186.
525 Stahl, You’re No Good to Me Dead, 162-168.
527 Zedric, Silent Warriors of World War II, 179, 216.
rounds of ammunition. He considered himself fortunate that the Japanese patrol that his group was supposed to ambush never materialized. In February 1945, Peralta on Panay made an urgent request for ammunition to SWPA Headquarters, and later reported that he had to order his forces to disengage from a firefight with the Japanese due to a lack of ammunition. A unit of the Cebu Area Command at one point acquired 56 rifles but only had 619 rounds of ammunition for them, or about 11 rounds per rifle, quite inadequate for any kind of extended combat. Besides lacking ammunition for fighting the Japanese, guerrillas often could not spare ammunition to train new fighters, although live-fire practice was also avoided to prevent the Japanese from locating guerrilla camps.

The guerrillas tried to solve their ammunition shortages in a number of ways. On Mindanao, Wendell Fertig’s guerrillas manufactured their own ammunition using brass curtain rods to make cartridge cases and explosives from captured Japanese mines to make propellant. Roberto Kangleon’s guerrillas on Leyte used imported Chinese firecrackers to get powder to make homemade ammunition. In some cases, ammunition shortfalls were made up through submarine or aerial supply drops. On March 5, 1943, during the second submarine mission to supply the guerrillas, the USS

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530 Cebu Area Command, “G-4 Periodic Report,” RG 496, Entry 112, Box 603, NARA II.
533 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 151.
*Tambor* (SS-198) delivered 50,000 rounds of .30-caliber and 20,000 rounds of .45-caliber ammunition to the guerrillas on Mindanao.\(^{534}\) In November 1944, Alamo Scouts operating with guerrillas of the 92\(^{nd}\) Division on Leyte were able to request and receive an emergency aerial resupply of ammunition for the guerrillas.\(^{535}\) The guerrillas, who had recently been in a number of engagements with the Japanese, were down to a day’s supply of ammunition, estimated to be sufficient for nothing more than a twenty-minute firefight.

While the variety of weapons acquired and used by the guerrillas made for a difficult logistics situation as far as ammunition was concerned, due to directives from SWPA Headquarters and General MacArthur himself, most guerrilla groups did not engage in large-scale combat with Japanese forces during the occupation and thus were able to preserve what little ammunition they had.\(^{536}\) Even on the eve of the Allied invasion of the Philippines, many groups counted more combatants in their ranks than weapons. Nevertheless, when the guerrillas did begin to conduct direct attacks on Japanese units immediately before Allied forces landed in the islands, Russell Volekmann’s USAFIP-NL, Marking’s Regiment, and the Hunters ROTC on Luzon, Macario Peralta’s forces on Panay, and Wendell Fertig’s troops on Mindanao had enough weapons to be effective in large-scale offensive operations.

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\(^{534}\) Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations*, 272.

\(^{535}\) Zedric, *Silent Warriors of World War II*, 162-163.

\(^{536}\) Holmes, *Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines*, Location 1871. As mentioned elsewhere, MacArthur sought to limit guerrilla attacks prior to the American invasion of the islands in order to limit Japanese reprisals against the civilian population. In large part, guerrilla groups reporting to MacArthur’s headquarters complied with his directives in this regard.
Food

Besides arms and ammunition, no military force can survive for long without food. Although some items, like rice, were staples for practically all guerrilla groups, the guerrilla diet varied widely based on local conditions and the amount of support they could receive from the local population. Iloff Richardson, an American naval officer who joined Filipino Col. Ruperto Kangleon’s guerrillas on Leyte, recalled that he and other American servicemen with him in 1942 would move periodically “[m]ostly so that the burden of feeding us would not be too heavy on any one family.”537 Similarly, because of food shortages on Mindanao by the summer of 1944, Wendell Fertig could not keep his guerrillas concentrated in one area because they would quickly exhaust local supplies.538 Some guerrillas, like those on Cebu, often dispersed their meager food stores into hidden supply depots as a precaution should their main bases be comprised.539 The guerrillas on Cebu also took possession of farmland “whose owners were either staying in enemy-controlled territory or had evacuated to places outside of Cebu.”540 However, most groups had to make do with what was available from the countryside or smuggling, no easy task given prevailing food shortages during the Japanese occupation. Archival records and memoirs provide a glimpse into what foods sustained the guerrillas.

538 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Philippine Activities,” 19 June 1944, RG 496, Entry 115, Box 611, “Selected Messages from the Philippines,” NARA II.
539 Cebu Area Command, “G-4 Periodic Report,” RG 496, Entry 112, Box 603, NARA II.
540 Francisco M. Mercado, Claims Service Philippine-Ryukyus Command, “Certificate,” no date, RG 407, Entry 1093, Box 250, NARA II.
The guerrillas on a number of islands issued receipts to civilians who provided them with food. Each district commander in Russell Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL was responsible for acquiring needed items, especially food, from civilians in its area of operations. Volckmann’s guerrillas made an “honest effort” to give receipts for all items and promised fair payment after the war.\footnote{Volckmann, \textit{We Remained}, 127.} The issuing of receipts was also a common practice for guerrillas on Panay and other islands.\footnote{Copies of such receipts from a number of groups are in Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” RG 496, NARA II. There is evidence that some people were repaid after the war, but payment depended on one’s ability to produce verifiable receipts, not an easy task.} Interestingly, the receipts of the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces would carefully record the exact quantities of meat and protein products they received from villages, but would not specify the amounts of vegetables given to them, instead just listing “vegetables” among the items acquired.\footnote{“LGAF Commandeering Record: Appointments of Special Agents,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 537 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.} One can speculate that this shows an emphasis on protein in the guerrilla diet.

The guerrillas in east-central Luzon benefitted from an extensive undercover network centered on the capital city of Manila. This network, later known as the Escoda Group, had leaders including Tony Escoda, Manila correspondent for the \textit{New York Herald-Tribune}, and his wife, and consisted mainly of women from Manila’s inner social circles.\footnote{Ramsey and Rivele, \textit{Lt. Ramsey’s War}, 169.} The network allowed Edwin Ramsey’s ECLGA to receive a variety of supplies, including foodstuffs and money, when operating in more remote areas. Ramsey’s close ties to the Manila network provided one of the steadier sources of supplies to his guerrillas, even though the Japanese succeeded in splintering the network.
on a number of occasions and even captured and executed the Escodas themselves.545

One of the ethnic Chinese resistance groups, the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and
Anti-Puppets League, also maintained a covert resupply network in Manila which
provided the Hua Zhi and even some Filipino groups with supplies such as money, food,
medicine, and clothing.546

Elsewhere on Luzon, groups operating in remote or mountainous areas greatly
prized foods that were portable and could be kept for long periods of time in the humid
climate. The 155th Provisional Guerrilla Battalion, while eating mountain rice when
available, primarily used buli-beans, which are similar to lima beans, as their staple food,
as they could be dried and stored for several weeks.547 On Negros, some of the guerrillas
subsisted on mountain rice obtained from the local population and got their protein from
fish sold by local vendors.548 The fish were often preserved with salt, but the guerrillas
sometimes found salt in short supply. Jerky was also commonly carried by guerrillas on
patrol, and while fruits and vegetables were often eaten during the dry season, they would
spoil quickly during the rainy season. Putrefied food often caused dysentery.

As one might expect, the finance records of the guerrillas on Panay reveal that
food was a priority, as most of the surviving receipts record payments for food, often
listed as “cereals,” “subsistence,” or “mess expenses.”549 Food payments could consume

545 Ibid.
547 Decker, On a Mountainside, 130.
548 Centina, Almost on the Carpet, 124.
549 See Folder “General Voucher, April 1944, Dist. Auditor,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla
Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II; “Receipt for PJ Fernandez,” 1 December 1944, RG 407, Entry
1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
upwards of 30,000 pesos (or approximately $15,000 U.S.) at a time.\textsuperscript{550} The records reveal a greater variety in the diet of the Panay guerrillas than that of other groups. Typical foods purchased included cereals like corn or palay (rice).\textsuperscript{551} Besides cereals and grains, the guerrillas often purchased fish, crabs, shrimp, eggs, or chickens.\textsuperscript{552} Sugar, salt, onions, tomatoes, papayas, and other vegetables were also available.\textsuperscript{553} Outside Panay, guerrillas could even make their own food and drinks. Under Wendell Fertig, the guerrillas on Mindanao used coconut milk to make tuba beer.\textsuperscript{554}

In many cases, however, the guerrillas could not rely on food supplies from the local population, either because they were away from population centers, the locals refused support due to fear of Japanese reprisals, or there were general shortages of food.\textsuperscript{555} Civilians throughout the Philippines, especially those on Luzon, began to suffer tremendously from food shortages by 1944 as inflation reached elevated levels. A pound of sugar could cost as much as $10 or twenty pesos, equivalent to approximately $136.50 in 2016 U.S. dollars, while coffee was $12 a pound, tea was $15 per pound, and eggs


\textsuperscript{551} “Receipt for Dominic Grillano [name unclear],” 25 June 1944, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II; “Receipt for Ferspecto de Pedro [name unclear],” 15 June 1944, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.

\textsuperscript{552} “Receipt for Lt. V. Palmer [name unclear],” 13 February 1944, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.

\textsuperscript{553} Duende-Multo, “Receipt for Octaliano s. Ahay [name unclear],” 16-31 December 1944; “Statements of Open Market Purchases,” February 1945, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.

\textsuperscript{554} Edward Haggerty, \textit{Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao} (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1946), 73.

\textsuperscript{555} See Francis K. Danquah, “Japan's Food Farming Policies in Wartime Southeast Asia: The Philippine Example, 1942-1944,” \textit{Agricultural History}, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 60-80.
were worth one peso ($0.50) each.\textsuperscript{556} In the fall of 1944, with food supplies on Luzon low due to Japanese stockpiling, Edwin Ramsey’s headquarters had to forage for subsistence, surviving on monkeys, birds, and the wild tuber \textit{kamoting kahoy}.\textsuperscript{557} With such a meager diet, Ramsey estimated he weighed less than 100 pounds at this point in the war. On Leyte, food supplies were low due to both inadequate levels of cultivation and inefficient policies for food distribution by the Japanese occupiers and the local Filipino governments working with them.\textsuperscript{558} Meanwhile, the food situation on Negros was so poor that the governor there, still loyal to the government-in-exile, requested permission from President Quezon to force civilians to grow crops.\textsuperscript{559}

Given such shortages throughout the archipelago, it is important to note that American submarines and aircraft also brought food to the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{560} Allied landings on Leyte in 1944 helped lessen the shortage of food in the Philippines, and an aerial supply drop in 1945 helped alleviate a food supply problem among guerrillas on southern Luzon.\textsuperscript{561} While the food often consisted of standard military rations, sometimes SWPA provided special items. Chick Parsons, acknowledging the importance of the Catholic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{557} Ramsey and Rivele, \textit{Lt. Ramsey’s War}, 290.
\item \textsuperscript{558} For more on the food situation on Leyte, see Satoshi Ara, “Food Supply Problem in Leyte, Philippines, during the Japanese Occupation (1942-1944),” \textit{Journal of Southeast Asia Studies}, Vo. 39, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp 59-82.
\item \textsuperscript{560} Several missions listing food among items delivered are in the Department of the Navy document “Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations,” at <http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/pi_subs_guerrillas.htm>.
\item \textsuperscript{561} Stahl, \textit{You’re No Good to Me Dead}, 157-160.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
faith to Filipinos, took care to bring wheat flour to make communion wafers for the guerrillas on Mindanao in 1943.  

Ultimately, the guerrillas needed food to survive, and despite great difficulties, major groups were able to overcome their food supply problems, albeit with a great deal of improvisation and often sacrifice on the part of the local population. That the guerrillas managed to operate under such trying circumstances is testament to their tenacity, persistence, and belief in their cause, as well as strong support from ordinary Filipino civilians. The guerrillas also showed a remarkable faith in the United States to return to the Philippines and alleviate the food shortages.

Money

The guerrillas viewed money as essential to their operations. Postwar documents list a variety of uses for cash by the guerrillas. As could be expected, for operational and supply purposes, guerrillas used cash to pay for medical supplies, food, arms, ammunition, vehicles, other transport like bus tickets, as well as the salaries of guerrilla officers and men.  

The Bohol Area Command alone procured an estimated 100,000 pesos worth of “foodstuffs, petroleum products, office supplies and other items of a perishable nature” each month from October 1943 to June 1944.  

The command kept

\[\text{Holmes, Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines, Location 2108.}\]
\[\text{The command could only pay 20-30,000 pesos each month in cash, the balance to be paid “when funds [were] available.” Headquarters, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Office of the Chief of Claims Service,}\]
fairly good records of its transactions, with copies of receipts going to suppliers, the Municipal Treasurer, and the command’s procurement depot. Guerrillas also offered cash, often in high sums, to Filipinos in exchange for guns scavenged from battlefields.\(^{565}\) Guerrillas would even pay local civilians for land usage not directly applicable to combat operations.\(^{566}\)

However, they also used cash payments to bribe Japanese and civilian officials for a number of purposes, including securing the release of guerrillas taken prisoner, gathering intelligence, and paying intelligence agents. The USAFIP-NL under Russell Volckmann spent “considerable sums” for “‘Intelligence purposes’ in sending messages to and from Manila and other points.”\(^{567}\) The receipts of Macario Peralta’s Sixth Military District on Panay also reflect payments for intelligence information in sums as large as 20,000 pesos to be distributed according to operational needs.\(^{568}\) Interestingly, payments to intelligence agents reflect the fact that many agents were women, including a certain Miss Lourdes Tateon on Panay, which might be because women were seen as less suspicious by the occupying Japanese.\(^{569}\) Beyond intelligence gathering, bribes could

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\(^{565}\) Lapham and Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders*, 82.


\(^{568}\) Sixth Military District, Philippine Army, “Receipt for Enrique J. Durado,” 18 February 1944, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.

\(^{569}\) “General Voucher to Miss Lourdes Tateon,” June 1944, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
also be used for direct action. The ECLGA used “every available peso” to bribe loyal Negritos into cutting Japanese phone lines in 1944.570

Additionally, cash was used to pay for “female companionship” or recreation.571 Guerrillas also used cash for other services from civilians, such as repairs on vehicles or manual labor as porters.572 The finance records of the Sixth Military District on Panay include receipts of payment for services like maintenance on motor vehicles and even boats.573 In many cases, receipts for goods and services issued by USAFIP-NL did not specify a price under the assumption that repayment would be determined at a later date.574

On Panay, another use for cash was paying relief to the families of those who lost property or loved ones to the Japanese.575 Victims of Japanese atrocities would fill out applications for relief, detailing who they were, where they lived, their relation to the deceased, how the Japanese committed the atrocity, and a certification that they had not received any other relief prior to the application in question. Local guerrilla officers willing to verify the victim’s story and “recommend” the request were also listed on the

571 Headquarters, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Office of the Chief of Claims Service, “Claims Arising out of Guerrilla Activities- Facts on Use of Currency,” 5 August 1947, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II. One assumes this could have been prostitution, but the records are very vague.
573 Several examples of these forms are available in a folder marked “General Voucher, April 1944, Dist. Auditor,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
575 See RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
application. The finance operations of Peralta’s guerrillas became so well-organized that civil servants like judges and clerks, unable to receive pay through normal channels, began to draw pay from military finance officers of the Sixth Military District, a situation which drew the ire of the civil governor, Tomas Confesor.576

The guerrillas used a variety of different currencies to fund their operations.577 Many utilized Japanese war notes or pesos which were printed during the occupation, as they were technically the only legal currency for transactions. These notes were derisively called “Mickey Mouse” currency.578 Guerrillas also used American dollars as well as pre-occupation Filipino government currency, and eventually printed their own occupation currency with the approval of the government-in-exile. However, possession of currency other than those which were approved or printed by the Japanese was generally a capital crime for guerrillas and civilians alike, which meant that some guerrilla leaders, like James Cushing on Cebu, decided against using guerrilla currency to prevent Japanese reprisals.579 Covertly in heavily occupied areas, or more openly in areas with few to no Japanese forces, Provincial Emergency Currency Boards, authorized by the exiled President Quezon, oversaw the printing and issuance of guerrilla currency.580

578 Chief of Claims, AFWESPAC, “Guerrilla Claims,” 28 March 1946, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
579 Shafer, Philippine Emergency and Guerrilla Currency, 15, 17.
580 Ibid., 18.
Beyond printing money outright, guerrillas obtained cash through a wide variety of sources. Sympathetic Filipinos from all walks of life donated cash to the guerrillas. Early into the Japanese occupation, Walter Cushing on Luzon was able to accept a donation of 2,000 pesos from a wealthy Filipino. Russell Volckmann’s forces of the USAFIP did not receive cash from American forces until the fall of 1944 and until then had to rely on contributions from “loyal Filipinos” for the “continued existence of the USAFIP Area Command.” Further south on Luzon, Edwin Ramsey’s guerrillas funneled cash through the extensive Manila underground network.

Despite generous donations from Filipinos sympathetic to the guerrillas, the guerrillas often found themselves lacking funds to buy necessities. Some staple commodities like those highlighted above cost many times their prewar prices. Given shortages of currency, many guerrilla leaders thought that printing money themselves would alleviate many issues. In March 1943, President Quezon authorized Wendell Fertig, via radio message, to print official emergency Philippine government notes, and authorized the Filipino treasury to advance three thousand pesos to the remaining U.S. forces in the Philippines. On Panay, the civil government’s Iloilo Currency Committee worked with Col. Peralta’s guerrillas to print emergency notes for paying guerrillas and

581 Volckmann, *We Remained*, 34.
other civil servants. Submarines even brought official plates from the treasury department of the Filipino government in exile to allow the guerrillas to print money.

Besides being generated from sources in the Philippines themselves, large quantities of cash were delivered to the guerrillas by American submarines on a number of occasions. On its March 5, 1943 mission to supply the guerrillas on Mindanao, the USS *Tambor* (SS-198) brought $10,000 (U.S.) in cash. A subsequent mission by the USS *Trout* (SS-202) brought another $10,000 to guerrillas on Basilon Island to establish an intelligence and coastwatcher station. Later, the USS *Bowfin* (SS-287) delivered more cash, as well as mail and other documents, to the guerrillas on Mindanao in September of 1943. Finally, the USAFIP-NL under Russell Volckmann received some 200,000 pesos from the USS *Gar* (SS-206) in the fall of 1944, the first financial support Volckmann’s troops received from American forces. After this delivery, Volckmann’s forces did not need to collect any Filipino currency from the local population to support their operations. Additionally, American submarines also carried counterfeit Japanese currency. Allied leaders hoped the counterfeit money would depreciate Japanese

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589 Ibid.
591 “Copy of Statement of Bado Dangwa and Jose Mencio,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
currency; given the rampant inflation of Japanese currency during the war, the counterfeit money may have had an effect.592

However, not all guerrilla organizations felt the need to use hard cash for funding their operations. Marking’s Regiment on Luzon did not pay cash to those who gave goods, cash loans, or services. Instead, the unit issued promissory notes, receipts in denominations of Philippine Treasury certificates or Japanese war notes, or receipts in the form of so-called “Liberty Bonds.”593 As mentioned above, James Cushing’s command on Cebu did not print guerrilla currency, instead accruing a substantial amount of debt to finance unit activities.594

In many cases, locals made loans to the guerrillas under the understanding that they would eventually be repaid. USAFIP-NL finance officers estimated their unit borrowed over 1.6 million yen in Japanese war notes, or approximately 92,000 Filipino pesos or 50,000 U.S. dollars, between December 1941 and January 1945.595 The guerrillas on Cebu had accrued more than 950,000 Philippine pesos of debt by the end of

592 Holmes, *Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines*, Location 2231; Courtney Whitney, “Procurement of Jap Currency,” dated 26 Sept 43, Record Group 16, Box 63, Folder 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.
593 Republic of the Philippines, Emergency Currency Board, Manila, “Promissory Notes or Receipts, ‘Liberty Bonds,’ and Other Evidence of Indebtedness of Guerrilla Organizations,” February 27, 1947, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
the war just for feeding guerrillas and laborers, with an unspecified amount due to the laborers themselves for services rendered.596

Based on a number of messages to General MacArthur, the exiled President Quezon was very concerned with guerrilla pay. In October 1943, Quezon proposed giving the guerrillas a Christmas bonus equivalent to two month’s pay, while civilian employees supporting the guerrillas would receive a bonus of one month’s pay.597 Citing a “scarcity” of available currency, MacArthur rejected this proposal, saying it may give a false impression that the Filipino government in exile was withholding pay.598 He instead had Quezon send a message promising payment of all salaries in arrears, as well as any outstanding loans, at the conclusion of the war.

Distribution of cash, especially illegal guerrilla notes, had to be conducted in a surreptitious manner and payment of salaries could be irregular. Most units consistently owed their troops back-pay. However, some guerrilla groups were able to pay their troops and spies regularly. Filipino officer Luis V. Centina, Jr. on Negros met with his network of intelligence agents every two weeks to receive their reports and allow them to claim their salaries.599

597 Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Regional Section, “Message 8998, To: General MacArthur, From: President Quezon,” 10 October 1943, RG 496, Entry 119, Box 615 “Radio Messages from Washington and President Quezon,” NARA II.
598 HQSWPA, “AGWAR,” 19 October 1943, RG 496, Entry 119, Box 615 “Radio Messages from Washington and President Quezon,” NARA II.
599 Centina, Almost on the Carpet, 123.
After the war, the U.S. government, through MacArthur’s headquarters, agreed to honor and pay claims for loans made to guerrilla forces, provided suitable conversion factors were applied for emergency or guerrilla currency. Even claims on loans made in Japanese invasion currency would be honored if such claims were “meritorious” and convertible to Philippine pesos for the time and place that the loan was made. After the war, guerrilla commanders were charged with verifying the authenticity of claims in certifying what their units had purchased, since units received loans from civilians based on the commanders’ authority. The guerrilla commanders disagreed among themselves as to how civilians should be repaid, with Russell Volckmann and James Cushing supporting compensation for all civilians who served, Wendell Fertig opposing compensation, and Macario Peralta supporting compensation only if it were applied to all guerrilla units and their areas. Fertig and others opposed compensation because they believed it would turn patriotic material support for the guerrillas into a purely monetary transaction.

The redemption of emergency currency even caught the attention of American President Harry S. Truman. In 1945, because such currency was used “for the prosecution of the war,” Truman felt that “its redemption is a responsibility of the United States government” and directed the secretaries of war and the treasury to analyze the

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situation and recommend ways to remedy it.\textsuperscript{603} Although the Manila Times was able to report in 1947 that the Philippines were able to receive 50 million Philippine pesos from the U.S. government to fulfill the obligations of the new republic “including the redemption of mountain or guerrilla notes,” the U.S. government did not fully compensate many guerrillas for their service until the 1990s or 2000s.\textsuperscript{604}

**Other Supplies**

Probably the most important pieces of equipment dropped off to the guerrillas by submarine were radios. Robert Lapham, who eventually commanded over 13,000 guerrillas on Luzon, later acknowledged, “Of all the supplies sent to us by submarine, what appealed most to me and positively elated my men were the arms and ammunition. That does not diminish the fact that the radio transmitters were far more valuable.”\textsuperscript{605} Russell Volckmann listed radios as one of the important items levied from local civilians by his guerrillas in northern Luzon.\textsuperscript{606} Radios allowed the guerrillas to communicate with each other, and most significantly from the perspective of MacArthur’s headquarters, allowed the guerrillas and their intelligence network to share crucial information on the composition, disposition, and strength of Japanese forces, as well as

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{603}{The White House, Washington, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War,” October 25, 1945, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.}
\footnote{604}{“PI Receives ₱50 Million Check Today,” Transcript, Manila Times, January 7, 1947, RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 534 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.; For a short summary of the struggles to compensate guerrillas for their service, see Denise Cruz’s introduction to Yay Panlilio’s *The Crucible*, reprinted by Rutgers University Press in 2009.}
\footnote{605}{Lapham and Norling, Lapham’s *Raiders*, 161.}
\footnote{606}{Volckmann, *We Remained*, 128.}
\end{footnotes}
weather and terrain data, with SWPA headquarters. During his intelligence survey of the Philippines in 1943, AIB agent Jesus Villamor invested a great deal of effort in establishing a radio network throughout the islands. He even saw to it that a disassembled radio was smuggled into Manila, with the parts hidden in baskets of vegetables and even inside the vegetables themselves.

Further emphasizing the importance of radios to the guerrillas, Edwin Ramsey undertook a dangerous month-long trip from his headquarters in east-central Luzon to go to Mindoro to pick up a radio dropped off by the Allied Intelligence Bureau via submarine. Although the radio had been captured by the Japanese by the time Ramsey arrived, another radio was smuggled to him by one Modesto Castaneda, who went by the pseudonym of “Captain Casey.” Castaneda journeyed the 1,000 miles from Negros over the course of four months to deliver the radio to Ramsey, who then proceeded to use the radio to pass intelligence to MacArthur’s headquarters. Ramsey also valued the radio because it allowed him and his forces to get valuable updates on the outside world, particularly the progress of Allied forces moving towards the Philippines. Radio transmitters, receivers, charging units, batteries, wires, and spare parts were priority items that Chick Parsons brought with him via submarine during his clandestine missions.

Outside of their utility for communications purposes, radios even helped demonstrate

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607 Submarines even dropped off equipment for guerrillas to gather data on the weather in the Philippines. Jose V. Valera, “Memorandum Regarding ‘Equipments’ for Commanding General, SWPA,” dated 23rd November 1944. Record Group 16, Box 3, Folder 6, “Guerrilla Activities, 1944-1945.” Courtney Whitney Papers, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, VA.
608 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 127.
609 See Ramsey and Rivele, Lt. Ramsey’s War, Chapter 5, “Filipino Patriot, 1944.”
610 Ibid., 242.
611 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 144.
American superiority to reluctant Filipinos. During the initial stages of AIB’s Mission ISRM (“I Shall Return, MacArthur”; one of several infiltrations of AIB agents into the Philippines), demonstration of a then-novel hand-held walkie-talkie, without stringing wires or using large broadcasting equipment, allowed the AIB agents to gain credibility and prestige with local guerrillas and civilians.612

The guerrillas also found fuel, used to run vehicles and generators, in short supply during the Japanese occupation, and supplemented their meager supplies through a variety of means. Guerrillas on Mindanao acquired fuel by manufacturing _tuba_ (fermented coconut sap) alcohol which could run engines and machinery as a gasoline substitute.613 The _tuba_ was manufactured in copper stills brought to the guerrillas by submarine.614 Submarines also dropped off fuel and oil to the guerrillas. On the _USS Nautilus_’ twelfth war patrol, conducted during September 1944, she dropped off several dozen drums of fuel and oil to guerrillas on Cebu, Panay, and North Pandan, among sixty-five tons of other cargo.615

Paper and office supplies were also essential for guerrilla operations, especially for record keeping and the printing of money as well as newspapers and propaganda. In the finance records of the guerrillas on Panay, there are several receipts for the purchase of “stationaries” and “bond papers,” or “manila papers,” ostensibly for maintaining

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613 Haggerty, _Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao_, 73.

614 Holmes, _Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines_, Location 2231.

records and sending letters or orders. Interestingly, graduates of an officers’ training school for guerrillas on Panay received diplomas printed on quality white bond paper. Russell Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL units collected office supplies from local civilians in addition to essentials like food and clothing. While there was a shortage of paper during the occupation and many guerrillas re-used documents from pre-war businesses or personal correspondence as a source of paper, paper and other office supplies like typewriters could also be brought in by submarine. Surprisingly, many surviving guerrilla documents from prominent groups were typed, which demonstrates that the request of AIB operative Captain Frank Young for a “portable mimeographing machine with stencils, 2 typewriters, [and] paper materials” for the guerrillas on Tawi-Tawi was not all that uncommon. Of course, items like pens and pencils were still used, but even these could be scarce. Due to inflation, by June 1944 a gross (quantity of 144 items) of pencils in Manila cost 180 pesos, or approximately $90 U.S. (in 1944 dollars).

Besides using paper for records, archival and other documents also contain or make reference to homemade, often typed, copies of guerrilla newspapers and propaganda. These included documents and propaganda printed by the “Free

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617 Manikan, Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island, 527.
618 Volckmann, We Remained, 127.
619 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Philippine Activities,” 20 June 1944, RG 496, Entry 115, Box 611, “Selected Messages from the Philippines,” NARA II.
620 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Philippine Activities,” 19 June 1944, RG 496, Entry 115, Box 611, “Selected Messages from the Philippines,” NARA II.

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Philippines” group in Manila, among others. One of the leftist ethnic Chinese groups fighting the Japanese, the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League, published a secret newspaper entitled Chinese Guide (Hiuigung dao boo) to help inspire and maintain resistance to the occupation.

Proper clothing for field operations was often in short supply, and the guerrillas worked to acquire such items as necessary or made do with what they had on hand. While former officers and men of the American or Filipino forces tended to use their issued uniforms until they became unserviceable, civilians often wore their normal outfits, many consisting of “shredded trousers and torn shirts,” and commonly went barefoot. Col. Russell Volckmann, leader of the USAFIP-NL, adopted civilian attire after the capture of previous the USFIP-NL leadership, Colonels Moses and Noble, including “shorts, [a] straw hat, and shoes.” The Hunters ROTC conducted a raid on an armory at the Mapua Institute of Technology specifically to gather quartermaster items like uniforms and shoes as well as canteens and mess kits. Socks, shirts, and underwear were among the items that U.S. Navy Lt. Commander Chick Parsons brought with him during his clandestine submarine missions. As needles and thread for repairing clothes were also in short supply in the islands during the Japanese occupation,

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621 The “Free Philippines” was “a group of young professionals formed in Dec 1941, after the fall of Manila, as a counter-propaganda unit.” Several hundred were discovered and arrested by Japanese authorities in 1944. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Philippine Activities,” 22 June 1944, RG 496, Entry 115, Box 611, “Selected Messages from the Philippines,” NARA II.
622 Li, The Huaqiao Warriors, 99-100.
623 Ramsey and Rivele, Lt. Ramsey’s War, 114.
624 Volckmann, We Remained, 121.
625 Mojica, Terry’s Hunters, 54.
626 Ind, Secret War Against Japan, 144.
sewing kits were also brought in by submarine for distribution to the guerrillas and local population as symbols of American commitment.627

Medical supplies, which were often hard to manufacture in the conditions under which the guerrillas were operating, were also prized. Items like bandages or surgical tools were necessary to treat guerrillas wounded in action, but other items like medicines were also important for maintaining the health of guerrilla fighters. Malaria was a constant threat due to the large numbers of mosquitoes in the humid, tropical climate of the Philippines, and this made quinine or Atabrine important to keep guerrillas in shape to fight.628 Medical units on Panay were able to produce quinine from the bark of certain trees.629 Proper disinfectant was hard to come by, and alcoholic beverages like gin were used as substitutes to clean wounds.630 Guerrillas acquired medical supplies by capturing them, or received them from local donations or via American submarines, but they also purchased them outright when available locally.631 Russell Volckmann’s guerrillas received many of their medical supplies from a female agent in Manila posing as a relief worker who would smuggle the supplies out of the city via messengers.632 Volckmann’s units also executed raids on two Japanese installations with the intention of capturing

627 Earle, Mission ISRM, 45.
628 Holmes, Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines, Location 1930.
629 Records refer to beta and casoy bark. Medical Battalion, 61st Division, “Unit Report,” dated May 28, 1943, in “6th MD Historical Combat Reports,” Box 253, RG 407, Entry 1093, NARA II.
630 Ramsey and Rivele, Lt. Ramsey’s War, 126.
632 Volckmann, We Remained, 128.
medical instruments and supplies. Chick Parsons brought the guerrillas drugs, surgical kits, and vaccines during his clandestine missions to the Philippines.

Hygiene and morale items could be produced in the islands. On Negros, the guerrillas used coconut oil to make soap. However, it was also common for submarines to bring such items. The first special mission to supply the guerrillas in the Philippines was conducted by the USS *Gudgeon* (SS-212). On January 14, 1943, *Gudgeon* landed six men, including Major Jesus A. Villamor, and one ton of equipment, including quinine, vitamins, medical supplies, cigarettes, and candy, in two boats near Catmon Point on Negros. During his trips to the Philippines, Lt. Cdr. Chick Parsons ensured key guerrilla leaders were kept happy by providing them with luxury items like saddle soap for shining leather, hygiene items, and even “teeth stickum” for loose dentures. Parsons also brought the guerrillas cigarettes and chocolate bars as well as newspapers and magazines. A Filipino-American officer known as “Tony” also brought morale and other items to the guerrillas on Negros, including pro-Allied propaganda, uniforms, tents, canteens, chocolate, canned goods, and cigarettes. Cigarette packs were

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633 Ibid.
634 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 144.
636 Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations*, 272. 51. *Gudgeon* was one of the first three submarines to conduct war patrols from Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attacks on Oahu.
639 Ind, *Secret War Against Japan*, 144.
640 Centina, *Almost on the Carpet*, 129. Centina, claims that this man arrived in the Philippines from Australia in November 1942, but this is unlikely given that the guerrillas had not yet made contact with SWPA GHQ. In any event, Centina suspected the man’s real name was Antonio Quesada.
sometimes wrapped with posters of Gen. MacArthur to remind the guerrillas and Filipino civilians of MacArthur’s promise to return.\textsuperscript{641}

As with many military organizations, the guerrillas in the Philippines had to have more than just food and weapons to fight effectively. Their ability to acquire what they needed, whether by producing it locally, purchasing or smuggling items, or requesting and receiving supplies via air or submarine, demonstrates the sophistication and ingenuity of many groups. Given the intensity of the Japanese occupation in many areas and the remoteness of some of their bases, the ability of the guerrillas to supply themselves remains a remarkable testament to their resilience and tenacity.

**Promotions, Recruitment, and Awards**

Surviving records indicate how important promotions and awards were for the guerrillas. Although in some cases guerrillas were literal “self-promoters” who bestowed upon themselves high ranks like that of Col. or general, many groups were diligent in requesting promotions (and the associated increases in pay) through proper channels, namely SWPA Headquarters.\textsuperscript{642} Edwin Ramsey promoted U.S. Army corporal John Boone to captain in the fall of 1942, but acknowledged his authority to do so derived

\textsuperscript{641} Earle, *Mission ISRM*, 45.
from Col. Thorp and ultimately Gen. MacArthur himself. However, MacArthur’s headquarters did see fit to advance deserving guerrillas like Peralta on Panay and Fertig on Mindanao, who were promoted in 1943. Edwin Ramsey only learned of his promotion to major by SWPA Headquarters in 1943 through Robert Lapham. Lapham said that Col. Claude Thorp had requested promotions to major for then-Lt.s Ramsey and Lapham, and while the message took two months to reach SWPA headquarters, MacArthur approved the promotions. Besides promotions, there was a great deal of communication regarding other favorable personnel actions, especially awards like the Philippines’ Distinguished Service Star.

Recruitment was another important part of personnel management. Sometimes guerrilla officers would personally make recruiting trips to increase their numbers, as Edwin Ramsey and John Boone did on Bataan in early 1943. However, others took a more systematic approach. In 1942, the Hunters ROTC established a system whereby groups of selected guerrillas would train in jungle camps and then be sent back to their towns to organize and train more guerrillas. The process of recruiting intelligence agents was fairly informal and not always recorded, although some groups maintained simple paper records of appointments. The records of the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces

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644 Message 6891, “Quezon to Fertig & Peralta congrats on promotions,” 16 Aug 1944, RG 496, Entry 1097, Box 615, “Messages from Washington and President Quezon,” NARA II.
646 Several messages from Quezon approving the awarding of this and other medals can be found in the box marked “Messages from Washington and President Quezon,” RG 496, Entry 1097, Box 615, NARA II. Several guerrilla leaders, including Macario Peralta on Panay and Ruperto Kangleon on Leyte, received the U.S. military’s Distinguished Service Cross following Allied landings.
include a number of appointment letters for “special agents” which granted them safe passage and charged them with gathering “information pertaining to the Activity of Japs and pro-Japs element [sic] and other Societies against the Organization [the LGAF],” instructing them to report “at frequent intervals.”\textsuperscript{649} On Panay, Peralta directed the establishment of an officers’ training school in late spring of 1944 as a place to train qualified non-commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{650}

Overall, guerrilla personnel practices, while far from perfect, allowed them to maintain fighters and support troops in their ranks for the duration of the Japanese occupation and into the liberation of the archipelago by Allied forces. The maintenance of a hierarchical system of ranks and the desire to reach all the way to Australia to institute and approve promotions again demonstrates the extent of professionalism and discipline prevalent among prominent groups, and shows that many remained loyal to the United States and Manuel Quezon’s government-in-exile. The fact that many of the guerrillas felt secure enough to focus on personnel matters, like promotions, versus purely operations, security, or tactics, also demonstrates their level of effectiveness and freedom of action without fear of Japanese interference.

\textsuperscript{649} Headquarters, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Claims Service “LGAF Commandeering Record: Appointments of Special Agents,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 537 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.

\textsuperscript{650} Manikan, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island}, 525. Later referred to as BOTS, or “Berlin Officers’ Troop School,” the school had as its namesake the 66\textsuperscript{th} “Berlin” guerrilla Regiment, which oversaw the school.
Military Justice and Corruption

Although most guerrillas performed in an exemplary manner given the circumstances of the Japanese occupation, there were those who took advantage of the lawless situation on many islands. In the years following World War II, the U.S. Veterans Administration office found that certain guerrillas had extorted the population of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, on Luzon of money and foodstuffs as well as carts and horses.651 Not waiting for justice to be served after the war, in some cases the guerrillas themselves attempted to police their ranks. Filipino officer Luis V. Centina, Jr. on Negros, part of the 7th Military District’s G2 section, noted that one of the duties of his section was “to track down and arrest abusive soldiers” to stand trial before a court martial because “[t]here was no effective civilian authority underground.”652 Ray C. Hunt recalled that his guerrilla unit was tasked with arresting a self-proclaimed guerrilla leader who was extorting the local population.653 By the middle part of 1942, Macario Peralta on Panay saw the need to establish courts-martial, and even summary courts at the company level, to prosecute cases of “cowardice, indiscipline, abuses [sic], corruption, graft, or crimes against the persons and property of the civilians” among the guerrillas.654 Concurrently, Governor Tomas Confesor, sometimes with unwanted help from Peralta’s guerrillas, was able to operate a civil government including courts and judges.655

651 See Folder “Guerrilla Bandits and Black Marketeers,” RG 407, Entry 1097, Box 537 “Guerrilla Finance and Supply Records,” NARA II.
652 Centina, Almost on the Carpet, 127-128.
653 Hunt and Norling Behind Japanese Lines, 117-118. After capturing the man and issuing him a stern warning, Hunt’s unit released him.
654 Manikan, Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island, 520.
655 Ibid., 497-498.
The guerrillas also found themselves dealing with collaborators, and those found to have been assisting the Japanese were often dealt with harshly. While on a supply trip to Mindanao, Lt. Cdr. Chick Parsons witnessed the trial of a spy for the Japanese. The man admitted his guilt and was subsequently executed with a Moro barong, or sword.656 During the initial creation of the Hunters ROTC in 1942, Filipino guerrilla Francisco “Kikoy” Adricula “secured either the surrender or the liquidation of all collaborators and spies in his area of operations.”657 Elsewhere on Luzon, Ray C. Hunt later noted “…our foremost immediate problem was always to pursue informers [for the Japanese] relentlessly and exterminate them” and “some guerrillas… exceeded all norms of reason and humanity in their relentless pursuit of informers and subsequent treatment of them.”658 Luis Centina, Jr. later asserted that “[e]xecutions without trial was [sic] not an uncommon occurrence within the guerrilla movement as the war dragged on,” especially executions of suspected collaborators, although he never personally witnessed such executions.659 This fact was born out by the ECGLA under the command of Edwin Ramsey. In 1943, after the wife of an executed collaborator threatened to reveal information about the ECLGA if she were released from guerrilla custody, Ramsey reluctantly issued a directive that all captured collaborators and Japanese spies be executed after they had been interrogated.660 He acknowledged that this decision had

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grim consequences, and later recalled the ostracism of a young boy who had carried out many of these executions for his guerrilla unit.661

Russell Volckmann’s memoir emphasizes the fact that pro-Japanese “spies, informers, and collaborators” were a pressing danger to the guerrillas and “had to be eliminated.”662 Having placed an emphasis on counterespionage when he took command of USAFIP-NL, Volckmann noted that spies for the Japanese “were apprehended and eliminated” over six month period, often in brutal fashion.663 When guerrillas operating in USAFIP-NL’s First District learned of the location of several Japanese spies who were seeking refuge in a village, they attacked and fixed the Japanese garrison there while setting fire to the building housing the spies.664

The summary justice and sometimes brutal methods of the guerrillas in eliminating informers and others assisting the Japanese is a dark chapter in the history of the Philippines. However, many leaders, perhaps self-servingly, asserted that their methods worked and that they and their guerrillas had little choice if they wanted to survive. The fact that many groups like those under Ramsey, Peralta, and Volckmann did survive through the occupation may lend credence to their claims for the efficacy of their methods. Also, in comparison to Japanese reprisals, the guerrilla methods seem somewhat measured, although given the brutality of Japanese atrocities this might not be saying much. Nevertheless, the guerrillas did try to be more discriminate than their

661 Ibid., 264-265.
662 Volckmann, We Remained, 125.
663 Ibid., 126.
664 Ibid.
opponents, and the number of civilian deaths due to guerrilla action is significantly smaller than those caused by the Japanese. Ultimately, perhaps one can understand the reasons for the somewhat ruthless nature of guerrilla operations against informers and spies, especially given the nature of their opponents, without condoning such brutality or condemning all guerrilla actions wholesale.

Conclusion

Despite the brutality of Japanese counter-guerrilla operations, many of the guerrilla groups were able to administer and sustain substantial and sophisticated intelligence-gathering and combat operations, including those of the USAFIP-NL (Russell Volckmann), Hunters ROTC, Lapham’s Raiders, and the Marking Regiment on Luzon; Macario Peralta’s guerrillas on Panay; and Wendell Fertig’s guerrillas on Mindanao. The leaders of many of these groups used their military experience to administer their units on American or Maoist lines, and in many ways the creation of staff sections specifically to deal with logistics and finance reveal a sophistication to guerrilla operations which is quite impressive. One is also struck by the sheer amount of paperwork, much of it typed, that many of the guerrilla groups generated, be they hundreds of receipts for the numerous civilians who sold items to the guerrillas or lists of individuals eligible for promotion. In an environment where paper was scarce, the will and ability to type extensive records is itself an indication that the guerrillas were trying and in many cases able to act in a manner consistent with many military bureaucracies. At the same time, the ability to maintain such records also shows that many of the
guerrilla groups were effective to the point that they were able to maintain written records with little threat of Japanese attack. While hardly as glamorous as covert intelligence gathering or large-scale combat, the effective daily sustainment and administrative operations conducted by the guerrillas were necessary to maintain unit readiness during the Japanese occupation and in preparation for their role in the liberation of the Philippines.
Chapter 6: Guerrillas Rising—The Guerrillas During the Liberation of the Philippines

“One phenomenon of the reconquest of the Philippines was certainly far different from any other experience of the war in the Pacific. That was the presence of a large, organized guerrilla force backed by a generally loyal population waiting only for the chance to make its contribution to the defeat of Japan.”

The liberation of the Philippines from Japanese occupation began on A-Day, October 20, 1944, with American landings on Leyte Island. By the time the campaign concluded on August 15, 1945, it had seen the commitment of sixteen American divisions or equivalent-sized units, making it the largest U.S. Army operation of the Pacific War, involving more American ground forces than those employed in North Africa, Italy, or Southern France. As forces under American General Douglas MacArthur fulfilled their commander’s promise to return to the Philippines, they encountered American and Filipino guerrilla forces who had been awaiting the liberation with much anticipation. Far from idle during the Japanese occupation, these units, in

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668 That the Allies would invade the Philippines in 1944 was not a forgone conclusion. Allied strategists debated the costs and benefits of bypassing the Philippines in favor of operations directly at Formosa. Due to logistical and other considerations, as well as Gen. MacArthur’s urging that the Allies had to fulfill obligations to the Filipino people, the Joint Chiefs of Staff settled on an operation to seize Luzon (and Leyte in a preliminary operation). See Robert Ross Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” in *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield, for more surrounding the controversy and ultimate decision to liberate the Philippines.
groups as small as a few dozen men or as large as several tens of thousands, had resisted the Japanese through a number of intelligence-gathering, sabotage, ambush, and raiding operations from the initial surrender in 1942 through 1944 and into 1945. Even with American forces bearing a heavy burden of the fighting, the guerrillas made significant contributions to the liberation, saving numerous American lives and in some cases providing large forces which complemented and often operated independent of American units. Without the guerrillas, the Philippines campaign would have been much more difficult for Allied forces and would have consumed greater amounts of time, resources, and manpower.

Prior to the Allied invasion of Leyte, the Japanese had approximately 240,000 troops spread throughout the Philippine archipelago. The Japanese plan for the defense of the Philippines was part of the overall SHO (Victory) plans, and was known as SHO I. The 14th Area Army was given responsibility for securing the Philippines, under the command of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Yamashita only assumed command on October 9, 1944, however, and found conditions in the Philippines unsatisfactory, with the troops in the islands having lackadaisical attitudes their duties. Despite his unenviable task, in accordance with Imperial General Headquarters directives, Yamashita decided to adopt “resistance in depth” tactics, whereby Japanese troops would not resist beach landings but would instead develop defenses on the interior of the islands where

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669 This number had been fairly accurately deduced by Gen. MacArthur’s G-2 section. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1992), 158-159.
670 Yamashita was known as the “Tiger of Malaya” for his brilliant campaign to seize British Singapore and Malaya early in the war.
671 Hamlin, The Return to the Philippines, 49-51.
they would be less vulnerable to American air and naval bombardment. Although he preferred to defend Luzon rather than spread his troops throughout the islands, Yamashita had little time to radically alter Japanese dispositions, but was fortunate to have a trusted subordinate in command when the Americans invaded Leyte.672 Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, commanding the 35th Army in the Central Philippines (including Leyte) and Yamashita’s immediate subordinate, adopted a resistance in depth on the eve of the American invasion, generally abandoning previously built defenses on the coast but keeping some of his forces on the beaches to resist the landings.673

On the Allied side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in conjunction with the planners under MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, decided to seize Leyte in the fall of 1944 as a staging base for further operations in the Philippines, with the island’s airfields being key objectives.674 MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Headquarters would oversee the liberation of the Philippines, with Nimitz providing the U.S. Seventh Fleet to escort and support the landings and the U.S. Third Fleet to provide protection against the Imperial Japanese Navy. The invasion fleet for Leyte numbered more than 700 ships, with the transports of the fleet carrying 160,000 troops of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth Army along with their equipment and supplies.675 As they had

672 Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra, 160. Yamashita felt that Luzon’s size would give him greater maneuver room and a battle there would force MacArthur to fight at the end of extended supply lines. Yamashita’s tenacious defense of the mountainous northern part of Luzon would prove problematic for Allied forces liberating the islands, including the large guerrilla units highlighted here.
673 Hamlin, The Return to the Philippines, 52.
674 The JCS had considered invading Mindanao as well, but decided in the weeks prior to the invasion to bypass it instead. Hamlin, The Return to the Philippines, 6-9, 23.
for the past few years, through an extensive radio network set up by the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of SWPA Headquarters, the guerrillas provided a fairly accurate picture of Japanese strength, dispositions, and defenses. Right before the Allied landings on Leyte, the Alamo Scouts of the 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit began three- to seventeen-day missions into the Philippines to work with the guerrilla units, bringing the guerrillas urgently needed supplies as well as coordinating guerrilla actions with the upcoming Allied operations and bolstering the guerrilla radio network.676 Krueger would later write that “After the landing, Philippine guerrilla forces furnished much valuable military intelligence and the civilian population, which was predominantly friendly, proved to be an important source of information.”677

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Figure 7. Major Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines

Numbering some 3,200 men by the fall of 1944, Kangleon’s men on Leyte Island were the first guerrillas in the Philippines to join with American forces liberating the islands. At the time of the Allied landings, Japanese forces on Leyte, centered on the 16th Division under Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, numbered some 20,000 troops, but following the Allied invasion the Japanese quickly decided to reinforce the Leyte garrison with elements of the 30th and 102nd Divisions and the 55th and 57th Independent Brigades.

Soon after the American landings by units of the U.S. Sixth Army under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger on October 20, 1944, Kangleon’s forces destroyed key bridges, ambushed and harassed Japanese patrols, and attacked Japanese supply depots. After the establishment of the American beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag on the island’s east coast, the American and guerrilla units had trouble establishing communications for several days. Once communications were established, however, guerrilla units were attached to the subordinate units of the Sixth Army.

Unlike their counterparts on other islands like Luzon, Kangleon’s guerrillas generally did not take part in large-scale fighting, but contributed to the Allied effort in a number of security and patrolling roles. This was especially valuable as American units advanced and Japanese troops attempted to infiltrate into rear areas and attack vulnerable supply depots and lines of communication. The guerrillas on Leyte also provided valuable intelligence information to the advancing American forces, and although they often exaggerated Japanese troop numbers, they generally gave correct locations for

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Japanese troop concentrations, allowing American forces to attack them with artillery, air strikes, or ground troops.

During the final phase of operations on Leyte, which focused on eliminating the remaining small pockets of Japanese resistance, the three guerrilla battalions of the 95th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, were attached to the American 96th Infantry Division, one battalion supporting the each of the 96th Division’s three regiments for patrolling and reconnaissance missions in Central Leyte through January 1945. In one case, a small mixed unit consisting of eleven Americans and three guerrillas conducted a long-range patrol deep in Japanese held areas. The patrol, originally intended to last four days, ended up taking over a week, with the men trying to avoid Allied artillery fire and skirmishing with several Japanese units before making contact with elements of the American 77th Infantry Division. Japanese resistance on Leyte was all but eliminated by the spring of 1945, with Kangleon’s forces demonstrating the importance that guerrilla forces could have in freeing up American forces from security duties to allow American combat units to undertake larger combat operations against the Japanese.

With Leyte secured, the Allied forces turned their attention to liberating Luzon, the largest island of the Philippine Archipelago and the location of the national capital, Manila. Luzon was the most heavily garrisoned island in the Philippines, and on the eve of the American invasion it boasted some 287,000 Japanese troops. Many of these

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680 G-3 Section, Headquarters, 96th Infantry Division, “96th Infantry Division, Narrative of Supplemental Action Against the Enemy, Operation Report King II (Leyte) Operation, 26 Dec 44- 10 Feb 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 11494, NARA II, 1-2.
681 Ibid., 2-3.
682 Drea, _MacArthur’s Ultra_, 185. Col. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2 Intelligence Officer, consistently underestimated the Japanese strength on Luzon by as many as 130,000 men.
units had participated in heavy-handed operations which successfully disrupted Luzon guerrilla forces during much of the Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, by the time American units landed on Luzon on January 9, 1945, several large guerrilla units were operating under the purview of several American and Filipino commanders scattered throughout the island. As on other islands, the guerrillas kept SWPA Headquarters abreast of Japanese troop strength and dispositions through radio communications, while preparing for combat and sabotage operations against Japanese troops and installations.

Central Luzon guerrilla units were still not as unified as those in other areas and included those under Maj. Edwin P. Ramsey in the East-Central-Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA). By this point, Ramsey commanded an estimated 40,000 guerrillas armed with everything from M2 .50-caliber machine guns to swords, although only a quarter could be armed at any one time. Also still operating in Central Luzon was Maj. Robert Lapham, commanding the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) numbering 5-6,000 guerrillas. Other smaller groups that had survived the occupation included the Hunters ROTC, President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG), and the 155th Provisional Guerrilla Battalion. Additionally, by this time Marking’s Fil-American Yay Regiment, led by

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683 There were numerous smaller guerrilla units which operated on Luzon through the Allied liberation. These even included a unit to counter Japanese propaganda called The Free Philippines. The actions of these units will not be covered in detail here, as in most cases they remain obscure with limited or nonexistent records. Charles A. Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines (New York: Vantage Press, 1972), 458-459.


685 PQOG units were commanded by Filipino officer Vicente S. Umali and finally made contact with the Eighth Army on February 8, 1945. Primitivo San Augustin, “Contact with Liberation Forces,” 8 February 1945, Record Group 496, Entry 112, Box 600, “PQOG,” NARA II. The 155th Provisional Guerrilla Battalion was composed of native Negritos and several American escapees from the Bataan Death March. Malcolm Decker, On a Mountainside: The 155th Provisional Guerrilla Battalion Against the Japanese on Luzon (Las Cruces, NM: Yucca Tree Press, 2004), vi.
Marcos V. Augustin and Yay Panilio, numbered several thousand guerrillas, while the Huks, the largest and best organized group on Central Luzon, were estimated at 100,000 guerrillas including unarmed auxiliaries.686

Also mainly operating in Central Luzon, Chinese guerrillas were divided between a variety of Nationalist and Communist groups, the latter often aligned with the Communist Huks. The Nationalist groups included four units, the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (COWHM), the Pekek Squadron (Squadron 399), the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (PCYWSSC), and the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP).687 These groups generally operated in smaller units supporting other Filipino groups or U.S. Army units during the liberation. For example, 159 members of the COWHM fought with the U.S. 25th Infantry Division’s 161st Infantry Regiment during fighting at Santa Fe and near the Balete Pass in the northern part of Luzon.688

The leftist units, far better organized and unified than their Nationalist counterparts, included the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Feilubin huaqiao kangri zhidui), normally shortened to Hua Zhi (Wha Chi, or Wah Chi), and the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (Feilubin huaqiao kangri chujian Yiyongdui, PCAJVC), or abbreviated Kang Chu.689 Although generally forming larger

688 Ibid., 123.
689 Ibid., 79.
units of several hundred guerrillas, the Communist Chinese units operated in conjunction with larger guerrilla groups or American units like their Nationalist counterparts. In particular, the Hua Zhi’s 1st Squadron assisted the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division during the liberation, while the 11th Airborne Division had the assistance of the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons. Although offering smaller contributions than the largely Filipino and American groups, the involvement of ethnic Chinese in the resistance to the Japanese remains an interesting part of the guerrilla story.

In contrast to the variety of groups in Central Luzon, the guerrillas in the northern part of the island were generally united in one group under a single commander. That group, American Col. Russell Volckmann’s U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAIP-NL) numbered approximately 10,000 guerrillas by the time of the Allied invasion. As discussed previously, Volckmann’s forces were distributed among five different sectors and were divided into regiments numbering approximately 1-2,000 men. During the liberation, Volckmann’s well-organized units were largely able to operate independently of American forces, only requiring air or artillery support for selected offensive operations against Japanese forces who were often in strong fortified positions.

American air support proved crucial to the operations of the USAIP-NL. A radio message from Lt. Gen. Krueger to Volckmann on 27 January notified the latter of an upcoming airstrike by eight American P-51 fighter-bombers on Japanese positions in Lingsa School and San Fernando Central in support of USAIP-NL. Krueger instructed

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690 Ibid., 87-89.
Volckmann’s forces to mark their front line by placing a panel across the national highway.\textsuperscript{692} This was to occur as the fighters were making three counterclockwise circles over the target area. Later communications showed that this strike was successful with no friendly casualties.

Volckmann himself related that air support was important in the seizure of San Fernando by the guerrillas of the 121\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Regiment. U.S. Marine Corps dive bombers operating from the Mangaldan airstrip in the vicinity of Lingayen Gulf provided close air support for the guerrilla attack, with the guerrillas finally seizing San Fernando on March 14 after several weeks of fighting, although the area was not entirely cleared until March 23.\textsuperscript{693} Volckmann and his men developed effective procedures for air-ground integration during this operation, working with embedded ground liaison parties from the 24\textsuperscript{th} Marine Air Group as well as attached L-5 liaison planes from the 308\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Wing, which operated out of Darigayos.\textsuperscript{694} It became a standard operating procedure for guerrillas to mark their front lines with white panels, important because airstrikes were often requested a mere fifty yards from friendly troops. Coordination became so refined that on a pre-arranged signal, Volckmann’s men often prepared to rush Japanese positions as the final American aircraft completed its strafing run, and normally caught the Japanese with their heads down.\textsuperscript{695}

\textsuperscript{692} General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Military Intelligence Section, “To: Volckmann, From: General Krueger, NR 46, 27 January (dated 28 January 1945),” Record Group 496, Entry 109, Box 572, NARA II.
\textsuperscript{693} Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 476.
\textsuperscript{695} Ibid., 199.
While Volckmann’s men were typically the ones sending, and not receiving, intelligence in the exchange between their and higher headquarters, intelligence-sharing did go both ways, demonstrating the high level of cooperation between Volckmann and the Sixth Army. On January 24 Volckmann radioed Krueger to request aerial reconnaissance of Japanese artillery positions in concrete emplacements that had previously been identified by his own forces. Volckmann doubted the authenticity of his units’ report and wanted confirmation through other means.696

Figure 8. Guerrilla Forces on Luzon, October-November 1944697

696 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Military Intelligence Section, “To: General Krueger, From: Volckmann, NR 37, 20 January (dated 25 January 1945),” Record Group 496, Entry 109, Box 572, NARA II.
In the Battle of Bessang Pass, fought by approximately 9,000 guerrillas of USAFIP-NL essentially operating as a combat infantry division, guerrilla units secured the key terrain and municipality of Cervantes from Japanese forces after heavy fighting over from April to June 1945. Sixth Army directed Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL to seize the pass by June 15 in conjunction with a Sixth Army operation to seize the Balete Pass. Initially, Volckmann only sent the 121st Infantry Regiment to complete the mission, but as resistance stiffened over the course of May, he reinforced the attack with the 15th and 66th Infantry Regiments. These three regiments were supported by the U.S. Army’s 122nd Field Artillery Battalion, detached by Sixth Army to support the guerrillas, as well as their own organic guerrilla battalion of 75mm pack howitzers. While the men of the 122nd and their commander, Lt. Col. R. P. Carlson, were initially reluctant to support the guerrillas, the artillerymen eventually developed a healthy respect for Volckmann’s forces.

The Japanese were well-entrenched in the Bessang Pass, and as Volckmann’s three regiments advanced along an 8,000-yard front they were met by withering fire from the Japanese in the pass and the heights alongside it. Volckmann described the battle as “the fiercest that I have ever witnessed,” with his men fighting the steep terrain as well as the Japanese. However, the guerrillas continued to make slow progress, and well-supported by attached artillery, succeeded in overrunning the remaining Japanese
positions on June 14, with artillery liaison planes calling down a heavy barrage on the retreating Japanese.

The following day the 121st Infantry seized Cervantes, and Volckmann’s three regiments continued their advance against token Japanese resistance, with the 121st finally linking in with the American 6th Infantry Division on July 14 to complete the encirclement of Yamashita’s forces in the north. Although heavy fighting ensued as the 66th Infantry pushed into the well-fortified Lepanto area on June 21, the 66th Infantry, under John Patrick O’Day, was able to overcome the Japanese positions, even seizing objectives that had been assigned to the American 32nd Infantry Division. After the 66th Infantry Regiment successfully made contact with the 32nd Infantry Division, Yamashita’s forces were surrounded, confined to a pocket with no roads and few trails. USAFIP-NL pressed the attack into the remaining Japanese positions from the north and west as the 32nd and 6th Infantry Divisions advanced from the east and south until the final ceasefire on August 15, when units of the USAFIP-NL were within five miles of Yamashita’s headquarters. The effectiveness of Volckmann’s guerrillas, coupled with the loss of two of Sixth Army’s combat infantry divisions to operations elsewhere, caused the newly-promoted Gen. Krueger to increase the role for guerrillas in operations on Luzon, and Sixth Army quickened efforts to arm and equip them. As Volckmann was quick to point out, because of the effectiveness of his and other guerrilla forces,

702 Ibid., 215.
MacArthur and Krueger never had to deploy more than three American divisions in Northern Luzon against more than 120,000 Japanese troops. 704

Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL was not the only large body of guerrillas to see combat against the Japanese on Luzon. Guerrillas under Filipino Marcos V. Augustin in the Fil-American Yay Regiment assisted the U.S. Army’s 43rd Infantry Division in seizing the Ipo Dam in May 1945. 705 The dam, which supplies approximately 30 percent of Manila’s water, had been cut off by the Japanese in April, and General MacArthur ordered his forces to seize and reopen it. 706

Operating under the scheme of maneuver dictated by the 43rd Infantry Division, some 3,000 of Marking’s guerrillas advanced independently from the northwest while two American columns advanced from the south and west. 707 Marking’s men had to move some 9,000 yards over rugged terrain to reach their designated objectives, but managed to drive in Japanese patrols and outposts that they encountered as the attack began. 708 The guerrillas seized Mount Kabuyao on May 9 and were able to destroy a Japanese artillery observation post, an important development given the great weight and effectiveness of Japanese artillery during the entirety of the Ipo Dam operation. 709 On May 11, in contrast to their earlier encounters, Marking’s guerrillas found stiff Japanese resistance as they tried to seize Four-Cornered Hill north of the dam, being repulsed three

704 Volckmann, We Remained, 216.
705 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 407.
708 G-3 Section, 43rd Infantry Division, “Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, 43rd Infantry Division,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 9163, NARA II, 47.
times.710 A fourth attack on the hill on May 12, supported by heavy American air and artillery attacks, finally succeeded. The guerrillas then went on to seize Hill 803, which commands the northern portion of the dam. Over the course of the night of May 14-15 the guerrillas repulsed two Japanese counterattacks, but were driven from one position on Hill 803 in vicious hand-to-hand fighting in a third Japanese attack on the morning of May 15.711 Despite this small setback, on May 17, in conjunction with a coordinated attack from the south by the three infantry regiments of the 43rd Division, the guerrillas moved down from Hill 803 to seize the north end of the dam.712

The dam was successfully captured intact and reopened as American forces, despite logistical difficulties, seized the hills south of the dam in vicious fighting to link in with Marking’s men, averting a potential humanitarian disaster. The 43rd Infantry Division had to supplement its logistical support units with native carriers and even some guerrillas to move supplies as the rains turned makeshift roads in the hills into an impassable quagmire. American and Filipino forces later discovered that the gate to the dam had been rigged with several hundred pounds of explosives which the Japanese had failed to detonate.713 On May 18, the day after the seizure of the dam by the combined Filipino-American forces, Private Urbano P. Gadon of Marking’s Regiment killed two Japanese soldiers with a knife, an action for which he received a Silver Star through the

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710 “Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, 43rd Infantry Division,” 47.
711 Ibid., 50.
712 Zimmer, History of the 43rd Infantry Division, 121.
713 “Historical Report, Luzon Campaign, 43rd Infantry Division,” 51.
43rd Infantry Division. Marking’s guerrillas continued to work closely with the 43rd Division to pursue and destroy remaining Japanese forces who had retreated into the hills.

South of the USAFIP-NL and Marking’s Guerrillas, the other guerrillas on Luzon attacked the Japanese and assisted American units in significant ways. Guerrillas in the 155th Provisional Battalion, armed with bows and arrows as well as rifles and shotguns, ambushed retreating Japanese troops and laid vicious pig traps along trails into the mountains. Other guerrillas harassed Japanese troops defending the Bataan Peninsula. Maj. (later colonel) Edwin Ramsey, operating out of a makeshift base in Tala in Central Luzon, received orders from MacArthur to begin sabotage operations with “maximum possible violence” on Japanese communication, transportation, and supply nodes on January 8. As the Sixth Army advanced, Ramsey’s 40,000 men and auxiliaries, formed into regiments, attached themselves to Sixth Army units in their respective areas, notably the 1st Cavalry Division. However, as less than a quarter of Ramsey’s men could be armed at any one time, their standards of training were poor. In April, a processing and training center for Filipino troops was established under the

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714 The Japanese soldiers were armed with “rifles and bayonets.” “Extract of GO No. 458, Hq 43rd Inf Div dtd 12 July 1945, AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR MEDAL,” Record Group 407, Entry 1094, Box 259, NARA II.
715 The pig traps consisted of pits lined with sharp spears, similar to punji stakes encountered by American forces during the Vietnam War. Decker, On a Mountainside, 177-178.
717 Ramsey and Rivele, Lt. Ramsey’s War, 301.
718 Ibid., 304.
719 In the fall of 1944, Ramsey only had about 7,000 weapons with which to arm his guerrillas. Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 452-453.
supervision of the Sixth Army, speeding the integration of Ramsey’s guerrillas into Sixth Army operations which were continuing in Northern Luzon.\footnote{Ramsey and Rivele, \textit{Lt. Ramsey’s War}, 323-324.}

At the request of the U.S. Sixth Army, Robert Lapham organized his estimated 6,000 guerrillas into the First Infantry Regiment of the LGAF, which trained for several weeks before it was officially integrated into the American 25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division on January 20, 1945.\footnote{Lapham and Norling, \textit{Lapham’s Raiders}, 184.} By June, Lapham’s forces had swelled to some 10-12,000 men, allowing him to organize a second regiment to attach to the U.S. 32\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division.\footnote{Ibid., 185.} These units would prove very effective during several high-profile missions with American forces.

One of the most famous special operations of the Pacific War, the liberation of Allied prisoners at Cabanatuan, saw extensive cooperation between Lapham’s guerrillas and the U.S. Army’s 6\textsuperscript{th} Ranger Battalion under Lt. Col. Henry Mucci.\footnote{General Headquarters, Far East Command, \textit{The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I}, 321.} The LGAF provided 287 guerrillas to augment Mucci’s 122 Rangers who assaulted the Cabanatuan prison camp on 30 January. The raid succeeded in liberating 513 prisoners and eliminated the entire Japanese garrison of some 200 men.\footnote{Lapham and Norling, \textit{Lapham’s Raiders}, 179-180. General Headquarters, Far East Command, \textit{Reports of General MacArthur}, 321.} Besides their significant contribution to the assault force, the guerrillas also manned blocking positions that prevented Japanese reinforcements from interfering with the raid. Lapham entrusted this important mission to Filipino Captains Eduardo Joson (who would later be elected a provincial governor) and Juan Pajota. In one harrowing engagement, LGAF troops under...
Captain Pajota fought for two hours against approximately 800 Japanese attempting to move from the town of Cabanatuan to the prison camp, inflicting dozens of Japanese casualties in a well-placed ambush while taking none themselves.\textsuperscript{725} Later, LGAF units assisted the U.S. Army’s 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division during the liberation of Allied prisoners in the Santo Tomas prison in Manila and, under Lapham’s subordinate Capt. Ray C. Hunt, fought alongside the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division during successful, but bloody, operations to clear the Villa Verde Trail in Central Luzon.\textsuperscript{726}

Although the drive to Manila and the subsequent bloody operations to seize the city were primarily conducted by the 37\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division and 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division advancing north to south from Lingayen Gulf, guerrillas did participate in smaller numbers, and their service as guides proved invaluable.\textsuperscript{727} In particular, Filipino guerrilla Capt. Manuel Colayco assisted the 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division in liberating the Allied military and civilian prisoners at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp. Colayco, who had formerly served with the U.S. Army as a scout, had extensive knowledge of the Japanese dispositions and this information allowed the lead columns to bypass Japanese minefields and successfully liberate the prisoners at Santo Tomas.\textsuperscript{728}

Elsewhere on Luzon, guerrillas assisted the operations of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Division in Central Luzon and in its drive on Manila from the south. Following a

\textsuperscript{725} Lapham and Norling, \textit{Lapham’s Raiders}, 181.
\textsuperscript{726} Ibid., 183, 186.
\textsuperscript{727} The Battle for Manila was an intense urban battle against dug-in Japanese defenders and resulted in 1,010 dead and 5,565 wounded for the Americans and some 16,000 Japanese killed in action. Japanese Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi had decided to defend the city in defiance of Yamashita’s orders to evacuate it. The Japanese committed numerous atrocities against civilians, massacring thousands. Richard Connaughton, John Pimlott, and Duncan Anderson. \textit{The Battle for Manila} (1995; repr., Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002), 186, 195, 200.
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid., 91.
parachute jump that went awry near Tagaytay Ridge on February 3, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment found its men scattered over some six miles. Fortunately, the jump was unopposed by the Japanese. As a later letter to the local guerrilla commander acknowledged, the area, with the exception of a Japanese element at Imus, had been cleared of Japanese forces by another small group operating in Central Luzon, the Fil-American Cavite Guerrilla Forces (FACGF) under Filipino Col. Mariano Castaneda.729 Advancing on Manila from the south, the 11th Airborne Division found few Japanese in its path, the guerrillas, coordinated by U.S. Army Maj. Jay D. Vanderpool from SWPA Headquarters, having eliminated the majority of Japanese resistance.730

Later in February, operating closely with guerrillas, the 11th Airborne Division executed a multi-pronged operation to free Allied prisoners from the Los Banos prison camp on Luzon, using intelligence from guerrillas in large measure during planning for the raid. Over the night of February 23-24, the operation freed more than 2,100 prisoners and resulted in the elimination of the Japanese garrison with few Allied losses.731 During the operation, elements of the 11th Airborne Division’s 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted a parachute assault in the vicinity of the camp, while elements of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 511th

730 Vanderpool, inserted by submarine, had been recruited by the SWPA Headquarters’ Philippine Regional Section and served as a liaison and coordinator between the guerrillas in Central Luzon and SWPA Headquarters. David W. Hogan, Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S Army, 1992), 80.
Parachute Infantry used amphibious tractors (amtracs) to land and attack the camp from a different direction.⁷³²

Outside of these American units, guerrillas from most of the prominent groups in Central Luzon participated in the raid.⁷³³ Joining the assault force on the camp were approximately 100 guerrillas from the Hunters ROTC unit, while guerrillas of the PQOG served as guides to the Americans and warned civilians to evacuate the area before the raid.⁷³⁴ Huks, who were persuaded to cooperate with the operation, guarded the drop zone for the 511th Regiment’s airborne jump and acted as a reserve. Chinese Nationalist guerrillas served to isolate the camp by guarding its approaches to the north and west. Finally, guerrillas from Marking’s unit secured the beach for the landing of the 188th Regiment and guarded the evacuation route. The Japanese were unable to mount a counterattack after the liberation of the camp, and the force, with the liberated prisoners, was able to evacuate the area in the amtracs. The success of the operation was due in no small part to the contributions of the guerrillas, both in the preparation of the raid itself and its execution.

One final guerrilla unit on Luzon deserves attention. In southern Luzon, several thousand guerrillas operated as the “Anderson Battalion” under American Maj. (later colonel) Bernard L. Anderson, who had served as a chief liaison between various Luzon

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⁷³² Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 427-28. Major Henry A. Burgess, commanding the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Infantry, later recalled that guerrilla participation was minimal, as he did not see many in the camp, but based on other accounts the guerrillas had significant contributions. Many of the Hunters ROTC guerrillas were likely outside the camp in pursuit of Japanese stragglers when Burgess arrived with his men. E.M. Flanagan, Jr., The Los Banos Raid: The 11th Airborne Jumps at Dawn (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 69.
guerrilla groups and MacArthur’s headquarters in Australia. Anderson had formed his Filipino battalion, attached to the U.S. Sixth Army, at the request of Allied forces. Composed of hand-picked men, the Anderson Battalion fought alongside American forces and amassed an exemplary combat record, killing some 3,000 Japanese troops and capturing another thousand during operations in central and eastern Luzon. This unit adds further credence to the assertion that guerrilla units were often startlingly effective during combat operations on Luzon and provided significant contributions to a campaign which would otherwise have required many more American troops.

Throughout Allied operations on Luzon, there was often a shortage of logistical personnel required to move supplies forward, especially during periods when roads washed out. The guerrillas helped make up for shortages, sometimes themselves serving as porters to move equipment and supplies as during the Ipo Dam operation. Guerrillas also assisted American forces by recruiting local civilian labor. Bernard Anderson recalled supplying civilian laborers, both male and female, to the 1st Cavalry Division and 38th Infantry Division. Guerrillas therefore made significant contributions in non-combat support roles as well.

Although operations to find and destroy the remaining Japanese forces on Luzon continued through the spring and summer of 1945, MacArthur directed some of his forces to begin clearing the Japanese from Panay, Cebu, Negros, and the smaller islands in the Southern Philippines. He assigned the clearance of the Southern Philippines to Gen.

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Robert E. Eichelberger and his Eighth Army, which launched a fast-moving, highly successful campaign in March. MacArthur was intent on liberating the entire archipelago despite no directives from the JCS to do so. Clearing the sea lanes south of Luzon before moving to the Visayas, Eichelberger would later explain, “Usually we sent Americans ashore for the quick capture of an island and then moved in native regulars and guerrillas to serve as garrison troops. In this way we were able to use our combat veterans over and over again.” Guerrillas therefore freed up American troops for use elsewhere.

By the time of the liberation of Panay, Filipino Col. Macario Peralta’s guerrilla forces numbered some 22,500 men. In comparison, the Japanese on the island, commanded by Lt. Col. Ryoichi Totsuka, numbered a mere 2,750 men, only 1,500 of whom were combat troops from various units of the 102nd Division. Prior to landings by the American 40th Infantry Division, Peralta’s men had cleared outlying districts of Japanese forces and seized nine airstrips on different parts of Panay, controlling much of the island. Peralta’s forces also seized key road junctions and repaired roads and bridges in preparation for the Allied invasion of the island. By some accounts, SWPA

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737 Although the Southern Philippines were of doubtful strategic value, MacArthur saw clearing them as fulfilling a promise to the Filipino people. Historian Ronald Spector in particular views MacArthur’s decision to divert Eichelberger south as wasteful given the difficulties the Sixth Army was having on northern Luzon. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun*, 526-527.
740 Ibid., 602.
Headquarters regarded Peralta’s extensive and efficient intelligence network as the best among the guerrillas in the Philippines.  

On March 18, the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalions of the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division’s 185\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment landed on Panay to the west of the principle city of Iloilo after a bombardment by U.S. Navy destroyers. The Americans found numerous civilians as well as Peralta’s men drawn up in parade formation on the beach, with no Japanese to be found, although by the end of the day U.S. troops killed seven Japanese soldiers in a minor action near the beach.  
Eighth Army Headquarters radioed the commander of the 40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Brush, soon afterwards and ordered Peralta to begin reporting to the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division Headquarters, which also assumed operational control of Filipino Lt. Col. Abcede’s guerrillas on Negros. That afternoon, Peralta relayed a message to the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division Headquarters through the commander of the 185\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment, stating that his men were in position to prevent a Japanese retreat but they urgently needed ammunition and a radio to establish direct contact with the American troops on the ground.  
Once the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division established itself ashore on Panay, it took responsibility for supplying Peralta’s men, although the Eighth Army ordered the 40\textsuperscript{th}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Uldarico S. Baclagon, \textit{Philippine Campaigns} (Manila, P.I.: Graphic House, 1973), 258.
\item Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 601. G-3 Section, 40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, “40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 32, 18 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8908, NARA II.
\item G-3 Section, 40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, “40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 21, 18 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8908, NARA II. The Eighth Army would continue supplying the guerrillas on Negros until the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division landed there two weeks later.
\item G-3 Section, 40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, “40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 43, 18 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8908, NARA II. Peralta related that his men only had 100 rounds per Enfield rifle or M1 carbine and even less for each submachine gun.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Division to disarm guerrillas who were not needed for operations in order to send their weapons to other guerrilla forces elsewhere in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{746}

![Figure 9. Central Philippines Guerrilla Organization, October-November 1944\textsuperscript{747}]

As on other islands, the guerrillas on Panay generated valuable intelligence on Japanese dispositions and served as local guides to the American troops, but also served in large numbers in subsequent offensive operations. In one larger operation, Peralta’s 61\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Regiment conducted a thousand-man attack on the town of Tiring using two reinforced battalions of guerrillas, seizing the town with the support of mortars and bazookas after killing more than 100 Japanese troops.\textsuperscript{748} The guerrillas also assumed

\textsuperscript{746} G-3 Section, 40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, “40\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 68, 19 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8908, NARA II. Those men who were disarmed but were officially members of the Philippine Army would be rearmed at a later date.


\textsuperscript{748} Headquarters, 61\textsuperscript{st} Infantry, “Subject: Combat Report; to: DC; 6\textsuperscript{th} MD,” dated 31 March ‘45, Record Group 407, Entry 1093, Box 253, NARA II.
duties securing key bridges, airfields, and road junctions in the 40th Division’s rear areas and, as they had done before the liberation, provided information on downed Allied aircraft, often going directly to crash sites to search for equipment and survivors. In one case, Peralta’s men searched the crash site of an American P-61 which had crashed on March 16, finding the aircraft totally destroyed.  

As the men of the 40th Division advanced in force from their beachhead, the guerrillas, in conjunction with the 40th Division’s Reconnaissance Troop, set up a series of roadblocks to hem in the outnumbered Japanese. Unfortunately for the Allied forces, around 0700 on March 20, Totsuka and 800 of his men managed to escape following a determined attack on the guerrillas’ positions near the town of Jaro. The Japanese attack was preceded by heavy fire from trench mortars, machine guns, and grenades, and culminated in a “banzai charge.” However, the Japanese withdrawal allowed the guerrillas and the 40th Division to liberate Iloilo that day. That afternoon, in a ceremony in Iloilo, Gen. Eichelberger awarded Peralta the Distinguished Service Cross for his service as a guerrilla during the Japanese occupation.

The 40th Division and Peralta’s men did not mount an immediate pursuit after the Japanese broke through the combined guerrilla-40th Division blocking positions, but when they resumed the offensive the guerrillas continued to contribute in large measure to 40th Division operations. During the seizure of San Jose, Peralta provided significant

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749 G-3 Section, 40th Infantry Division, “40th Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 129, 20 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8909, NARA II.
750 G-3 Section, 40th Infantry Division, “40th Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry Nos. 19 and 20, 20 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8909, NARA II.
751 G-3 Section, 40th Infantry Division, “40th Infantry Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 124, 20 Mar 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 8909, NARA II.
troops in the defeat of the strong Japanese garrison.\textsuperscript{752} When the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division handed back control of the island to Peralta in June, its casualties only numbered some 20 killed and 50 wounded, casualties which would no doubt have been higher had Peralta’s guerrillas not been operating on Panay.\textsuperscript{753}

On Cebu, the most densely populated island in the Philippines, American Lt. Col. James H. Cushing directed his guerrillas to disrupt the movements of Japanese troops prior to the landing of the U.S. Army’s Americal Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, on March 26, 1945.\textsuperscript{754} Cushing had some 8,500 guerrillas under his command, and Arnold’s headquarters arranged for them to attempt to seize the water sources for Cebu City before the division’s landing.\textsuperscript{755} Short one of its regimental combat teams, the Americal Division deemed Cushing’s guerrillas crucial to bolstering its ranks given estimates of Japanese strength on Cebu at 12,250 troops.\textsuperscript{756} Despite their strength, however, the Japanese forces largely fled to the mountains when the American troops landed, and Cushing’s guerrillas joined the Americans in pursuing them, benefitting from air support coordinated by Guerrilla Air Support Team Number 1 from the Thirteenth Air Force.\textsuperscript{757} So that it could prepare for the anticipated invasion of Japan,

\textsuperscript{753} Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 601. Panay was intended to serve as the embarkation point for the 40\textsuperscript{th} Division and the 5\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division (enroute from Europe) during the planned invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Ibid., 604.
\textsuperscript{755} Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 608.
\textsuperscript{756} The Americal Division’s 146\textsuperscript{th} Regimental Combat Team was serving as the Eighth Army Reserve at this time. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{757} General Headquarters, Far East Command, \textit{The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I}, 315; To request air support for the guerrillas, Thirteenth Air Force organized five Guerrilla Air Support Teams equipped with jeep-mounted radios. These teams could direct air strikes if necessary and provided intelligence to pilots on areas where the Japanese had anti-aircraft weapons. See Joe G. Taylor, “Air Support of Guerrillas on Cebu,” \textit{Military Affairs}, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Autumn, 1959), pp. 149-152.
by June 20 the Americal Division left Cushing’s guerrillas to clear the small groups of remaining Japanese.\footnote{Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 614.}

While Maj. Gen. Arnold stated that the guerrillas on Cebu were of “negligible” combat effectiveness for offensive operations, Cushing’s men proved very able in defending key logistical nodes from Japanese attacks.\footnote{Headquarters, Americal Division, “Arnold to Eichelberger, SITREP, 31 MAR,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 4877, NARA II.} On one occasion, units of the guerrillas’ 82nd Philippine Infantry Division repelled a Japanese assault on a filter station and suffered no casualties.\footnote{G-3 Section, Americal Division, “Americal Division, G-3 Journal Entry No. 5, 3 Apr 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 4877, NARA II.} On the night of April 2-3, the guerrillas repulsed an attack on the Americal Division’s Distribution Point.\footnote{Headquarters, Americal Division, “CG Americal Division to 8th Army ATTN G-3, 3 Apr 45,” Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 4877, NARA II.} Outside of defending key areas, the guerrillas conducted independent patrols to kill isolated groups of Japanese troops, in some cases operating as the sole Allied forces on small islands in the Americal Division zone of operations.

Guerrilla forces on Negros led by Filipino Lt. Col. Salvador Abcede numbered upwards of 14,000 fighters by December 1944. Abcede’s units were strong enough to fix Japanese forces, 1,400 strong, on the northern part of Negros prior to the invasion by units of the American 40th Infantry Division on March 29, 1945.\footnote{Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 605, 618.} The Japanese were restricted to the areas north of and including the capital Bacolod and the town of San Carlos, with the guerrillas holding the vast majority of the towns elsewhere.\footnote{General Headquarters, Far East Command, \textit{Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I}, 315. The record in the \textit{Reports of General MacArthur} ends its account immediately after the American landings, based on Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 605, 618.} Like their
counterparts on other islands, the Negros guerrillas served as native guides and scouts under the command of the 40th Division, but also executed a number of combat missions. Despite initial failures to dislodge the Japanese, one of Abcede’s regiments and elements of the 164th RCT succeeded in overrunning the main Japanese defenses (centered on a ring of hills inland) by May 28, and as no organized resistance remained by June 14, the 164th RCT was withdrawn and replaced by a solitary company from the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, which worked with Abcede’s forces until the cessation of hostilities.764

Bohol, the main island in Filipino guerrilla Maj. Ismael Ingeniero’s Bohol Area Command, was largely free of Japanese forces by April 11, when American forces, a battalion of the 164th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), landed there.765 After discovering the main enemy force inland on April 15, the men of the 164th, assisted by Ingeniero’s guerrillas, destroyed the Japanese forces, which numbered 330 men, at the cost of 7 killed and 14 wounded.766 The 164th RCT withdrew its battalion on May 7, and Ingeniero’s men, with the 21st Reconnaissance Troop of the Americal Division, fought off what remained of the Japanese resistance. At the end of the war, around fifty men of the original Japanese garrison remained to surrender to the Allied forces.

765 General Headquarters, Far East Command, *The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I*, 315. Bohol’s guerrillas had previously had a great degree of infighting and alienated the civilian population, and a Japanese punitive expedition had some success in breaking up the guerrillas until Ingeniero reconstituted the Bohol guerrillas in the summer of 1944.
Mindanao was the last major island to be cleared by Allied forces. The 38,000 guerrillas on the island under Col. Wendell Fertig had been receiving steady amounts of supplies from American forces via airdrops and submarines.\textsuperscript{767} As the Allies began to liberate the southern Philippines in spring 1945, SWPA Headquarters directed Fertig to engage in open combat against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{768} By early 1945, Fertig’s units already controlled some ninety percent of the island as Japanese forces withdrew into more defensible areas, and by the spring Japanese forces had to move in large truck convoys or risk destruction by Fertig’s guerrillas.\textsuperscript{769} Left on their own until April 1945, when American forces landed, Fertig’s forces served as an economy of force mission while U.S. forces were used to seize areas of higher priority on Luzon. Fertig received U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps support to facilitate the completion of his missions destroying Japanese forces.

On March 22, 1945, the 110\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, 110\textsuperscript{th} Division (Guerrilla), approximately 350 men, landed near the municipality of Talisayan, in the northern Mindanao province of Misamis Oriental, to destroy a Japanese garrison there numbering 250 soldiers. Talisayan was a key barge staging base. The guerrillas, including 110\textsuperscript{th} Division commander American Maj. Paul H. Marshall, conducted combined planning with the U.S. Navy’s Task Group 70.4 prior to conducting this amphibious operation. Two LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry) and two LCSs (Landing Craft, Support) transported the

\textsuperscript{768} Ibid., 309.
guerrillas, with the LCSs shelling the Japanese garrison prior to the guerrillas’ storming the beach. The operation was performed flawlessly, resulting in the capture of the assigned objectives, two barges, two trucks, and numerous supplies. The guerrillas counted 138 Japanese killed, with the remainder of Japanese force fleeing into the hills, for no losses among the Allied land or naval forces. 770 Fertig recalled this was the first guerrilla amphibious operation against the Japanese in the Philippines.

To support Fertig’s forces and to liberate the remainder of the island, Eichelberger’s Eighth Army decided to clear eastern Mindanao with the 24th and 31st Infantry Divisions of Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert’s X Corps, with the 24th planning a landing at Illana Bay in the vicinity of Malabang on April 17 and the 31st following suit on April 22. 771 However, after receiving a radio message from Fertig, the Eighth Army and X Corps headquarters decided to change the main landing site to Parang, also on Illana Bay. Fertig’s 108th Division had already seized the airstrip at Malabang over the preceding days, and U.S. Army liaison planes and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft had been using the strip for several days when the 24th Infantry Division landed. 772 As the 108th had secured the entire area by April 11, the American landings were unopposed and proceeded as planned on April 17. Some of the Americans recalled being greeted by a lone female guerrilla armed with an old American rifle as they went ashore. 773

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770 10th Military District Intelligence Section, “Historical Record: Mindanao Guerrilla Resistance Movement, Part 17,” Wendell W. Fertig Papers, Box 1, Army Heritage Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
771 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 621.
Fertig’s forces went on to support the advance of the 24th Division (consisting of the 19th, 21st, and 34th Infantry Regiments) by guarding the division’s vulnerable flank along Highway 1 on the advance to Davao, situated on Mindanao’s eastern shore. In addition, Fertig’s guerrillas aided the advancing frontline troops directly with scouts and an entire guerrilla battalion from the 108th Division. In one notable instance, a guerrilla warned American troops of a Japanese bivouac. When he could not pinpoint the bivouac location on a map, he agreed to ride in an artillery liaison plane and, though violently nauseous, was able to identify the bivouac for the pilot to radio for a successful artillery strike. Guerrillas also undoubtedly prevented many American casualties by serving as scouts along main roads and trails. Like many Americans on Mindanao, Sergeant Tom Saunders later recalled an incident where a guerrilla operating with

Figure 10. Mindanao Guerrilla Organization, 31 January 1945

774 Ibid., 291-292.
his unit (in this case one of the Muslim Moros) stealthily located a hidden Japanese ambush, allowing the Americans to kill the Japanese soldiers before they could detonate several 500-lb. bombs hidden in the road on which Saunders’ unit was traveling.776

The seizure of Davao on May 3 by units of the 19th Infantry Regiment provided the 24th Infantry Division with a secure base area from which to root out the remaining Japanese resistance, namely the 100th Division, which had assumed defensive positions on hills inland. A large number of Filipino guerrillas operated with the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division during its drive west from Davao to destroy the remaining enemy forces.777 The regimental commander, Col. William J. Verbeck, personally led a group of these guerrillas in bypassing a Japanese strongpoint to enter the town of Bayabas.778

In mid-May, the 19th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division received orders to strike from Davao up the coast to the north, clearing the area of Japanese and linking up with Fertig’s 107th Division, under the command of American Col. Frank McGee.779 McGee’s troops, 1,300 strong, had been trying to eliminate Japanese outposts north of Davao, with limited success, and their reinforcement by the 19th Infantry Regiment would make possible the destruction of the Japanese forces there.780 The 19th Infantry and

776 Valtin, Children of Yesterday, 301.
777 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 628.
779 McGee had previously commanded the guerrilla 106th Division.
780 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 633.
McGee’s guerrillas finally made contact on May 24. McGee became an attachment to the 24th Infantry Division, charged with controlling all guerrillas in the division’s sector.

Elsewhere on Mindanao, the 31st Infantry Division was clearing the interior of the island of resistance by remaining elements of the Japanese 30th Division. To hold the supply lines for these American units, an entire RCT of the 31st Division, the 167th RCT, was required, along with significant guerrilla forces. Landing unopposed on northern Mindanao on May 10, the 108th RCT of the 40th Infantry Division made contact with some of Fertig’s guerrillas almost immediately after coming ashore, and found most of their initial line of advance cleared of Japanese forces. Although American units in the interior and northern parts of the island did encounter some determined Japanese resistance, the guerrillas harassed Japanese lines of communication incessantly and often demolished Japanese bridges shortly after they had been rebuilt, preventing effective movement of reinforcements or supplies.

Late in June, the guerrillas of the 107th Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division in order to eliminate the remaining Japanese resistance in the eastern portion of Mindanao. Fertig’s guerrillas independently cleared areas around the Davao Gulf, on the eastern end of Mindanao, without American assistance, and continued to root out Japanese stragglers until the cessation of hostilities. Unfortunately, Col. McGee was killed by a Japanese sniper on August 7, and sporadic fighting continued until the

781 24th Infantry Division Committee, 24th Infantry Division, 60.  
782 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 638.  
783 Ibid., 641.  
784 Ibid., 637.  
785 24th Infantry Division Committee, 24th Infantry Division, 65.  
786 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 644.
Japanese surrender on August 15.\textsuperscript{787} By this date Fertig’s organization had proven to be one of the most capable of the guerrilla forces in the Philippines.

Despite numerous successes throughout the Philippines, guerrilla forces were not always able to destroy remaining Japanese forces after American forces moved on. An American infantry company from the 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division’s 19\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment landed on Verde Island between Luzon and Mindoro on February 23 and fought for three days before turning the island over to Filipino guerrillas. However, the guerrillas proved unable to defeat remaining Japanese forces, and the 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division was compelled to send elements of two of its constituent regiments to eliminate the last Japanese opposition on the island at the cost of six Americans wounded.\textsuperscript{788}

While they were sometimes capable of independent operations, in large part the guerrillas relied on American units to conduct the heavy fighting against Japanese forces during the liberation of the Philippines. However uneven the performance of individual guerrilla units, they provided a decisive contribution to the campaign in a number of ways, in most cases successfully integrating with American units.\textsuperscript{789} On the eve of the American landings, guerrillas provided valuable intelligence on Japanese forces while conducting direct attacks to destroy Japanese installations and disrupt Japanese movements. They continued to pass the Americans such intelligence as they advanced inland. Following American landings, the guerrillas successfully secured American rear

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{787} 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division Committee, 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, 65.
\item \textsuperscript{788} Ibid., 43-45.
\item \textsuperscript{789} The reasons for such uneven performance can be attributed to the disparities in the guerrillas’ ability to train in safe base areas, the uneven quantities of supplies the guerrillas received from the Allies, and the discipline and professionalism of the guerrillas and their leaders.
\end{itemize}
areas, lines of communication, and logistical nodes against Japanese raids and infiltrations. By all accounts, the Japanese were unsuccessful in attacks on logistical nodes defended by guerrillas.

Most significantly, when ably led and organized, and supported by American artillery and air attacks, the guerrillas could seize even heavily-defended Japanese positions in large-scale offensive operations. Although guerrilla performance was uneven, the liberation of the Philippines would without a doubt have required tens of thousands of additional Allied ground troops, both on the front lines and securing rear areas, to defeat and isolate the Japanese forces if the guerrillas had not been present. In addition, without guerrilla-provided intelligence, or guerrilla guides, Allied forces would have taken much longer to complete their objectives and would have suffered untold numbers of additional casualties in rooting out the stubborn Japanese resistance.
Conclusion and Epilogue

Although the formal end of hostilities in the Pacific Theater occurred on August 15, 1945, the Japanese Shobu Group under Gen. Yamashita did not surrender until September 2. In the preceding months, the estimated 200,000 guerrillas in the Philippines had done much to contribute to the liberation of the archipelago from Japanese occupation, from frontline duty in regimental and division strength to intelligence gathering and the recruitment of laborers to assist Allied forces. As operations wound down, many guerrilla units formed into regular Philippine Army formations.

The experiences of the guerrillas fighting the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II have largely supported the theories of counterinsurgency theorists, such as David Galula and Max Boot, who have focused on popular support and population control as the keys to success for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. In the case of the Philippines during World War II examined here, the guerrillas largely maintained popular support from the vast majority of the Filipino population during the Japanese occupation, while the Japanese failed to win widespread acceptance. The ideology of Filipino nationalism, already stoked by promises and legislated guarantees of independence from the United States, found itself opposed to inclusion in Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, even if the Japanese were able to grant nominal
independence to the Filipino occupation government under Jose Laurel. Meanwhile, harsh Japanese punitive measures and atrocities turned many Filipinos against the occupiers; ironically, Filipinos viewed Japanese conciliation after such harshness as a sign of weakness.

Could the Japanese have defeated the guerrillas? Perhaps, but only if Japanese victories elsewhere in the Pacific eliminated the chances of Allied liberation of the archipelago. As it was, most Filipinos retained faith in the return of Douglas MacArthur’s forces and Manuel Quezon’s government-in-exile, the latter generally being viewed as the legitimate government in the Philippines despite the ebb and flow of public opinion during the war. Allied failures elsewhere would have added legitimacy to Japanese claims of hegemony and certainly would have decreased the morale of Filipinos anxious for the return of Allied forces and the Quezon government, but as such claims were never substantiated, the Japanese were unable to convince most Filipinos that Imperial forces deserved local support as the apparent victors.

In the meantime, MacArthur’s headquarters helped to maintain the spirit of resistance by sending material aid and weapons to the guerrillas, while Quezon’s government did its best to maintain legitimacy by sending messages to the Philippines imploring the people to maintain their faith in the Allies. A Japanese reporter who visited Manila in 1943 noted, “Even during the Japanese occupation, the influence of President

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790 For recent work discussing the “inevitability” of Japanese defeat, see Michael W. Myers, The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2015).
Manuel Quezon and Vice-President Sergio Osmeña, then in exile at Washington, were deeply rooted in the Filipino political concepts.”791 That both SWPA and Quezon’s government were able to maintain legitimacy from afar was remarkable, and was evidenced by the fact that the guerrillas would still route requests for promotions through SWPA GHQ. Additionally, the enormous amount of legitimacy, prestige, and support a guerrilla leader would gain from designation as an official district commander by Quezon’s government and SWPA GHQ was further evidence that the Americans and government-in-exile still enjoyed strong support from much of the Filipino population.

A closer examination of the organizations within SWPA GHQ that supported the guerrillas reveals the difficulty of commanding and controlling disparate groups from afar, but did demonstrate the importance of providing material aid to guerrilla forces. While Courtney Whitney and his PRS had greater ambitions for leading the guerrillas from Australia than were possible under the existing circumstances, the PRS, along with its parent organization the AIB, successfully infiltrated Allied agents into the Philippines along with weapons, munitions, foodstuffs, and all-important radios to build up the intelligence network in the archipelago. Although, as in the case of the Phillips’ party sent to Mindoro, PRS sometimes overreached, the aid sent to the guerrillas maintained the morale of the resistance and provided materials necessary to enhance the guerrillas’ effectiveness in intelligence-gathering and combat operations.

The guerrillas were never strong enough to overcome the Japanese forces on their own. The guerrillas’ lack of unity was perhaps a hindrance to the effectiveness of any kind of overall “movement” to resist the Japanese occupation, although decentralization also made it difficult for the Japanese to enact any kind of decapitation strategy. However, in spite of the lack of unity, the guerrillas themselves proved tough opponents. The most successful groups were led by competent and charismatic Filipino and American officers and enlisted personnel who formed sophisticated intelligence-gathering networks and combat formations supported by extensive military staff systems. Despite severe Japanese repressive measures that often resulted in significant losses to guerrilla cadres, most groups were able to evade superior Japanese forces and live to fight another day.

Guerrilla effectiveness did not mean these groups were perfect models of military discipline and efficiency. As noted in Chapter 3, the guerrillas were far from perfect and often fought with one another, reducing their ability to resist the Japanese and causing significant disruption to the lives of ordinary Filipinos. Guerrillas were often accused of abusing or taking advantage of civilians. Guerrillas also participated in their share of atrocities, often summarily executing or torturing accused traitors, Japanese spies, collaborators, and brigands through rough administrations of their own form of justice. While the necessity of such measures to the guerrillas’ survival could clearly be the subject of debate, it seems that most of Filipinos supported such harshness, perhaps in light of the even crueler nature of Japanese atrocities. Even putting the idea of necessity aside, the moral and ethical problems of summary executions and torture make such
actions questionable at the very least. Nevertheless, despite possessing a darker side, the guerrillas were largely able to maintain intact their forces, supplies, and organization during the Japanese occupation. Notably, the strength of guerrilla forces generally trended upward from 1943 to the liberation of the archipelago in 1944 and 1945.

While the guerrillas collected valuable intelligence on Japanese forces and their movements during the occupation, the guerrillas’ achievements immediately before and during the liberation were perhaps their most notable and contributed the most to Japanese defeat. Prior to allied landings, the guerrillas conducted important sabotage operations, diverted Japanese troops from more vital areas, helped downed airmen, and seized key installations such as airfields. Once Allied troops landed, the guerrillas served as guides, provided actionable intelligence on Japanese forces for their targeting by Allied aircraft, artillery and ground troops, and fought on the frontlines on almost every island.

Significantly, several guerrilla groups, such as those led by Russell Volckmann and Augustin Marking, operated in large numbers in regimental or even division-strength, demonstrating effectiveness at large-scale maneuver and combat with the support of artillery and aircraft. Outside of direct combat roles, the guerrillas also secured rear areas from Japanese infiltration, and provided porters to transport supplies for Allied troops along roads and trails that were difficult for vehicles to navigate. All-in-all, while not uniformly effective, the guerrillas provided valuable services to the Allied cause and provided the equivalent of one to two corps worth of troops, no small contribution and one which enabled a quicker Allied victory, despite the long campaign
to clear northern Luzon. Perhaps a member of the Hunters ROTC group said it best in a postwar memoir: “None of us guerrillas kidded ourselves: We knew we could never have defeated the Japanese ourselves. We kept our country’s hopes alive when the U.S. have been defeated, though. We kept some measure of order among the people, and we laid the groundwork for MacArthur’s return.”

The guerrilla story did not end in 1945, however. While their forces demobilized or transitioned to become Philippine Army formations, Filipino guerrilla leaders in many cases went on to have successful postwar careers in the Filipino government. The guerrilla leader on Leyte, Ruperto K. Kangleon, later became the sixth Secretary of National Defense, and served as a senator in the Philippine Congress. In 1962, Macario Peralta, the guerrilla leader on Panay, became the thirteenth Secretary of National Defense in the Philippines. After World War II, Tomas Confesor, Panay’s governor, served as the Philippines’ Secretary of the Interior and was also a senator in the Philippine Congress before his death in the 1950s. Eleuterio Adevoso of the Hunters ROTC guerrilla organization became the Philippine Republic’s Labor Secretary. In 1946 Luis Taruc, the Huk leader, and several of his Communist colleagues were elected

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794 Republic of the Philippines, Department of National Defense, “Macario Peralta, Jr.,” <http://www.dnd.gov.ph/macario-peralta-jr.html>, accessed 01 December 2016; As Secretary of National Defense, Peralta was part of a controversy involving advancement in rank for 1940 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, men he felt were overly entitled to their promotions. Alfred W. McCoy, Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 112-113.
796 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, 135
to the Philippine House of Representatives, having carried on a low-level guerrilla struggle against the new government but trying to gain legitimacy with the election. Barred from taking their seats by Nationalist President Manuel Roxas, who had vowed to eliminate the Communists, the Huks would carry on a guerrilla struggle until their defeat in 1955.

Figure 11. Portrait of President Ramon Magsaysay (Philippine Presidential Museum and Library)

Among Filipino presidents, service as a guerrilla, or in support of the resistance, was a common thread in the decades after World War II. Ramon Magsaysay, who had been a guerrilla leader in the Zambales region on Luzon, served as the Secretary of

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798 Ibid., 141.
National Defense in 1950 before he was elected president in 1953, throughout his career overseeing the suppression of the Communist Huks.\textsuperscript{800} Carlos P. Garcia, president of the Philippine Republic from 1957 to 1961, had been a guerrilla leader on the island of Bohol.\textsuperscript{801} Diosdado Macapagal, who had served under Japanese-sanctioned President Jose P. Laurel during the occupation, was, despite his “collaboration,” still noted for aiding those resisting the Japanese.\textsuperscript{802}

American guerrilla leaders who had been U.S. Army officers often continued their service in a variety of capacities, their expertise in irregular warfare being particularly valuable in during the Cold War as the U.S. tried to combat revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Russell Volckmann, as a Lt. Col. in 1949, wrote the first U.S. Army manuals devoted to guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{803} Donald Blackburn, commander of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment under Volckmann’s U.S. Forces in the Philippines- North Luzon, served in a variety of U.S. Army command and staff assignments, commanding the 77\textsuperscript{th} Special Forces Group (later the 7\textsuperscript{th} SFG) in the 1950s and the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam from 1965 to 1966.\textsuperscript{804} Wendell Fertig, before his release from active duty U.S. Army service in the

mid-1950s, helped establish the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare Center, which later morphed into the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School for training U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers.  

For many Filipinos, service as a guerrilla after World War II served as a badge of honor, so much so that prominent Filipinos would fake or exaggerate their service. A notable example was Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos’ contention that he led a guerrilla unit during World War II and was highly decorated with more than thirty medals, claims which were later discredited as fraudulent by U.S. Army investigators. 

While Marcos likely served as a guerrilla, his assertions were wildly exaggerated. For ordinary guerrillas, the experiences postwar were mixed. Luis T. Centina Jr., a guerrilla intelligence officer on Negros, served in the Philippine Army as an investigator helping process accused collaborators and war criminals. Centina was discharged in 1946 and then took advantage of preferential hiring practices benefitting veterans to find a government job in Iloilo. Returning to Negros in 1950, Centina would eventually emigrate to the United States, and passed away in 2015 in Belleville, NJ.

Antonio A. Nieva, who endured the Bataan Death March before being released and joining the Hunters ROTC, participated in the liberation of the Allied prisoners at Los Banos. He would later decry the withholding of benefits for Filipino veterans by the

U.S. government, writing that many guerrillas were “bastards of Bataan, dupes of Corregidor, and guerrilla orphans – with no mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam.” Despite his bitterness, Nieva would enjoy a successful corporate law career after the war, and continued to fight for the rights of Filipino veterans until his death in 1992. His daughter published a first draft of his memoir five years later.

In contrast, Rudy de Lara, who had been with the Hunters ROTC guerrillas, found that the immediate period of liberation saw a certain amount of disorder, and later noted that “People of low character had plenty of chances for criminal activities” until the restoration of security under the Philippine government. De Lara would find himself kidnapped and held for ransom by criminals shortly after the war. Although he escaped, he would also find himself at odds with the law, accused of murdering an innocent doctor while he was a guerrilla. Although some insisted the doctor had been a collaborator, four of the accused murderers were convicted, while de Lara and two others were exonerated. Despite his rough treatment after the war, de Lara did eventually make his way to the United States and found work as an engineer after completing his schooling.

Besides the impacts of the guerrilla experience on individual guerrillas and leaders, the guerrilla movement also enacted some social changes in Filipino society. The landed gentry, previously in positions of political and social power, no longer

retained such power by mere virtue of their status as landlords. Instead, those landed
gentry who retained influence “owed power not to their position as landlords but to their
activities USAFFE guerrillas, their control over guerrilla networks and followers, and
their connections with army commanders.”

However, change was not complete, as many of the traditional Filipino oligarchs and “wartime Filipino leaders (who had all been Commonwealth leaders) were, throughout the Occupation, politically astute enough to maintain a foothold among key nonrevolutionary guerrilla organizations and thus protect themselves in the event of a Japanese defeat.”

Although collaboration was certainly not viewed favorably by ordinary Filipinos, many leading Filipino oligarchs who had worked with the Japanese escaped harsh punishments because “to purge the elite was to decapitate” Filipino society and remove an “anchor of continuity” vital to the revitalization of the archipelago after the war. This was especially important to many Filipinos worried about the threat of further social dislocation from Huk agitation. In the postwar period, Filipinos chose stability over “justice” enacted against collaborators against the wishes of American President Franklin Roosevelt and others. Douglas MacArthur’s exoneration of prominent “collaborator” Manuel Roxas, who had also helped the guerrillas and SWPA, stifled prosecution of collaborators, while President Harry S. Truman’s rejection of a proposal to delay

Philippine elections until collaborators could be prosecuted ensured that the vast majority of collaborators would escape punishment.\textsuperscript{814}

However, disagreements over how to deal with those who had cooperated with the Japanese did little to damage U.S.-Philippine relations strengthened by the experience of the guerrillas. As one example, the Philippines sent fifty young men, many of whom had served in the U.S. Army or with the guerrillas, to attend the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in 1947, forming almost a quarter of the class.\textsuperscript{815} By 1949, a prominent Filipino political leader, a former guerrilla himself, pushed for a “Pacific Pact” against potential Communist expansion.\textsuperscript{816} In 1950, demonstrating strong resolve against perceived Communist aggression, an entire Philippine Army battalion, including many former guerrillas, volunteered to fight in the Korean War.\textsuperscript{817} The loyalty of the Filipino guerrillas to the United States carried on long after the end of World War II.

Despite the loyalty felt for the United States, for many Filipino guerrilla veterans another struggle began after World War II and continues to this day— the struggle for recognition by the Filipino and U.S. governments. As a senator, Ruperto Kangleon championed the cause of Filipino veterans in the Philippine Congress, pushing for legislation to better the welfare of those who had fought against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{818} During

\textsuperscript{815} United Press, “Filipinos Attend Marine Academy,” \textit{The Sunday Star News}, Wilmington, N.C., Sunday, August 3, 1947, 14-B.
\textsuperscript{816} “Philippine Legislator Urges Pacific Pact for Aggression ‘Squeeze,’” \textit{The Evening Star}, Friday, April 1, 1949, A-14.
\textsuperscript{817} The Associated Press, “Every Man in Philippine Unit Volunteers to go to Korea,” \textit{The Evening Star}, Friday, August 23, 1950, A-4.
World War II, the U.S. government had authorized the recruitment of Filipinos into the American armed forces, offering the same benefits to those who served as it did to other American veterans. However, with the independence of the Philippines after the war, the U.S. Congress reneged on that offer through a series of rescission acts, resulting in a decades-long fight by Filipino veterans for their benefits to be reinstated.819

Beyond postwar benefits for those serving in the U.S. armed forces, during the war the U.S. government had also offered back pay and benefits to members of recognized guerrilla units. Through 1946, U.S. forces in the Philippines received hundreds of requests for recognition by a number of guerrilla groups. On May 10, 1945, HQ, USAFFE formed a Guerrilla Affairs Section whose primary mission was processing recognized guerrillas and recommending recognition of guerrilla units not already recognized, and its mission continued under various commands until it was deactivated in 1948.820 The process for gaining recognition was often long and tedious, and a large number of those who applied for recognition did not receive it.821

This situation has been partially rectified in recent years. In 2010, one scholar noted “While FVEM [Filipino Veterans Equity Movement] remains unable to persuade Congress to commit to a wholesale overturning of the Rescission Acts, the veterans have

821 Panlilio, The Crucible, xviii.
been successful in securing legislation that increases benefits for Filipino veterans in a piecemeal fashion.\textsuperscript{822} The Republic of the Philippines provides medical care to those veterans of World War II deemed eligible by their army or guerrilla service. In 2000, under U.S. congressional legislation, veterans of the Philippine Commonwealth Army or recognized guerrilla units were authorized to receive health care compensation equal to that of other U.S. veterans if they were “either U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens.”\textsuperscript{823} Legislation signed in 2009 awarded a lump-sum payment of $15,000 to Filipinos who were U.S. citizens and $9,000 to those who were not citizens.\textsuperscript{824} In 2016, the 114\textsuperscript{th} U.S. Congress passed an act awarding a Congressional Gold Medal to Filipino Veterans of World War II, including members of the “Philippine Commonwealth Army, the Philippine Scouts, the Philippine Constabulary, and Recognized Guerrilla units.”\textsuperscript{825} While guerrillas may finally be receiving some public and monetary recognition for their service, in MacArthur’s words, “the vital aids to [Allied] military operations” that the guerrillas provided—intelligence, troops, mobilization of the local population—proved indispensable to the successful liberation of the Philippine archipelago.\textsuperscript{826} Without the guerrillas, liberating the Philippines would


have taken more time and Allied resources, and the fact that the Philippines today is an independent country is perhaps the final tribute to the guerrillas’ success.
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